Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 048BAC54EED for ; Mon, 30 Jan 2023 15:28:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238194AbjA3P2Z (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 Jan 2023 10:28:25 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:42604 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S238140AbjA3P2U (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 Jan 2023 10:28:20 -0500 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D8664367E4 for ; Mon, 30 Jan 2023 07:28:18 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2540361180 for ; Mon, 30 Jan 2023 15:28:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 403F8C433EF; Mon, 30 Jan 2023 15:28:17 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1675092497; bh=AcZ+6LQcfJ+3FmwU9zsCTeQShF/vTWZBT8hNMdtfOgM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:Date:From; b=t771CfotsgOeet6SsmHZxofnxjF5IgLLG7iA5r5z06iAMCbpJjnIyIG+MOEehuAqJ fk/Oi5NXadt6VvUNOjbA24vloE8vYk8pZ4mSmGiJfygmDZKkoiGsXW3e90hNeREC4d 1TGJYEYi9hori0Slb9aFavWLBEGX2KUtuSG9DhyH5DTqq2AHeBvcBPdKZK9laSIiXW MNaBmm6Ijjuy/RZvasrEfpj1h1WWWN8vkiYUIWqOxpxGESDsNi2DOMnhDEPv8Uhnmi k7kPebQbV1CnYeTTgP+jV3dPzgBJqPGSRfbm017Bvcw0OdKeTESp8JK8/MlqYYDM7E 6stLWoytBxhPQ== From: =?utf-8?B?QmrDtnJuIFTDtnBlbA==?= To: Guo Ren , "liaochang (A)" Cc: palmer@dabbelt.com, paul.walmsley@sifive.com, mhiramat@kernel.org, conor.dooley@microchip.com, penberg@kernel.org, mark.rutland@arm.com, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Guo Ren Subject: Re: [PATCH] riscv: kprobe: Optimize kprobe with accurate atomicity In-Reply-To: References: <20230126161559.1467374-1-guoren@kernel.org> <0abbbdd4-6b85-9659-03ee-97c56a5b77c1@huawei.com> Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2023 16:28:15 +0100 Message-ID: <87r0vc9h4g.fsf@all.your.base.are.belong.to.us> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Guo Ren writes: >> In the serie of RISCV OPTPROBES [1], it patches a long-jump instructions= pair >> AUIPC/JALR in kernel text, so in order to ensure other CPUs does not exe= cute >> in the instructions that will be modified, it is still need to stop othe= r CPUs >> via patch_text API, or you have any better solution to achieve the purpo= se? > - The stop_machine is an expensive way all architectures should > avoid, and you could keep that in your OPTPROBES implementation files > with static functions. > - The stop_machine couldn't work with PREEMPTION, so your > implementation needs to work with !PREEMPTION. ...and stop_machine() with !PREEMPTION is broken as well, when you're replacing multiple instructions (see Mark's post at [1]). The stop_machine() dance might work when you're replacing *one* instruction, not multiple as in the RISC-V case. I'll expand on this in a comment in the OPTPROBES v6 series. >> > static void __kprobes arch_prepare_simulate(struct kprobe *p) >> > @@ -114,16 +120,23 @@ void *alloc_insn_page(void) >> > /* install breakpoint in text */ >> > void __kprobes arch_arm_kprobe(struct kprobe *p) >> > { >> > - if ((p->opcode & __INSN_LENGTH_MASK) =3D=3D __INSN_LENGTH_32) >> > - patch_text(p->addr, __BUG_INSN_32); >> > - else >> > - patch_text(p->addr, __BUG_INSN_16); >> > +#ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_C >> > + u32 opcode =3D __BUG_INSN_16; >> > +#else >> > + u32 opcode =3D __BUG_INSN_32; >> > +#endif >> > + patch_text_nosync(p->addr, &opcode, GET_INSN_LENGTH(opcode)); >> >> Sounds good, but it will leave some RVI instruction truncated in kernel = text, >> i doubt kernel behavior depends on the rest of the truncated instruction= , well, >> it needs more strict testing to prove my concern :) > I do this on purpose, and it doesn't cause any problems. Don't worry; > IFU hw must enforce the fetch sequence, and there is no way to execute > broken instructions even in the speculative execution path. This is stretching reality a bit much. ARMv8, e.g., has a chapter in the Arm ARM [2] Appendix B "Concurrent modification and execution of instructions" (CMODX). *Some* instructions can be replaced concurrently, and others cannot without caution. Assuming that that all RISC-V implementations can, is a stretch. RISC-V hasn't even specified the behavior of CMODX (which is problematic). If anything it would be more likely that the existing "stop_machine()-to-replace-with-ebreak" works (again, replacing one instruction does not have the !PREEMPTION issues). Then again, no spec, so mostly guessing from my side. :-( Oh, but the existing "ebreak replace" might be broken like [3]. Bj=C3=B6rn [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/Y7%2F6AtX5X0+5qF6Y@FVFF77S0Q05N/ [2] https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0487/latest [3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20230126170607.1489141-2-guoren@ker= nel.org/