Received-SPF: Pass (protection.outlook.com: domain of amd.com designates
 165.204.84.17 as permitted sender) receiver=protection.outlook.com;
 client-ip=165.204.84.17; helo=SATLEXMB04.amd.com; pr=C
From:   Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To:     <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>
CC:     Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
        "Larry Dewey" <larry.dewey@amd.com>
Subject: [RESEND PATCH] virt/sev-guest: Return -EIO if certificate buffer is not large enough
Date:   Wed, 22 Feb 2023 10:39:39 -0600
Message-ID: <2afbcae6daf13f7ad5a4296692e0a0fe1bc1e4ee.1677083979.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Content-Type: text/plain
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalArrivalTime: 22 Feb 2023 16:39:45.9511
 (UTC)
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: be801534-93a4-4a5f-e663-08db14f36825
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: 3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalAttributedTenantConnectingIp: TenantId=3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d;Ip=[165.204.84.17];Helo=[SATLEXMB04.amd.com]
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthSource: BN8NAM11FT114.eop-nam11.prod.protection.outlook.com
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthAs: Anonymous
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-FromEntityHeader: HybridOnPrem
X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: DS0PR12MB6559
Precedence: bulk
List-ID: <linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org>
X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org

Commit 47894e0fa6a5 ("virt/sev-guest: Prevent IV reuse in the SNP guest
driver") changed the behavior associated with the return value when the
caller does not supply a large enough certificate buffer. Prior to the
commit a return value of -EIO was returned. Now a return value of 0 is
returned. This breaks the established ABI with the user.

Change the code to detect the buffer size error and return -EIO.

Fixes: 47894e0fa6a5 ("virt/sev-guest: Prevent IV reuse in the SNP guest driver")
Reported-by: Larry Dewey <larry.dewey@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
index 4ec4174e05a3..7b4e9009f335 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
@@ -377,9 +377,26 @@ static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, in
 		snp_dev->input.data_npages = certs_npages;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Increment the message sequence number. There is no harm in doing
+	 * this now because decryption uses the value stored in the response
+	 * structure and any failure will wipe the VMPCK, preventing further
+	 * use anyway.
+	 */
+	snp_inc_msg_seqno(snp_dev);
+
 	if (fw_err)
 		*fw_err = err;
 
+	/*
+	 * If an extended guest request was issued and the supplied certificate
+	 * buffer was not large enough, a standard guest request was issued to
+	 * prevent IV reuse. If the standard request was successful, return -EIO
+	 * back to the caller as would have originally been returned.
+	 */
+	if (!rc && err == SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN)
+		return -EIO;
+
 	if (rc) {
 		dev_alert(snp_dev->dev,
 			  "Detected error from ASP request. rc: %d, fw_err: %llu\n",
@@ -395,9 +412,6 @@ static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, in
 		goto disable_vmpck;
 	}
 
-	/* Increment to new message sequence after payload decryption was successful. */
-	snp_inc_msg_seqno(snp_dev);
-
 	return 0;
 
 disable_vmpck:
-- 
2.39.1