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Peter Anvin" , kvm@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V2 5/8] kvm: x86/mmu: Move the code out of FNAME(sync_page)'s loop body into mmu.c Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2023 23:57:31 +0800 Message-Id: <20230207155735.2845-6-jiangshanlai@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1.6.gb485710b In-Reply-To: <20230207155735.2845-1-jiangshanlai@gmail.com> References: <20230207155735.2845-1-jiangshanlai@gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Lai Jiangshan Rename mmu->sync_page to mmu->sync_spte and move the code out of FNAME(sync_page)'s loop body into mmu.c. No functionalities change intended. Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan --- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 4 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 64 +++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 139 +++++++++++--------------------- 3 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 101 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 81429a5640d6..6c64ebfbd778 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -441,8 +441,8 @@ struct kvm_mmu { gpa_t (*gva_to_gpa)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu, gpa_t gva_or_gpa, u64 access, struct x86_exception *exception); - int (*sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, - struct kvm_mmu_page *sp); + int (*sync_spte)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, int i); void (*invlpg)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, hpa_t root_hpa); struct kvm_mmu_root_info root; union kvm_cpu_role cpu_role; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c index e30ca652f6ff..c271d0a1ed54 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c @@ -1908,10 +1908,62 @@ static bool sp_has_gptes(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp) &(_kvm)->arch.mmu_page_hash[kvm_page_table_hashfn(_gfn)]) \ if ((_sp)->gfn != (_gfn) || !sp_has_gptes(_sp)) {} else +static int __kvm_sync_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp) +{ + union kvm_mmu_page_role root_role = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role; + bool flush = false; + int i; + + /* + * Ignore various flags when verifying that it's safe to sync a shadow + * page using the current MMU context. + * + * - level: not part of the overall MMU role and will never match as the MMU's + * level tracks the root level + * - access: updated based on the new guest PTE + * - quadrant: not part of the overall MMU role (similar to level) + */ + const union kvm_mmu_page_role sync_role_ign = { + .level = 0xf, + .access = 0x7, + .quadrant = 0x3, + .passthrough = 0x1, + }; + + /* + * Direct pages can never be unsync, and KVM should never attempt to + * sync a shadow page for a different MMU context, e.g. if the role + * differs then the memslot lookup (SMM vs. non-SMM) will be bogus, the + * reserved bits checks will be wrong, etc... + */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->role.direct || + (sp->role.word ^ root_role.word) & ~sync_role_ign.word)) + return -1; + + for (i = 0; i < SPTE_ENT_PER_PAGE; i++) { + int ret = vcpu->arch.mmu->sync_spte(vcpu, sp, i); + + if (ret < -1) + return -1; + flush |= ret; + } + + /* + * Note, any flush is purely for KVM's correctness, e.g. when dropping + * an existing SPTE or clearing W/A/D bits to ensure an mmu_notifier + * unmap or dirty logging event doesn't fail to flush. The guest is + * responsible for flushing the TLB to ensure any changes in protection + * bits are recognized, i.e. until the guest flushes or page faults on + * a relevant address, KVM is architecturally allowed to let vCPUs use + * cached translations with the old protection bits. + */ + return flush; +} + static int kvm_sync_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, struct list_head *invalid_list) { - int ret = vcpu->arch.mmu->sync_page(vcpu, sp); + int ret = __kvm_sync_page(vcpu, sp); if (ret < 0) kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(vcpu->kvm, sp, invalid_list); @@ -4463,7 +4515,7 @@ static void nonpaging_init_context(struct kvm_mmu *context) { context->page_fault = nonpaging_page_fault; context->gva_to_gpa = nonpaging_gva_to_gpa; - context->sync_page = NULL; + context->sync_spte = NULL; context->invlpg = NULL; } @@ -5054,7 +5106,7 @@ static void paging64_init_context(struct kvm_mmu *context) { context->page_fault = paging64_page_fault; context->gva_to_gpa = paging64_gva_to_gpa; - context->sync_page = paging64_sync_page; + context->sync_spte = paging64_sync_spte; context->invlpg = paging64_invlpg; } @@ -5062,7 +5114,7 @@ static void paging32_init_context(struct kvm_mmu *context) { context->page_fault = paging32_page_fault; context->gva_to_gpa = paging32_gva_to_gpa; - context->sync_page = paging32_sync_page; + context->sync_spte = paging32_sync_spte; context->invlpg = paging32_invlpg; } @@ -5151,7 +5203,7 @@ static void init_kvm_tdp_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, context->cpu_role.as_u64 = cpu_role.as_u64; context->root_role.word = root_role.word; context->page_fault = kvm_tdp_page_fault; - context->sync_page = NULL; + context->sync_spte = NULL; context->invlpg = NULL; context->get_guest_pgd = get_cr3; context->get_pdptr = kvm_pdptr_read; @@ -5283,7 +5335,7 @@ void kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool execonly, context->page_fault = ept_page_fault; context->gva_to_gpa = ept_gva_to_gpa; - context->sync_page = ept_sync_page; + context->sync_spte = ept_sync_spte; context->invlpg = ept_invlpg; update_permission_bitmask(context, true); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h index 57f0b75c80f9..5ab9e974fdac 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h @@ -977,114 +977,67 @@ static gpa_t FNAME(gva_to_gpa)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu, * can't change unless all sptes pointing to it are nuked first. * * Returns - * < 0: the sp should be zapped - * 0: the sp is synced and no tlb flushing is required - * > 0: the sp is synced and tlb flushing is required + * < 0: failed to sync spte + * 0: the spte is synced and no tlb flushing is required + * > 0: the spte is synced and tlb flushing is required */ -static int FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp) +static int FNAME(sync_spte)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, int i) { - union kvm_mmu_page_role root_role = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role; - int i; bool host_writable; gpa_t first_pte_gpa; - bool flush = false; - - /* - * Ignore various flags when verifying that it's safe to sync a shadow - * page using the current MMU context. - * - * - level: not part of the overall MMU role and will never match as the MMU's - * level tracks the root level - * - access: updated based on the new guest PTE - * - quadrant: not part of the overall MMU role (similar to level) - */ - const union kvm_mmu_page_role sync_role_ign = { - .level = 0xf, - .access = 0x7, - .quadrant = 0x3, - .passthrough = 0x1, - }; + u64 *sptep, spte; + struct kvm_memory_slot *slot; + unsigned pte_access; + pt_element_t gpte; + gpa_t pte_gpa; + gfn_t gfn; - /* - * Direct pages can never be unsync, and KVM should never attempt to - * sync a shadow page for a different MMU context, e.g. if the role - * differs then the memslot lookup (SMM vs. non-SMM) will be bogus, the - * reserved bits checks will be wrong, etc... - */ - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->role.direct || - (sp->role.word ^ root_role.word) & ~sync_role_ign.word)) - return -1; + if (!sp->spt[i]) + return 0; first_pte_gpa = FNAME(get_level1_sp_gpa)(sp); + pte_gpa = first_pte_gpa + i * sizeof(pt_element_t); - for (i = 0; i < SPTE_ENT_PER_PAGE; i++) { - u64 *sptep, spte; - struct kvm_memory_slot *slot; - unsigned pte_access; - pt_element_t gpte; - gpa_t pte_gpa; - gfn_t gfn; - - if (!sp->spt[i]) - continue; - - pte_gpa = first_pte_gpa + i * sizeof(pt_element_t); - - if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest_atomic(vcpu, pte_gpa, &gpte, - sizeof(pt_element_t))) - return -1; - - if (FNAME(prefetch_invalid_gpte)(vcpu, sp, &sp->spt[i], gpte)) { - flush = true; - continue; - } + if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest_atomic(vcpu, pte_gpa, &gpte, + sizeof(pt_element_t))) + return -1; - gfn = gpte_to_gfn(gpte); - pte_access = sp->role.access; - pte_access &= FNAME(gpte_access)(gpte); - FNAME(protect_clean_gpte)(vcpu->arch.mmu, &pte_access, gpte); + if (FNAME(prefetch_invalid_gpte)(vcpu, sp, &sp->spt[i], gpte)) + return 1; - if (sync_mmio_spte(vcpu, &sp->spt[i], gfn, pte_access)) - continue; + gfn = gpte_to_gfn(gpte); + pte_access = sp->role.access; + pte_access &= FNAME(gpte_access)(gpte); + FNAME(protect_clean_gpte)(vcpu->arch.mmu, &pte_access, gpte); - /* - * Drop the SPTE if the new protections would result in a RWX=0 - * SPTE or if the gfn is changing. The RWX=0 case only affects - * EPT with execute-only support, i.e. EPT without an effective - * "present" bit, as all other paging modes will create a - * read-only SPTE if pte_access is zero. - */ - if ((!pte_access && !shadow_present_mask) || - gfn != kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(sp, i)) { - drop_spte(vcpu->kvm, &sp->spt[i]); - flush = true; - continue; - } + if (sync_mmio_spte(vcpu, &sp->spt[i], gfn, pte_access)) + return 0; - /* Update the shadowed access bits in case they changed. */ - kvm_mmu_page_set_access(sp, i, pte_access); + /* + * Drop the SPTE if the new protections would result in a RWX=0 + * SPTE or if the gfn is changing. The RWX=0 case only affects + * EPT with execute-only support, i.e. EPT without an effective + * "present" bit, as all other paging modes will create a + * read-only SPTE if pte_access is zero. + */ + if ((!pte_access && !shadow_present_mask) || + gfn != kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(sp, i)) { + drop_spte(vcpu->kvm, &sp->spt[i]); + return 1; + } - sptep = &sp->spt[i]; - spte = *sptep; - host_writable = spte & shadow_host_writable_mask; - slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gfn); - make_spte(vcpu, sp, slot, pte_access, gfn, - spte_to_pfn(spte), spte, true, false, - host_writable, &spte); + /* Update the shadowed access bits in case they changed. */ + kvm_mmu_page_set_access(sp, i, pte_access); - flush |= mmu_spte_update(sptep, spte); - } + sptep = &sp->spt[i]; + spte = *sptep; + host_writable = spte & shadow_host_writable_mask; + slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gfn); + make_spte(vcpu, sp, slot, pte_access, gfn, + spte_to_pfn(spte), spte, true, false, + host_writable, &spte); - /* - * Note, any flush is purely for KVM's correctness, e.g. when dropping - * an existing SPTE or clearing W/A/D bits to ensure an mmu_notifier - * unmap or dirty logging event doesn't fail to flush. The guest is - * responsible for flushing the TLB to ensure any changes in protection - * bits are recognized, i.e. until the guest flushes or page faults on - * a relevant address, KVM is architecturally allowed to let vCPUs use - * cached translations with the old protection bits. - */ - return flush; + return mmu_spte_update(sptep, spte); } #undef pt_element_t -- 2.19.1.6.gb485710b