Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 47B48C7EE23 for ; Fri, 24 Feb 2023 22:17:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229723AbjBXWRt (ORCPT ); Fri, 24 Feb 2023 17:17:49 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57880 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229713AbjBXWRo (ORCPT ); Fri, 24 Feb 2023 17:17:44 -0500 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3BFE06C1B6; Fri, 24 Feb 2023 14:17:43 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BCD4C61984; Fri, 24 Feb 2023 22:17:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 90471C433D2; Fri, 24 Feb 2023 22:17:41 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1677277062; bh=7lRSlQmVLHZZ0EJH5h6DpbLhkxYWUyaYvb0f4M6ASdg=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=RMGtiAkqLeK+zHUbpS8ZH5f5DVC2VrukS27Y8Psml6ahFfxamfIQPoWMDOzxaXwEg TJjzdKTHlCYSNWuwlBfptuGBdt45iMd5jNHTQg/bGh1o4F69Ai2DYkpGTXp9VxPlm5 5VPCZFV/hYXLROz2iJDa9cbfxydETUKpsfCE6jQhfLmYbroxfzNKFQ89FGyFMdIIAi BeujsGkeyYRXaLb60jNOzllPyls6YZKWqEuGTkkN/8LOao8/ydoDY9P5fxYVkbaBla IeYEBkZZYQxfJmq+3LLKCC/SoFvOW+PCbs9Cgeuq9QKsbqEJkWrViPAifhtEW8EzaL 1OjFXHskqzQfQ== Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2023 14:17:40 -0800 From: Jakub Kicinski To: Sabrina Dubroca Cc: Hangyu Hua , Florian Westphal , borisp@nvidia.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com, davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com, pabeni@redhat.com, davejwatson@fb.com, aviadye@mellanox.com, ilyal@mellanox.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: tls: fix possible race condition between do_tls_getsockopt_conf() and do_tls_setsockopt_conf() Message-ID: <20230224141740.63d5e503@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: References: <20230224105811.27467-1-hbh25y@gmail.com> <20230224120606.GI26596@breakpoint.cc> <20230224105508.4892901f@kernel.org> <20230224130625.6b5261b4@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, 24 Feb 2023 22:48:57 +0100 Sabrina Dubroca wrote: > 2023-02-24, 13:06:25 -0800, Jakub Kicinski wrote: > > On Fri, 24 Feb 2023 21:22:43 +0100 Sabrina Dubroca wrote: > [...] > > > > > > I suggested a change of locking in do_tls_getsockopt_conf this > > > morning [1]. The issue reported last seemed valid, but this patch is not > > > at all what I had in mind. > > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/Y/ht6gQL+u6fj3dG@hog/ > > > > Ack, I read the messages out of order, sorry. > > > > > do_tls_setsockopt_conf fills crypto_info immediately from what > > > userspace gives us (and clears it on exit in case of failure), which > > > getsockopt could see since it's not locking the socket when it checks > > > TLS_CRYPTO_INFO_READY. So getsockopt would progress up to the point it > > > finally locks the socket, but if setsockopt failed, we could have > > > cleared TLS_CRYPTO_INFO_READY and freed iv/rec_seq. > > > > Makes sense. We should just take the socket lock around all of > > do_tls_getsockopt(), then? > > That would make things simple and consistent. My idea was just taking > the existing lock_sock in do_tls_getsockopt_conf out of the switch and > put it just above TLS_CRYPTO_INFO_READY. > > While we're at it, should we move the > > ctx->prot_info.version != TLS_1_3_VERSION > > check in do_tls_setsockopt_no_pad under lock_sock? Yes, or READ_ONCE(), same for do_tls_getsockopt_tx_zc() and its access on ctx->zerocopy_sendfile. > I don't think that > can do anything wrong (we'd have to get past this check just before a > failing setsockopt clears crypto_info, and even then we're just > reading a bit from the context), it just looks a bit strange. Or just > lock the socket around all of do_tls_setsockopt_no_pad, like the other > options we have. The delayed locking feels like a premature optimization, we'll keep having such issues with new options. Hence my vote to lock all of do_tls_getsockopt().