Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2E938C636D3 for ; Tue, 7 Feb 2023 17:15:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230286AbjBGRPK (ORCPT ); Tue, 7 Feb 2023 12:15:10 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:50608 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232249AbjBGROu (ORCPT ); Tue, 7 Feb 2023 12:14:50 -0500 Received: from mail-pg1-x54a.google.com (mail-pg1-x54a.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::54a]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3E4428698 for ; Tue, 7 Feb 2023 09:14:00 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-pg1-x54a.google.com with SMTP id h126-20020a636c84000000b004d31ad79086so7082420pgc.23 for ; Tue, 07 Feb 2023 09:14:00 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20210112; h=cc:to:from:subject:mime-version:message-id:date:from:to:cc:subject :date:message-id:reply-to; bh=gaqlkUHlROHo1Iu/mvu/VhOVerpPZOfXGd0nbt/7zs8=; b=aFSF+mDkwXMPhNXoGe9Q/j26WS0JRqyy750UYsBMIHe2uxsn5RTNKfWiXtceSvhxa5 jtE+wKy5v7XDg0HNBzSH2kcs5k0RPiVdlmiHEigKt+L/Dx/GRZ95cfV/8haSHCcm6e/6 OybLUuEDpssvqVROntd3VOoMTRGRn3FgHA9N+aXExjoJwgShq1wHpm1S9S4NV9pWuTKE i5zm3mZuh6Ca6I6q+iuYH0CnU3MAA2KomIjb8tuhX7oH1H7M0Apn3rrYCm++euStY1AV PNE0SoqrGOrbbcoQEfj7ugB8nDtisZYJRPB0h5jKDccuxm6DHEpGAQlJRqPlDIfjEJLR nlSA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=cc:to:from:subject:mime-version:message-id:date:x-gm-message-state :from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=gaqlkUHlROHo1Iu/mvu/VhOVerpPZOfXGd0nbt/7zs8=; b=JcKRtAF23reVy3BSyvgibVPmyon0S46qXBwM0V8oR4U8MLHukalEY5GazhjzuZ7SSp Tg7NBtQV3vuV82SJYlZwlzrohMqjARUqtUReQKIRSruaT8lA0HlTaBPQDXJ9C1cD5QS2 S9pOXZk48oBSbQc4b0xUhlFpno6wTrXvnmN7uIfHwDw0bZdGQUsLnaezqcsofOBn00zP zqaqnNuX9P2Be3NU4vGabfrJE5kFumu6l2HzC1G7ytgm1hvUD4Itx3RaJmvCY3c5ENHI Js9iti97vmobhHQc+PPYIkN/YOv8vfRJh/t5ORZAgK7sbuPN0pEenM8vqaYZVz+IhKBX jvqw== X-Gm-Message-State: AO0yUKVNSsKaP/MIqvU/lrRhOJir9Amdj1QoUPj/wJpXnFy3gHFIDNCC IC0g9xoMB2Syc5Jiz20etr6VfPFdCYs= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AK7set+er4Uv/iKukfLeR1lCffkTft0lTR8HoB29ISgFrwHdoSYSqGHr9L2MtrFudzW2cCM4F0rt08AXC9k= X-Received: from pgonda1.kir.corp.google.com ([2620:0:1008:11:346e:6fd8:c3bf:b38f]) (user=pgonda job=sendgmr) by 2002:a17:902:a3ce:b0:196:3672:f24b with SMTP id q14-20020a170902a3ce00b001963672f24bmr868930plb.32.1675790039532; Tue, 07 Feb 2023 09:13:59 -0800 (PST) Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2023 09:13:54 -0800 Message-Id: <20230207171354.4012821-1-pgonda@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.1.519.gcb327c4b5f-goog Subject: [PATCH V2] KVM: sev: Fix potential overflow send|recieve_update_data From: Peter Gonda To: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Peter Gonda , Andy Nguyen , Thomas Lendacky , David Rientjes , Paolo Bonzini , Sean Christopherson , stable@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA and KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA have an integer overflow issue. Params.guest_len and offset are both 32bite wide, with a large params.guest_len the check to confirm a page boundary is not crossed can falsely pass: /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary * offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE)) Add an additional check to this conditional to confirm that params.guest_len itself is not greater than PAGE_SIZE. The current code is can only overflow with a params.guest_len of greater than 0xfffff000. And the FW spec says these commands fail with lengths greater than 16KB. So this issue should not be a security concern Fixes: 15fb7de1a7f5 ("KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command") Fixes: d3d1af85e2c7 ("KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command") Reported-by: Andy Nguyen Suggested-by: Thomas Lendacky Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Sean Christopherson Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org --- V2 * Updated conditional based on feedback from Tom. --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 273cba809328..3d74facaead8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -1294,7 +1294,7 @@ static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */ offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); - if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE)) + if (params.guest_len > PAGE_SIZE || (params.guest_len + offset) > PAGE_SIZE) return -EINVAL; /* Pin guest memory */ @@ -1474,7 +1474,7 @@ static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */ offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); - if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE)) + if (params.guest_len > PAGE_SIZE || (params.guest_len + offset) > PAGE_SIZE) return -EINVAL; hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len); -- 2.39.1.519.gcb327c4b5f-goog