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Date:   Tue, 17 Jan 2023 14:25:40 -0600
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v6] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support
Content-Language: en-US
To:     Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, bp@alien8.de
Cc:     mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
        seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, michael.roth@amd.com,
        zhi.wang.linux@gmail.com, David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
        stable@kernel.org
References: <20230116091036.72579-1-nikunj@amd.com>
From:   Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
In-Reply-To: <20230116091036.72579-1-nikunj@amd.com>
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On 1/16/23 03:10, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
> The hypervisor can enable various new features (SEV_FEATURES[1:63])
> and start the SNP guest. Some of these features need guest side
> implementation. If any of these features are enabled without guest
> side implementation, the behavior of the SNP guest will be undefined.
> The SNP guest boot may fail in a non-obvious way making it difficult
> to debug.
> 
> Instead of allowing the guest to continue and have it fail randomly
> later, detect this early and fail gracefully.
> 
> SEV_STATUS MSR indicates features which the hypervisor has enabled.
> While booting, SNP guests should ascertain that all the enabled
> features have guest side implementation. In case any feature is not
> implemented in the guest, the guest terminates booting with GHCB
> protocol Non-Automatic Exit(NAE) termination request event[1]. Populate
> SW_EXITINFO2 with mask of unsupported features that the hypervisor
> can easily report to the user.
> 
> More details in AMD64 APM[2] Vol 2: 15.34.10 SEV_STATUS MSR
> 
> [1] https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf
>      4.1.13 Termination Request
> 
> [2] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/40332.pdf
> 
> Fixes: cbd3d4f7c4e5 ("x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support")
> CC: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> CC: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
> CC: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> CC: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> CC: <stable@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

> 
> ---
> 
> Changes:
> v5:
> * Use ghcb_version directly
> * Add helper function - sev_es_ghcb_terminate()
> * Update broken document links
> 
> v4:
> * Update comments and indentation
> * Reuse GHCB MSR Protocol reason set
> * Invalidate ghcb page before using
> * GHCB protocol NAE termination event is available after version 2,
>    verify ghcb version before using the termination event.
> 
> v3:
> * Use GHCB protocol NAE termination event SEV-SNP feature(s)
>    not supported along with SW_EXITINFO2 containing mask of the
>    unsupported features. Need handling of this event on the HV.
> * Add the SNP features check initialize_identity_maps() when the
>    boot GHCB page can be initialized and used.
> * Fixed sphinx warnings in documentation
> 
> v2:
> * Updated Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> * Address review feedback from Boris/Tom
> 
> v1:
> * Dropped _ENABLED from the feature bits
> * Use approprate macro/function names and move closer to the function where
>    it is used.
> * More details added to the commit message and comments
> * Fixed compilation issue
> ---
>   Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 36 +++++++++++++++
>   arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S          |  9 ++++
>   arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h             |  1 +
>   arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c              | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++
>   arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h            | 20 ++++++++
>   arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h             |  6 +++
>   arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c                | 17 +++++++
>   7 files changed, 140 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> index a1940ebe7be5..934310ce7258 100644
> --- a/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> @@ -95,3 +95,39 @@ by supplying mem_encrypt=on on the kernel command line.  However, if BIOS does
>   not enable SME, then Linux will not be able to activate memory encryption, even
>   if configured to do so by default or the mem_encrypt=on command line parameter
>   is specified.
> +
> +Secure Nested Paging (SNP)
> +==========================
> +
> +SEV-SNP introduces new features (SEV_FEATURES[1:63]) which can be enabled
> +by the hypervisor for security enhancements. Some of these features need
> +guest side implementation to function correctly. The below table lists the
> +expected guest behavior with various possible scenarios of guest/hypervisor
> +SNP feature support.
> +
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +| Feature Enabled | Guest needs   | Guest has     | Guest boot       |
> +| by the HV       | implementation| implementation| behaviour        |
> ++=================+===============+===============+==================+
> +|      No         |      No       |      No       |     Boot         |
> +|                 |               |               |                  |
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +|      No         |      Yes      |      No       |     Boot         |
> +|                 |               |               |                  |
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +|      No         |      Yes      |      Yes      |     Boot         |
> +|                 |               |               |                  |
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +|      Yes        |      No       |      No       | Boot with        |
> +|                 |               |               | feature enabled  |
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +|      Yes        |      Yes      |      No       | Graceful boot    |
> +|                 |               |               | failure          |
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +|      Yes        |      Yes      |      Yes      | Boot with        |
> +|                 |               |               | feature enabled  |
> ++-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
> +
> +More details in AMD64 APM[1] Vol 2: 15.34.10 SEV_STATUS MSR
> +
> +[1] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/40332.pdf
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> index a75712991df3..551d583fac9c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> @@ -557,6 +557,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(.Lrelocated)
>   	/* Pass boot_params to initialize_identity_maps() */
>   	movq	(%rsp), %rdi
>   	call	initialize_identity_maps
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> +	/*
> +	 * Now that the required page table mappings are established and a
> +	 * GHCB can be used, check for SNP guest/HV feature compatibility.
> +	 */
> +	call	snp_check_features
> +#endif
> +
>   	popq	%rsi
>   
>   /*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
> index 62208ec04ca4..593415e22614 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
> @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ static inline void console_init(void)
>   
>   #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>   void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp);
> +void snp_check_features(void);
>   void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void);
>   extern bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address);
>   void snp_set_page_private(unsigned long paddr);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> index c93930d5ccbd..e7423da79d33 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> @@ -270,6 +270,57 @@ static void enforce_vmpl0(void)
>   		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_NOT_VMPL0);
>   }
>   
> +/*
> + * SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ is the mask of SNP features that will need
> + * guest side implementation for proper functioning of the guest. If any
> + * of these features are enabled in the hypervisor but are lacking guest
> + * side implementation, the behavior of the guest will be undefined. The
> + * guest could fail in non-obvious way making it difficult to debug.
> + *
> + * As the behavior of reserved feature bits is unknown to be on the
> + * safe side add them to the required features mask.
> + */
> +#define SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ	(MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM |			\
> +				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_REFLECT_VC |		\
> +				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESTRICTED_INJ |		\
> +				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_ALT_INJ |		\
> +				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP |		\
> +				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMPL_SSS |		\
> +				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC |		\
> +				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMGEXIT_PARAM |		\
> +				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROTECTION |	\
> +				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 |		\
> +				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 |		\
> +				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK)
> +
> +/*
> + * SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT is the mask of SNP features that are implemented
> + * by the guest kernel. As and when a new feature is implemented in the
> + * guest kernel, a corresponding bit should be added to the mask.
> + */
> +#define SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT (0)
> +
> +void snp_check_features(void)
> +{
> +	u64 unsupported_features;
> +
> +	if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
> +		return;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Terminate the boot if hypervisor has enabled any feature
> +	 * lacking guest side implementation.
> +	 */
> +	unsupported_features = sev_status & SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ & ~SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT;
> +	if (unsupported_features) {
> +		if (ghcb_version < 2 || (!boot_ghcb && !early_setup_ghcb()))
> +			sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
> +
> +		sev_es_ghcb_terminate(boot_ghcb, SEV_TERM_SET_GEN,
> +				      GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED, unsupported_features);
> +	}
> +}
> +
>   void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>   {
>   	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> index 37ff47552bcb..d3fe82c5d6b6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> @@ -566,6 +566,26 @@
>   #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED	BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED_BIT)
>   #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED	BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED_BIT)
>   
> +/* SNP feature bits enabled by the hypervisor */
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM			BIT_ULL(3)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_REFLECT_VC		BIT_ULL(4)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESTRICTED_INJ		BIT_ULL(5)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_ALT_INJ			BIT_ULL(6)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP		BIT_ULL(7)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_PREVENT_HOST_IBS		BIT_ULL(8)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_BTB_ISOLATION		BIT_ULL(9)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMPL_SSS			BIT_ULL(10)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC		BIT_ULL(11)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMGEXIT_PARAM		BIT_ULL(12)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBS_VIRT			BIT_ULL(14)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROTECTION	BIT_ULL(16)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROTECTION		BIT_ULL(17)
> +
> +/* SNP feature bits reserved for future use. */
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13		BIT_ULL(13)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15		BIT_ULL(15)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK		GENMASK_ULL(63, 18)
> +
>   #define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL	0xc001011f
>   
>   /* AMD Collaborative Processor Performance Control MSRs */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
> index f69c168391aa..80e1df482337 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
> @@ -116,6 +116,12 @@
>   #define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE			1
>   #define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_DESTROY			2
>   #define SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES			0x8000fffd
> +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REQUEST		0x8000fffe
> +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON(reason_set, reason_code)	\
> +	/* SW_EXITINFO1[3:0] */					\
> +	(((((u64)reason_set) & 0xf)) |				\
> +	/* SW_EXITINFO1[11:4] */				\
> +	((((u64)reason_code) & 0xff) << 4))
>   #define SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT		0x8000ffff
>   
>   /* Exit code reserved for hypervisor/software use */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
> index 3a5b0c9c4fcc..d6786c6407a6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
> @@ -164,6 +164,23 @@ static __always_inline void vc_ghcb_invalidate(struct ghcb *ghcb)
>   	__builtin_memset(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, 0, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
>   }
>   
> +static void __noreturn sev_es_ghcb_terminate(struct ghcb *ghcb, unsigned int set,
> +					     unsigned int reason, u64 exit_info_2)
> +{
> +	u64 exit_info_1 = SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON(set, reason);
> +
> +	vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
> +	ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REQUEST);
> +	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, exit_info_1);
> +	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, exit_info_2);
> +
> +	sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa(ghcb));
> +	VMGEXIT();
> +
> +	while (true)
> +		asm volatile("hlt\n" : : : "memory");
> +}
> +
>   static bool vc_decoding_needed(unsigned long exit_code)
>   {
>   	/* Exceptions don't require to decode the instruction */