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Date:   Thu, 9 Feb 2023 16:43:21 +0100
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Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC)
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To:     Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc:     concord@gentoo.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Christian Heimes <christian@python.org>,
        Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
        Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>,
        Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
        =?UTF-8?Q?Philippe_Tr=c3=a9buchet?= 
        <philippe.trebuchet@ssi.gouv.fr>,
        Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Steve Dower <steve.dower@python.org>,
        Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@ssi.gouv.fr>,
        Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@ssi.gouv.fr>,
        linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
        Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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On 08/02/2023 20:32, Kees Cook wrote:
> *thread necromancy*
> 
> On Tue, Apr 05, 2022 at 06:09:03PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>
>> On 05/04/2022 01:26, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>>> On Mon, Apr 4, 2022 at 3:25 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>>
>> [...]
>>
>>>
>>>> I think this already exists as AT_EACCESS? It was added with
>>>> faccessat2() itself, if I'm reading the history correctly.
>>>
>>> Yeah, I noticed myself, I just hadn't looked (and I don't do enough
>>> user-space programming to be aware of if that way).
>>
>> I think AT_EACCESS should be usable with the new EXECVE_OK too.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>>>       (a) "what about suid bits that user space cannot react to"
>>>>
>>>> What do you mean here? Do you mean setid bits on the file itself?
>>>
>>> Right.
>>>
>>> Maybe we don't care.
>>
>> I think we don't. I think the only corner case that could be different is
>> for files that are executable, SUID and non-readable. In this case it
>> wouldn't matter because userspace could not read the file, which is required
>> for interpretation/execution. Anyway, S[GU]ID bits in scripts are just
>> ignored by execve and we want to follow the same semantic.
> 
> Hi Mickaël,
> 
> Is there a new version of this being worked on? It would be really nice
> to have the O_MAYEXEC/faccessat2() visibility for script execution control
> in userspace. It seems like it would be mainly a respin of an earlier
> version of this series before trusted_for() was proposed.

Yes, I plan to send a new version in a few weeks.

> 
> -Kees
>