Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 58995C7EE2E for ; Mon, 27 Feb 2023 08:25:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230417AbjB0IY4 (ORCPT ); Mon, 27 Feb 2023 03:24:56 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54838 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230183AbjB0IYM (ORCPT ); Mon, 27 Feb 2023 03:24:12 -0500 Received: from mga18.intel.com (mga18.intel.com [134.134.136.126]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7C6481B544; Mon, 27 Feb 2023 00:24:09 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1677486249; x=1709022249; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=nTv/U+mUm95QtF7oZPCtVaqb4pkWJ9aAmF3abQXYvnY=; b=YIZBcyurFQ8fQphawGHYBUlg/cT0zZybj5ejyURmPCrebprgbEwAJBJ2 6QdGnWnFWAn1c/0Rx7FMi3dtiXaW64dlQG+yyc6x/OS0rpz40fDUzEvWe Enzht5raZt7JvrRNvQUxkH/J71E32i90f5If7monMnfENmp+d+n7moPzr FLWv6b/CycfTPd4nyNcTWp0dPSyuw8OgnZ4VS3VoPZ/j3rAkkJqrESX06 WdGXNzFBzpDZj9AGrNVmR4+P+vZwwopf6PXTEH32XjjgjeVixzmvOQ9PZ qb+41O9Uj5ZjdqMIg3LWrQ4gVFIQUrCKjD2VtdSPivTL78pKrgKB5yUNs w==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6500,9779,10633"; a="317608710" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.97,331,1669104000"; d="scan'208";a="317608710" Received: from fmsmga002.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.26]) by orsmga106.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 27 Feb 2023 00:24:03 -0800 X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6500,9779,10633"; a="783242050" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.97,331,1669104000"; d="scan'208";a="783242050" Received: from ls.sc.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([143.183.96.54]) by fmsmga002-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 27 Feb 2023 00:24:03 -0800 From: isaku.yamahata@intel.com To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: isaku.yamahata@intel.com, isaku.yamahata@gmail.com, Paolo Bonzini , erdemaktas@google.com, Sean Christopherson , Sagi Shahar , David Matlack , Kai Huang , Zhi Wang , Sean Christopherson Subject: [PATCH v12 013/106] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2023 00:22:12 -0800 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Isaku Yamahata As the first step to create TDX guest, create/destroy VM struct. Assign TDX private Host Key ID (HKID) to the TDX guest for memory encryption and allocate extra pages for the TDX guest. On destruction, free allocated pages, and HKID. Before tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some resources of the guest TD to be destroyed (i.e. HKID must have been reclaimed, etc). Add flush_shadow_all_private callback before tearing down private page tables for it. Add vm_free() of kvm_x86_ops hook at the end of kvm_arch_destroy_vm() because some per-VM TDX resources, e.g. TDR, need to be freed after other TDX resources, e.g. HKID, were freed. Co-developed-by: Kai Huang Signed-off-by: Kai Huang Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata --- Changes v11 -> v12: - use cpu_feature_enabled(). Changes v10 -> v11: - Fix doule free in tdx_vm_free() by setting NULL. - replace struct tdx_td_page tdr and tdcs from struct kvm_tdx with unsigned long --- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 34 ++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 440 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 6 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 9 + arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 + 7 files changed, 496 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h index 7522c193f2b4..c30d2d2ad686 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h @@ -24,7 +24,9 @@ KVM_X86_OP(is_vm_type_supported) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(max_vcpus); KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_enable_cap) KVM_X86_OP(vm_init) +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(flush_shadow_all_private) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_destroy) +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_free) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_precreate) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_create) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_free) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index bc9ecba514a9..f4e82ee3d668 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -1551,7 +1551,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops { unsigned int vm_size; int (*vm_enable_cap)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap); int (*vm_init)(struct kvm *kvm); + void (*flush_shadow_all_private)(struct kvm *kvm); void (*vm_destroy)(struct kvm *kvm); + void (*vm_free)(struct kvm *kvm); /* Create, but do not attach this VCPU */ int (*vcpu_precreate)(struct kvm *kvm); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c index a090c029efd5..cdc73c09bf0b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c @@ -49,14 +49,40 @@ static int vt_vm_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap) return -EINVAL; } +static void vt_hardware_unsetup(void) +{ + tdx_hardware_unsetup(); + vmx_hardware_unsetup(); +} + static int vt_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) { if (is_td(kvm)) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* Not ready to create guest TD yet. */ + return tdx_vm_init(kvm); return vmx_vm_init(kvm); } +static void vt_flush_shadow_all_private(struct kvm *kvm) +{ + if (is_td(kvm)) + tdx_mmu_release_hkid(kvm); +} + +static void vt_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) +{ + if (is_td(kvm)) + return; + + vmx_vm_destroy(kvm); +} + +static void vt_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm) +{ + if (is_td(kvm)) + tdx_vm_free(kvm); +} + static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { if (!is_td(kvm)) @@ -81,7 +107,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compat, - .hardware_unsetup = vmx_hardware_unsetup, + .hardware_unsetup = vt_hardware_unsetup, .hardware_enable = vmx_hardware_enable, .hardware_disable = vmx_hardware_disable, @@ -92,7 +118,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx), .vm_enable_cap = vt_vm_enable_cap, .vm_init = vt_vm_init, - .vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy, + .flush_shadow_all_private = vt_flush_shadow_all_private, + .vm_destroy = vt_vm_destroy, + .vm_free = vt_vm_free, .vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate, .vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c index 16e207168dc1..928eb47e7379 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include "capabilities.h" #include "x86_ops.h" #include "tdx.h" +#include "tdx_ops.h" #include "x86.h" #undef pr_fmt @@ -46,6 +47,271 @@ int tdx_vm_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap) return r; } +struct tdx_info { + u8 nr_tdcs_pages; +}; + +/* Info about the TDX module. */ +static struct tdx_info tdx_info; + +/* + * Some TDX SEAMCALLs (TDH.MNG.CREATE, TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB, + * TDH.MNG.KEY.RECLAIMID, TDH.MNG.KEY.FREEID etc) tries to acquire a global lock + * internally in TDX module. If failed, TDX_OPERAND_BUSY is returned without + * spinning or waiting due to a constraint on execution time. It's caller's + * responsibility to avoid race (or retry on TDX_OPERAND_BUSY). Use this mutex + * to avoid race in TDX module because the kernel knows better about scheduling. + */ +static DEFINE_MUTEX(tdx_lock); +static struct mutex *tdx_mng_key_config_lock; + +static __always_inline hpa_t set_hkid_to_hpa(hpa_t pa, u16 hkid) +{ + return pa | ((hpa_t)hkid << boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits); +} + +static inline bool is_td_created(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx) +{ + return kvm_tdx->tdr_pa; +} + +static inline void tdx_hkid_free(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx) +{ + tdx_guest_keyid_free(kvm_tdx->hkid); + kvm_tdx->hkid = 0; +} + +static inline bool is_hkid_assigned(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx) +{ + return kvm_tdx->hkid > 0; +} + +static void tdx_clear_page(unsigned long page_pa) +{ + const void *zero_page = (const void *) __va(page_to_phys(ZERO_PAGE(0))); + void *page = __va(page_pa); + unsigned long i; + + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B)) { + clear_page(page); + return; + } + + /* + * Zeroing the page is only necessary for systems with MKTME-i: + * when re-assign one page from old keyid to a new keyid, MOVDIR64B is + * required to clear/write the page with new keyid to prevent integrity + * error when read on the page with new keyid. + * + * clflush doesn't flush cache with HKID set. + * The cache line could be poisoned (even without MKTME-i), clear the + * poison bit. + */ + for (i = 0; i < PAGE_SIZE; i += 64) + movdir64b(page + i, zero_page); + /* + * MOVDIR64B store uses WC buffer. Prevent following memory reads + * from seeing potentially poisoned cache. + */ + __mb(); +} + +static int tdx_reclaim_page(hpa_t pa, bool do_wb, u16 hkid) +{ + struct tdx_module_output out; + u64 err; + + do { + err = tdh_phymem_page_reclaim(pa, &out); + /* + * TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.RECLAIM is allowed only when TD is shutdown. + * state. i.e. destructing TD. + * TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.RECLAIM requires TDR and target page. + * Because we're destructing TD, it's rare to contend with TDR. + */ + } while (err == (TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_RCX)); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) { + pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM, err, &out); + return -EIO; + } + + if (do_wb) { + /* + * Only TDR page gets into this path. No contention is expected + * because of the last page of TD. + */ + err = tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd(set_hkid_to_hpa(pa, hkid)); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) { + pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, err, NULL); + return -EIO; + } + } + + tdx_clear_page(pa); + return 0; +} + +static void tdx_reclaim_td_page(unsigned long td_page_pa) +{ + if (!td_page_pa) + return; + /* + * TDCX are being reclaimed. TDX module maps TDCX with HKID + * assigned to the TD. Here the cache associated to the TD + * was already flushed by TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB before here, So + * cache doesn't need to be flushed again. + */ + if (tdx_reclaim_page(td_page_pa, false, 0)) + /* + * Leak the page on failure: + * tdx_reclaim_page() returns an error if and only if there's an + * unexpected, fatal error, e.g. a SEAMCALL with bad params, + * incorrect concurrency in KVM, a TDX Module bug, etc. + * Retrying at a later point is highly unlikely to be + * successful. + * No log here as tdx_reclaim_page() already did. + */ + return; + free_page((unsigned long)__va(td_page_pa)); +} + +static int tdx_do_tdh_phymem_cache_wb(void *param) +{ + u64 err = 0; + + do { + err = tdh_phymem_cache_wb(!!err); + } while (err == TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE); + + /* Other thread may have done for us. */ + if (err == TDX_NO_HKID_READY_TO_WBCACHE) + err = TDX_SUCCESS; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) { + pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_CACHE_WB, err, NULL); + return -EIO; + } + + return 0; +} + +void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm) +{ + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm); + cpumask_var_t packages; + bool cpumask_allocated; + u64 err; + int ret; + int i; + + if (!is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx)) + return; + + if (!is_td_created(kvm_tdx)) + goto free_hkid; + + cpumask_allocated = zalloc_cpumask_var(&packages, GFP_KERNEL); + cpus_read_lock(); + for_each_online_cpu(i) { + if (cpumask_allocated && + cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i), + packages)) + continue; + + /* + * We can destroy multiple the guest TDs simultaneously. + * Prevent tdh_phymem_cache_wb from returning TDX_BUSY by + * serialization. + */ + mutex_lock(&tdx_lock); + ret = smp_call_on_cpu(i, tdx_do_tdh_phymem_cache_wb, NULL, 1); + mutex_unlock(&tdx_lock); + if (ret) + break; + } + cpus_read_unlock(); + free_cpumask_var(packages); + + mutex_lock(&tdx_lock); + err = tdh_mng_key_freeid(kvm_tdx->tdr_pa); + mutex_unlock(&tdx_lock); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) { + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_KEY_FREEID, err, NULL); + pr_err("tdh_mng_key_freeid failed. HKID %d is leaked.\n", + kvm_tdx->hkid); + return; + } + +free_hkid: + tdx_hkid_free(kvm_tdx); +} + +void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm) +{ + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm); + int i; + + /* Can't reclaim or free TD pages if teardown failed. */ + if (is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx)) + return; + + if (kvm_tdx->tdcs_pa) { + for (i = 0; i < tdx_info.nr_tdcs_pages; i++) + tdx_reclaim_td_page(kvm_tdx->tdcs_pa[i]); + kfree(kvm_tdx->tdcs_pa); + kvm_tdx->tdcs_pa = NULL; + } + + if (!kvm_tdx->tdr_pa) + return; + /* + * TDX module maps TDR with TDX global HKID. TDX module may access TDR + * while operating on TD (Especially reclaiming TDCS). Cache flush with + * TDX global HKID is needed. + */ + if (tdx_reclaim_page(kvm_tdx->tdr_pa, true, tdx_global_keyid)) + return; + + free_page((unsigned long)__va(kvm_tdx->tdr_pa)); + kvm_tdx->tdr_pa = 0; +} + +static int tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config(void *param) +{ + hpa_t *tdr_p = param; + u64 err; + + do { + err = tdh_mng_key_config(*tdr_p); + + /* + * If it failed to generate a random key, retry it because this + * is typically caused by an entropy error of the CPU's random + * number generator. + */ + } while (err == TDX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILED); + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) { + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_KEY_CONFIG, err, NULL); + return -EIO; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int __tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm); + +int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) +{ + /* + * TDX has its own limit of the number of vcpus in addition to + * KVM_MAX_VCPUS. + */ + kvm->max_vcpus = min(kvm->max_vcpus, TDX_MAX_VCPUS); + + /* Place holder for TDX specific logic. */ + return __tdx_td_init(kvm); +} + int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp) { struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps; @@ -97,6 +363,160 @@ int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp) return 0; } +static int __tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm) +{ + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm); + cpumask_var_t packages; + unsigned long *tdcs_pa = NULL; + unsigned long tdr_pa = 0; + unsigned long va; + int ret, i; + u64 err; + + ret = tdx_guest_keyid_alloc(); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + kvm_tdx->hkid = ret; + + va = __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!va) + goto free_hkid; + tdr_pa = __pa(va); + + tdcs_pa = kcalloc(tdx_info.nr_tdcs_pages, sizeof(*kvm_tdx->tdcs_pa), + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO); + if (!tdcs_pa) + goto free_tdr; + for (i = 0; i < tdx_info.nr_tdcs_pages; i++) { + va = __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!va) + goto free_tdcs; + tdcs_pa[i] = __pa(va); + } + + if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&packages, GFP_KERNEL)) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto free_tdcs; + } + cpus_read_lock(); + /* + * Need at least one CPU of the package to be online in order to + * program all packages for host key id. Check it. + */ + for_each_present_cpu(i) + cpumask_set_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i), packages); + for_each_online_cpu(i) + cpumask_clear_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i), packages); + if (!cpumask_empty(packages)) { + ret = -EIO; + /* + * Because it's hard for human operator to figure out the + * reason, warn it. + */ + pr_warn("All packages need to have online CPU to create TD. Online CPU and retry.\n"); + goto free_packages; + } + + /* + * Acquire global lock to avoid TDX_OPERAND_BUSY: + * TDH.MNG.CREATE and other APIs try to lock the global Key Owner + * Table (KOT) to track the assigned TDX private HKID. It doesn't spin + * to acquire the lock, returns TDX_OPERAND_BUSY instead, and let the + * caller to handle the contention. This is because of time limitation + * usable inside the TDX module and OS/VMM knows better about process + * scheduling. + * + * APIs to acquire the lock of KOT: + * TDH.MNG.CREATE, TDH.MNG.KEY.FREEID, TDH.MNG.VPFLUSHDONE, and + * TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB. + */ + mutex_lock(&tdx_lock); + err = tdh_mng_create(tdr_pa, kvm_tdx->hkid); + mutex_unlock(&tdx_lock); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) { + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_CREATE, err, NULL); + ret = -EIO; + goto free_packages; + } + kvm_tdx->tdr_pa = tdr_pa; + + for_each_online_cpu(i) { + int pkg = topology_physical_package_id(i); + + if (cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(pkg, packages)) + continue; + + /* + * Program the memory controller in the package with an + * encryption key associated to a TDX private host key id + * assigned to this TDR. Concurrent operations on same memory + * controller results in TDX_OPERAND_BUSY. Avoid this race by + * mutex. + */ + mutex_lock(&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[pkg]); + ret = smp_call_on_cpu(i, tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config, + &kvm_tdx->tdr_pa, true); + mutex_unlock(&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[pkg]); + if (ret) + break; + } + cpus_read_unlock(); + free_cpumask_var(packages); + if (ret) + goto teardown; + + kvm_tdx->tdcs_pa = tdcs_pa; + for (i = 0; i < tdx_info.nr_tdcs_pages; i++) { + err = tdh_mng_addcx(kvm_tdx->tdr_pa, tdcs_pa[i]); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) { + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_ADDCX, err, NULL); + for (i++; i < tdx_info.nr_tdcs_pages; i++) { + free_page((unsigned long)__va(tdcs_pa[i])); + tdcs_pa[i] = 0; + } + ret = -EIO; + goto teardown; + } + } + + /* + * Note, TDH_MNG_INIT cannot be invoked here. TDH_MNG_INIT requires a dedicated + * ioctl() to define the configure CPUID values for the TD. + */ + return 0; + + /* + * The sequence for freeing resources from a partially initialized TD + * varies based on where in the initialization flow failure occurred. + * Simply use the full teardown and destroy, which naturally play nice + * with partial initialization. + */ +teardown: + tdx_mmu_release_hkid(kvm); + tdx_vm_free(kvm); + return ret; + +free_packages: + cpus_read_unlock(); + free_cpumask_var(packages); +free_tdcs: + for (i = 0; i < tdx_info.nr_tdcs_pages; i++) { + if (tdcs_pa[i]) + free_page((unsigned long)__va(tdcs_pa[i])); + } + kfree(tdcs_pa); + kvm_tdx->tdcs_pa = NULL; + +free_tdr: + if (tdr_pa) + free_page((unsigned long)__va(tdr_pa)); + kvm_tdx->tdr_pa = 0; +free_hkid: + if (is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx)) + tdx_hkid_free(kvm_tdx); + return ret; +} + int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_tdx_cmd tdx_cmd; @@ -137,9 +557,11 @@ static int __init tdx_module_setup(void) return ret; } - /* Sanitary check just in case. */ tdsysinfo = tdx_get_sysinfo(); WARN_ON(tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config > TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS); + tdx_info = (struct tdx_info) { + .nr_tdcs_pages = tdsysinfo->tdcs_base_size / PAGE_SIZE, + }; pr_info("TDX is supported.\n"); return 0; @@ -153,6 +575,8 @@ bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { + int max_pkgs; + int i; int r; if (!enable_ept) { @@ -160,6 +584,14 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) return -EINVAL; } + max_pkgs = topology_max_packages(); + tdx_mng_key_config_lock = kcalloc(max_pkgs, sizeof(*tdx_mng_key_config_lock), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tdx_mng_key_config_lock) + return -ENOMEM; + for (i = 0; i < max_pkgs; i++) + mutex_init(&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[i]); + /* TDX requires VMX. */ r = vmxon_all(); if (!r) @@ -168,3 +600,9 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) return r; } + +void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void) +{ + /* kfree accepts NULL. */ + kfree(tdx_mng_key_config_lock); +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h index 3860aa351bd9..4b790503e43e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h @@ -8,7 +8,11 @@ struct kvm_tdx { struct kvm kvm; - /* TDX specific members follow. */ + + unsigned long tdr_pa; + unsigned long *tdcs_pa; + + int hkid; }; struct vcpu_tdx { diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h index 71f7dc9ca118..e497a5347329 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h @@ -139,17 +139,26 @@ void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops); +void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void); bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type); int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp); int tdx_vm_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap); +int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm); +void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm); +void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm); int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp); #else static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return -ENOSYS; } +static inline void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void) {} static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) { return false; } static inline int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }; static inline int tdx_vm_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap) { return -EINVAL; }; +static inline int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } +static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm) {} +static inline void tdx_flush_shadow_all_private(struct kvm *kvm) {} +static inline void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm) {} static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 318e36535aa6..b2dd5670f552 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -12356,6 +12356,7 @@ void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm) kvm_page_track_cleanup(kvm); kvm_xen_destroy_vm(kvm); kvm_hv_destroy_vm(kvm); + static_call_cond(kvm_x86_vm_free)(kvm); } static void memslot_rmap_free(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) @@ -12670,6 +12671,13 @@ void kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all(struct kvm *kvm) { + /* + * kvm_mmu_zap_all() zaps both private and shared page tables. Before + * tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some TD resources to + * be destroyed (i.e. keyID must have been reclaimed, etc). Invoke + * kvm_x86_flush_shadow_all_private() for this. + */ + static_call_cond(kvm_x86_flush_shadow_all_private)(kvm); kvm_mmu_zap_all(kvm); } -- 2.25.1