From:   "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
To:     Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc:     Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
References: <20230215131807.293556-1-omosnace@redhat.com>
        <20230215124747.6f8df3c4675517eacf1e9a39@linux-foundation.org>
Date:   Thu, 16 Feb 2023 10:07:53 -0600
In-Reply-To: <20230215124747.6f8df3c4675517eacf1e9a39@linux-foundation.org>
        (Andrew Morton's message of "Wed, 15 Feb 2023 12:47:47 -0800")
Message-ID: <87a61d7fvq.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org>
User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/27.1 (gnu/linux)
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Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel/sys.c: fix and improve control flow in
 __sys_setres[ug]id()
Precedence: bulk

Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> writes:

> On Wed, 15 Feb 2023 14:18:07 +0100 Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> wrote:
>
>> 1. First determine if CAP_SET[UG]ID is required and only then call
>>    ns_capable_setid(), to avoid bogus LSM (SELinux) denials.
>
> Can we please have more details on the selinux failures?  Under what
> circumstances?  What is the end-user impact?

It is puzzling the structure with having the capability check first
dates to 2.1.104 (when a hand coded test for root was replaced
with capable(CAP_SETID).  Which means the basic structure and logic
of the code is even older than that.

Eric