From:   Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
To:     Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc:     Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        darwi@linutronix.de, elena.reshetova@intel.com,
        kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com,
        Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>,
        stable@vger.kernel.org, alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] PCI/MSI: Cache the MSIX table size
In-Reply-To: <86fsc2n8fp.wl-maz@kernel.org>
References: <20230119170633.40944-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
 <20230119170633.40944-2-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
 <Y8z7FPcuDXDBi+1U@unreal> <86fsc2n8fp.wl-maz@kernel.org>
Date:   Tue, 24 Jan 2023 13:59:33 +0200
Message-ID: <87sfg0p2hm.fsf@ubik.fi.intel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Precedence: bulk

Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> writes:

> On Sun, 22 Jan 2023 09:00:04 +0000,
> Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> wrote:
>> 
>> On Thu, Jan 19, 2023 at 07:06:32PM +0200, Alexander Shishkin wrote:
>> > A malicious device can change its MSIX table size between the table
>> > ioremap() and subsequent accesses, resulting in a kernel page fault in
>> > pci_write_msg_msix().
>> > 
>> > To avoid this, cache the table size observed at the moment of table
>> > ioremap() and use the cached value. This, however, does not help drivers
>> > that peek at the PCIE_MSIX_FLAGS register directly.
>> > 
>> > Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
>> > Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
>> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>> > ---
>> >  drivers/pci/msi/api.c | 7 ++++++-
>> >  drivers/pci/msi/msi.c | 2 +-
>> >  include/linux/pci.h   | 1 +
>> >  3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>> 
>> I'm not security expert here, but not sure that this protects from anything.
>> 1. Kernel relies on working and not-malicious HW. There are gazillion ways
>> to cause crashes other than changing MSI-X.
>> 2. Device can report large table size, kernel will cache it and
>> malicious device will reduce it back. It is not handled and will cause
>> to kernel crash too.
>> 
>
> Indeed, this was my exact reaction reading this patch. This only makes
> sure the same (potentially wrong) value is used at all times. So while
> this results in a consistent use, this doesn't give much guarantee.

It guarantees that the MSIX table is big enough to fit all the vectors,
so it should prevent the page faults from out-of-bounds accesses.

> The only way to deal with this is to actually handle the resulting
> fault, similar to what the kernel does when accessing userspace. Not
> sure how possible this is with something like PCIe.

Do you mean replacing MMIO accesses with exception handling accessors?
That seems like a monumental effort. And then we'd have to figure out
how to handle errors in the __pci_write_msi_msg() path.

Preventing page faults from happening in the first place seems like a
more reasonable solution, or what do you think?

Thanks,
--
Alex