Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F21CFC636D4 for ; Fri, 17 Feb 2023 07:27:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229715AbjBQH1O (ORCPT ); Fri, 17 Feb 2023 02:27:14 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:44002 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229687AbjBQH1K (ORCPT ); Fri, 17 Feb 2023 02:27:10 -0500 Received: from loongson.cn (mail.loongson.cn [114.242.206.163]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8C2BE5DE33 for ; Thu, 16 Feb 2023 23:26:50 -0800 (PST) Received: from loongson.cn (unknown [113.200.148.30]) by gateway (Coremail) with SMTP id _____8Bxutk4LO9jWa4BAA--.3784S3; Fri, 17 Feb 2023 15:26:48 +0800 (CST) Received: from bogon.localdomain (unknown [113.200.148.30]) by localhost.localdomain (Coremail) with SMTP id AQAAf8Cxf+QmLO9jiSQ1AA--.63745S7; Fri, 17 Feb 2023 15:26:48 +0800 (CST) From: Youling Tang To: Huacai Chen , Xi Ruoyao , Jinyang He Cc: Xuerui Wang , loongarch@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v5 5/5] LoongArch: Add support for kernel address space layout randomization (KASLR) Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2023 15:26:29 +0800 Message-Id: <1676618789-20485-6-git-send-email-tangyouling@loongson.cn> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.1.0 In-Reply-To: <1676618789-20485-1-git-send-email-tangyouling@loongson.cn> References: <1676618789-20485-1-git-send-email-tangyouling@loongson.cn> X-CM-TRANSID: AQAAf8Cxf+QmLO9jiSQ1AA--.63745S7 X-CM-SenderInfo: 5wdqw5prxox03j6o00pqjv00gofq/ X-Coremail-Antispam: 1Uk129KBjvJXoW3XFyxJr1kJryrtFWkJrWfAFb_yoW3Wr4xpF Wakw45tr47GF17GrsrX34kury5Aws7W343WFsrKryrua17tF1rXa4kur9rXFy8trW0gr4a qFy5ta1a9w4UAaDanT9S1TB71UUUUU7qnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUj1kv1TuYvTs0mT0YCTnIWj qI5I8CrVACY4xI64kE6c02F40Ex7xfYxn0WfASr-VFAUDa7-sFnT9fnUUIcSsGvfJTRUUU b2xYFVCjjxCrM7AC8VAFwI0_Jr0_Gr1l1xkIjI8I6I8E6xAIw20EY4v20xvaj40_Wr0E3s 1l1IIY67AEw4v_Jrv_JF1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0rcxSw2x7M28EF7xv wVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW5JVW7JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxVW8JVWxJwA2z4 x0Y4vEx4A2jsIE14v26r4UJVWxJr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E14v26r4UJVWxJr1l e2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqjxCEc2xF0cIa020Ex4CE44I27wAqx4xG64xvF2 IEw4CE5I8CrVC2j2WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jw0_WrylYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26F4j6r4U JwAm72CE4IkC6x0Yz7v_Jr0_Gr1lF7xvr2IYc2Ij64vIr41l42xK82IYc2Ij64vIr41l4I 8I3I0E4IkC6x0Yz7v_Jr0_Gr1lx2IqxVAqx4xG67AKxVWUJVWUGwC20s026x8GjcxK67AK xVWUGVWUWwC2zVAF1VAY17CE14v26r126r1DMIIYrxkI7VAKI48JMIIF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcV AFwI0_Xr0_Ar1lIxAIcVC0I7IYx2IY6xkF7I0E14v26r4j6F4UMIIF0xvE42xK8VAvwI8I cIk0rVWUJVWUCwCI42IY6I8E87Iv67AKxVW8JVWxJwCI42IY6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E14v26r 4j6r4UJbIYCTnIWIevJa73UjIFyTuYvjxU7eT5DUUUU Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org This patch adds support for relocating the kernel to a random address. Entropy is derived from the banner, which will change every build and random_get_entropy() which should provide additional runtime entropy. The kernel is relocated by up to RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET bytes from its link address. Because relocation happens so early in the kernel boot, the amount of physical memory has not yet been determined. This means the only way to limit relocation within the available memory is via Kconfig. Limit the maximum value of RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET to 256M(0x10000000) because our memory layout has many holes. Signed-off-by: Youling Tang Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao # Fix compiler warnings --- arch/loongarch/Kconfig | 23 +++++ arch/loongarch/kernel/head.S | 14 ++- arch/loongarch/kernel/relocate.c | 142 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 175 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig index 406a28758a52..ab4c2ab146ab 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig @@ -530,6 +530,29 @@ config RELOCATABLE kernel binary at runtime to a different virtual address than the address it was linked at. +config RANDOMIZE_BASE + bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image (KASLR)" + depends on RELOCATABLE + help + Randomizes the physical and virtual address at which the + kernel image is loaded, as a security feature that + deters exploit attempts relying on knowledge of the location + of kernel internals. + + The kernel will be offset by up to RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET. + + If unsure, say N. + +config RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET + hex "Maximum KASLR offset" if EXPERT + depends on RANDOMIZE_BASE + range 0x0 0x10000000 if 64BIT + default "0x01000000" + help + When KASLR is active, this provides the maximum offset that will + be applied to the kernel image. + + config SECCOMP bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode" depends on PROC_FS diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/head.S b/arch/loongarch/kernel/head.S index 499edc80d8ab..b12f459ad73a 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/head.S +++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/head.S @@ -87,10 +87,22 @@ SYM_CODE_START(kernel_entry) # kernel entry point set_saved_sp sp, t0, t1 #ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE + bl do_kaslr + + /* Repoint the sp into the new kernel image */ + PTR_LI sp, (_THREAD_SIZE - PT_SIZE) + PTR_ADD sp, sp, tp + set_saved_sp sp, t0, t1 + + /* do_kaslr returns the new kernel image entry point */ + jr a0 + ASM_BUG() +#else /* Apply the relocations */ bl relocate_kernel #endif - +#endif bl start_kernel ASM_BUG() diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/relocate.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/relocate.c index 6f31753be1da..acdac7380e4a 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/relocate.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/relocate.c @@ -9,11 +9,15 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include +#include #include #include #include #define RELOCATED(x) ((void *)((long)x + reloc_offset)) +#define RELOCATED_KASLR(x) ((void *)((long)x + offset)) static unsigned long reloc_offset; @@ -38,13 +42,13 @@ static inline __init void relocate_relative(void) } } -static inline void __init relocate_la_abs(void) +static inline void __init relocate_la_abs(long offset) { struct rela_la_abs *p; for (p = (void *)&__la_abs_begin; (void *)p < (void *)&__la_abs_end; p++) { long v = p->symvalue + reloc_offset; - union loongarch_instruction *insn = (void *)p - p->offset; + union loongarch_instruction *insn = (void *)p - p->offset + offset; u32 lu12iw, ori, lu32id, lu52id; lu12iw = (v >> 12) & 0xfffff; @@ -59,6 +63,138 @@ static inline void __init relocate_la_abs(void) } } +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE +static inline __init unsigned long rotate_xor(unsigned long hash, + const void *area, size_t size) +{ + size_t i; + unsigned long *ptr = (unsigned long *)area; + + for (i = 0; i < size / sizeof(hash); i++) { + /* Rotate by odd number of bits and XOR. */ + hash = (hash << ((sizeof(hash) * 8) - 7)) | (hash >> 7); + hash ^= ptr[i]; + } + + return hash; +} + +static inline __init unsigned long get_random_boot(void) +{ + unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(); + unsigned long hash = 0; + + /* Attempt to create a simple but unpredictable starting entropy. */ + hash = rotate_xor(hash, linux_banner, strlen(linux_banner)); + + /* Add in any runtime entropy we can get */ + hash = rotate_xor(hash, &entropy, sizeof(entropy)); + + return hash; +} + +static inline __init bool kaslr_disabled(void) +{ + char *str; + + str = strstr(boot_command_line, "nokaslr"); + if (str == boot_command_line || (str > boot_command_line && *(str - 1) == ' ')) + return true; + + return false; +} + +/* Choose a new address for the kernel */ +static inline void __init *determine_relocation_address(void) +{ + unsigned long kernel_length; + void *dest = _text; + unsigned long offset; + + if (kaslr_disabled()) + return dest; + + kernel_length = (long)_end - (long)_text; + + offset = get_random_boot() << 16; + offset &= (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET - 1); + if (offset < kernel_length) + offset += ALIGN(kernel_length, 0xffff); + + return RELOCATED_KASLR(dest); +} + +static inline int __init relocation_addr_valid(void *loc_new) +{ + if ((unsigned long)loc_new & 0x00000ffff) { + /* Inappropriately aligned new location */ + return 0; + } + if ((unsigned long)loc_new < (unsigned long)_end) { + /* New location overlaps original kernel */ + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static inline void __init update_reloc_offset(unsigned long *addr, long offset) +{ + unsigned long *new_addr = (unsigned long *)RELOCATED_KASLR(addr); + + *new_addr = (unsigned long)offset; +} + +void *__init do_kaslr(void) +{ + void *loc_new; + unsigned long kernel_length; + long offset = 0; + /* Default to original kernel entry point */ + void *kernel_entry = start_kernel; + char *cmdline = early_ioremap(fw_arg1, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE); + + /* Boot command line was passed in fw_arg1 */ + strscpy(boot_command_line, cmdline, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE); + + kernel_length = (long)(_end) - (long)(_text); + + loc_new = determine_relocation_address(); + + /* Sanity check relocation address */ + if (relocation_addr_valid(loc_new)) + offset = (unsigned long)loc_new - (unsigned long)(_text); + + reloc_offset = (unsigned long)_text - VMLINUX_LOAD_ADDRESS; + + if (offset) { + /* Copy the kernel to it's new location */ + memcpy(loc_new, _text, kernel_length); + + /* Sync the caches ready for execution of new kernel */ + __asm__ __volatile__ ( + "ibar 0 \t\n" + "dbar 0 \t\n"); + + reloc_offset += offset; + + /* The current thread is now within the relocated image */ + __current_thread_info = RELOCATED_KASLR(__current_thread_info); + + /* Return the new kernel's entry point */ + kernel_entry = RELOCATED_KASLR(start_kernel); + + update_reloc_offset(&reloc_offset, offset); + } + + if (reloc_offset) + relocate_relative(); + + relocate_la_abs(offset); + + return kernel_entry; +} +#endif + void __init relocate_kernel(void) { reloc_offset = (unsigned long)_text - VMLINUX_LOAD_ADDRESS; @@ -66,7 +202,7 @@ void __init relocate_kernel(void) if (reloc_offset) relocate_relative(); - relocate_la_abs(); + relocate_la_abs(0); } /* -- 2.37.3