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References: <20230215131807.293556-1-omosnace@redhat.com> <20230215124747.6f8df3c4675517eacf1e9a39@linux-foundation.org>
In-Reply-To: <20230215124747.6f8df3c4675517eacf1e9a39@linux-foundation.org>
From:   Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Date:   Fri, 17 Feb 2023 17:14:05 +0100
Message-ID: <CAFqZXNsP8zrQ=trMqLE09T5P-poeDPAVLj_YkTc1NpEDn4c_Sw@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel/sys.c: fix and improve control flow in __sys_setres[ug]id()
To:     Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc:     "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
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On Wed, Feb 15, 2023 at 9:47 PM Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Wed, 15 Feb 2023 14:18:07 +0100 Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> > 1. First determine if CAP_SET[UG]ID is required and only then call
> >    ns_capable_setid(), to avoid bogus LSM (SELinux) denials.
>
> Can we please have more details on the selinux failures?  Under what
> circumstances?  What is the end-user impact?
>
> Because a fix for "bogus LSM (SELinux) denials" sounds like something
> which should be backported into earlier kernels, but there simply isn't
> sufficient information here for others to decide on this.

Fair point. I will send a v2 with a more detailed explanation.

-- 
Ondrej Mosnacek
Senior Software Engineer, Linux Security - SELinux kernel
Red Hat, Inc.