Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 22672C05027 for ; Thu, 26 Jan 2023 12:31:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S237201AbjAZMbC (ORCPT ); Thu, 26 Jan 2023 07:31:02 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:49352 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230233AbjAZMbA (ORCPT ); Thu, 26 Jan 2023 07:31:00 -0500 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 337024900B; Thu, 26 Jan 2023 04:31:00 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A8F256171A; Thu, 26 Jan 2023 12:30:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 414D4C433EF; Thu, 26 Jan 2023 12:30:57 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1674736259; bh=vREGzkq+bPL/Z76zAsHlWevTeL+rDpASMNvBRnphyuY=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=FbNtYzGTxfAtX1HH/O/f6F0nhnSDnGlU8hJFQJglyD1N96KI9bOmqPyYG0FYCqF7m /EIS1knBwnhVBQkFwEoaer+G0eVSd5woxF49Nh5jSTnnPpHCXpa8xt094Np9yLx2ED hYCBhQFOgpmSuqi43vPYpc7mhB6TuJGwLwEPJQKHl6ee0N46F9lVJNvCqQdwYmx2hz gQarmSO+7ilgIoQY4a5k9DHCcNEDlw6Ni+yIl6tOgye8JV3/oMJWplqXJafRw5NEHQ nUwPy2p0K+5/6CUdiEfTGQtyfglXEAGTC/YSCRbQSZugSL1yQCL6fkv9mx/P96K+7R eRaJcQCp5Lp0w== Date: Thu, 26 Jan 2023 13:30:53 +0100 From: Alexey Gladkov To: Andrew Morton Cc: LKML , containers@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Alexey Dobriyan , Al Viro , Christian Brauner , Val Cowan Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/6] proc: Add allowlist for procfs files Message-ID: References: <20230125153628.43c12cbe05423fef7d44f0dd@linux-foundation.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20230125153628.43c12cbe05423fef7d44f0dd@linux-foundation.org> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 03:36:28PM -0800, Andrew Morton wrote: > On Wed, 25 Jan 2023 16:28:47 +0100 Alexey Gladkov wrote: > > > The patch expands subset= option. If the proc is mounted with the > > subset=allowlist option, the /proc/allowlist file will appear. This file > > contains the filenames and directories that are allowed for this > > mountpoint. By default, /proc/allowlist contains only its own name. > > Changing the allowlist is possible as long as it is present in the > > allowlist itself. > > > > This allowlist is applied in lookup/readdir so files that will create > > modules after mounting will not be visible. > > > > Compared to the previous patches [1][2], I switched to a special virtual > > file from listing filenames in the mount options. > > > > Changlog doesn't explain why you think Linux needs this feature. The > [2/6] changelog hints that containers might be involved. IOW, please > fully describe the requirement and use-case(s). Ok. I will. Basically, as Christian described, the motivation is to give containerization programs (docker, podman, etc.) a way to control the content in procfs. Now container tools use a list of dangerous files that they hide with overmount. But procfs is not a static filesystem and using a bad list to hide dangerous files can't be the solution. I believe that a container should define a list of files that it considers useful within the container, and not try to hide what it considers unwanted. > Also, please describe why /proc/allowlist is made available via a mount > option, rather than being permanently present. Like subset=pid, this file is needed to change the visibility of files in the procfs mountpoint. > And why add to subset=, instead of a separate mount option. > > Does /proc/allowlist work in subdirectories? Like, permit presence of > /proc/sys/vm/compact_memory? Yes. But /proc/allowlist is limited in size to 128K. > I think the whole thing is misnamed, really. "allowlist" implies > access permissions. Some of the test here uses "visibility" and other > places use "presence", which are better. "presentlist" and > /proc/presentlist might be better. But why not simply /proc/contents? I don't hold on to the name allowlist at all :) present list is perfect for me. The /proc/contents is confusing to me. > Please run these patches through checkpatch and consider the result. Ok. I will. -- Rgrds, legion