Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 15864C38142 for ; Tue, 31 Jan 2023 16:00:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233525AbjAaQAp (ORCPT ); Tue, 31 Jan 2023 11:00:45 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:38598 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233520AbjAaQAm (ORCPT ); Tue, 31 Jan 2023 11:00:42 -0500 Received: from mail.8bytes.org (mail.8bytes.org [85.214.250.239]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7064C4FC16; Tue, 31 Jan 2023 08:00:37 -0800 (PST) Received: from 8bytes.org (p5b006afb.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [91.0.106.251]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange ECDHE (P-256) server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mail.8bytes.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B4843221B65; Tue, 31 Jan 2023 17:00:35 +0100 (CET) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=8bytes.org; s=default; t=1675180835; bh=f8+N+QlIuIQFbhMVMQyAXaOrIIwv00xABJZc2RkJ2pk=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=mamH11c5t/CDNFa7C/309AitR/ZII/C1ASm+L+zIQ5yioW7LS94mESPbYva6hDl5a 1X0xVrEqDQKbBzmJAIG7ThhVi+nVt1bjZef4vJGuptnci+GxuTadkp3Zck1N/bWdI6 MDVUt66wZuXxW1vrFGnLwUIGzdzaw9dKllA2um4Eu4HOVsNyeEZlKv/azsh/9Vw7Vr npsf78xoXc4Y35IRY8OilVkX1R5+ATdTZfT1JlUWvAh8OV93lC2erD0k6oJ/WC5zvO Q9PR7X4/HnuQfnPcAS37a269TM0zKKVRVT+6Hfm+of8TIAjk3rjZEJ+a6sswXl78w+ bFhruJwgylOiA== Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2023 17:00:29 +0100 From: Joerg Roedel To: Sean Christopherson Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" , Alexey Kardashevskiy , Peter Zijlstra , kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Jiri Kosina , Ingo Molnar , Dave Hansen , Borislav Petkov , Tom Lendacky Subject: Re: [Question PATCH kernel] x86/amd/sev/nmi+vc: Fix stack handling (why is this happening?) Message-ID: References: <20230127035616.508966-1-aik@amd.com> <3bb3e080-caee-8bc8-7de9-f44969f16e75@amd.com> <38C572D7-E637-48C2-A57A-E62D44FF19BB@zytor.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Jan 31, 2023 at 03:53:39PM +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote: > I don't think that is technically true. A _well-behaved_ hypervisor will not > intercept DR0-DR6 accesses for SEV-ES guests, but AFAICT nothing in the SEV-ES > architecture enforces that behavior. Not from the hardware architecture side, but the GHCB spec does not list NAE events for DR0-DR6 accesses, so a guest is not required to handle them in the VC handler. Linux under SEV-ES will crash if the HV intercepts debug registers, except DR7. Regards, Joerg