Date:   Mon, 20 Feb 2023 04:13:50 -0800
From:   Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
To:     KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, pjt@google.com, evn@google.com,
        tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
        dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
        peterz@infradead.org, pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com,
        kim.phillips@amd.com, alexandre.chartre@oracle.com,
        daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com,
        =?utf-8?B?Sm9zw6k=?= Oliveira <joseloliveira11@gmail.com>,
        Rodrigo Branco <rodrigo@kernelhacking.com>,
        Alexandra Sandulescu <aesa@google.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2
 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
Message-ID: <20230220121350.aidsipw3kd4rsyss@treble>
References: <20230220120127.1975241-1-kpsingh@kernel.org>
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In-Reply-To: <20230220120127.1975241-1-kpsingh@kernel.org>
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On Mon, Feb 20, 2023 at 01:01:27PM +0100, KP Singh wrote:
> +static inline bool spectre_v2_user_no_stibp(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
> +{
> +	/* When IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, STIBP is not needed.
> +	 *
> +	 * However, With KERNEL_IBRS, the IBRS bit is cleared on return
> +	 * to user and the user-mode code needs to be able to enable protection
> +	 * from cross-thread training, either by always enabling STIBP or
> +	 * by enabling it via prctl.
> +	 */
> +	return (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode) &&
> +		!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS));
> +}

The comments and code confused me, they both seem to imply some
distinction between IBRS and KERNEL_IBRS, but in the kernel those are
functionally the same thing.  e.g., the kernel doesn't have a user IBRS
mode.

And, unless I'm missing some subtlety here, it seems to be a convoluted
way of saying that eIBRS doesn't need STIBP in user space.

It would be simpler to just call it spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode().

static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
{
	return mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
	       mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
	       mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
}

And then spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode() could be changed to call that:

static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
{
	return spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode) || mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
}

> @@ -1496,6 +1504,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
>  		break;
>  
>  	case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
> +		pr_err("enabling KERNEL_IBRS");

Why?

> @@ -2327,7 +2336,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
>  
>  static char *stibp_state(void)
>  {
> -	if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
> +	if (spectre_v2_user_no_stibp(spectre_v2_enabled))
>  		return "";

This seems like old cruft, can we just remove this check altogether?  In
the eIBRS case, spectre_v2_user_stibp will already have its default of
SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE.

-- 
Josh