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Date:   Wed, 18 Jan 2023 08:36:54 +0100
From:   Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
To:     Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc:     Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>, Bryan Tan <bryantan@vmware.com>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
        Israel Rukshin <israelr@nvidia.com>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>,
        Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org, linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
        Max Gurtovoy <mgurtovoy@nvidia.com>, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
        Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
        Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>,
        Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>,
        Selvin Xavier <selvin.xavier@broadcom.com>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
        Vishnu Dasa <vdasa@vmware.com>,
        Yishai Hadas <yishaih@nvidia.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH rdma-next 00/13] Add RDMA inline crypto support
Message-ID: <20230118073654.GC27048@lst.de>
References: <cover.1673873422.git.leon@kernel.org>
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On Mon, Jan 16, 2023 at 03:05:47PM +0200, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> >From Israel,
> 
> The purpose of this patchset is to add support for inline
> encryption/decryption of the data at storage protocols like nvmf over
> RDMA (at a similar way like integrity is used via unique mkey).
> 
> This patchset adds support for plaintext keys. The patches were tested
> on BF-3 HW with fscrypt tool to test this feature, which showed reduce
> in CPU utilization when comparing at 64k or more IO size. The CPU utilization
> was improved by more than 50% comparing to the SW only solution at this case.

One thing that needs to be solved before we can look into this is the
interaction with protection information (or integrity data in Linux
terms).  Currently inline encryption and protection information are
mutally incompatible.