Message-ID: <4463b0ae-edcd-eb91-9ef3-a3596a98616f@amd.com>
Date:   Thu, 16 Feb 2023 16:09:29 +0530
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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH kernel 1/2] perf/x86/amd: Add
 amd_prevent_hostibs_window() to set per-cpu ibs_flags
To:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, acme@kernel.org,
        jolsa@kernel.org, namhyung@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
        bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, seanjc@google.com,
        pbonzini@redhat.com, jpoimboe@kernel.org,
        pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com, babu.moger@amd.com,
        sandipan.das@amd.com, jmattson@google.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
        nikunj@amd.com, ravi.bangoria@amd.com, eranian@google.com,
        irogers@google.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
        linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org
References: <20230206060545.628502-1-manali.shukla@amd.com>
 <20230206060545.628502-2-manali.shukla@amd.com>
 <Y+o23lcYHbYWua62@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
From:   "Shukla, Manali" <mashukla@amd.com>
In-Reply-To: <Y+o23lcYHbYWua62@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
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On 2/13/2023 6:40 PM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 06, 2023 at 06:05:44AM +0000, Manali Shukla wrote:
>> Add a function to set per-cpu ibs_flags based on an active or inactive
>> PreventHostIBS window.
>>
>> MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHCTL[IbsFetchEn] and MSR_AMD64_IBSOPCTL[IbsOpEn] bits
>> need to be cleared for PreventHostIBS feature to be enabled before VMRUN
>> is executed.
>>
>> ENABLE bit and VALID bit for MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHCTL are contained in the
>> same MSR and same is the case with MSR_AMD64_IBSOPCTL.
>>
>> Consider the following scenario:
>> - The IBS MSR which has ENABLE bit set and VALID bit clear is read.
>> - During the process of clearing the ENABLE bit and writing the IBS MSR
>>   to disable IBS, an IBS event can occur that sets the VALID bit.
>> - The write operation on IBS MSR can clear the newly set VALID bit.
>> - Since this situation is occurring in the CLGI/STGI window
>>   (PreventHostIBS window), the actual NMI is not taken.
>> - Once VMRUN is issued, it will exit with VMEXIT_NMI. As soon as STGI is
>>   executed, the pending NMI will trigger.
>> - The IBS NMI handler checks for the VALID bit to determine if the NMI
>>   is generated because of IBS.
>> - Since VALID bit is now clear, it doesn't recognize that an IBS event
>>   is occurred. Due to this reason, the dazed and confused unknown NMI
>>   messages are generated.
>>
>> amd_prevent_hostibs_window() is added to avoid these messages when
>> PreventHostIBS window is active and PreventHostIBS feature is enabled
>> for the guest.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Manali Shukla <manali.shukla@amd.com>
> 
> URGH... so am I reading this right that this is a sodding terrible
> software implementation of perf_event_attr::exclude_guest ?

Not exactly. 
Unlike exclude_guest where profiler decides whether it wants to trace
guest data or not, PreventHostIBS gives control to the Guest. Secured 
guests(SEV-ES/SEV-SNP) can disallow the use of IBS by the hypervisor,
in order to limit the information which can be gathered by host from
its execution.

-Manali