Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1760405AbXILWET (ORCPT ); Wed, 12 Sep 2007 18:04:19 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1754762AbXILWEL (ORCPT ); Wed, 12 Sep 2007 18:04:11 -0400 Received: from cantor2.suse.de ([195.135.220.15]:43179 "EHLO mx2.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755108AbXILWEK (ORCPT ); Wed, 12 Sep 2007 18:04:10 -0400 From: Andreas Schwab To: Brent Casavant Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: O_NOLINK for open() References: <20070912144128.D5573@pkunk.americas.sgi.com> X-Yow: I'm having an emotional outburst!! Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2007 23:42:37 +0200 In-Reply-To: <20070912144128.D5573@pkunk.americas.sgi.com> (Brent Casavant's message of "Wed\, 12 Sep 2007 15\:37\:44 -0500 \(CDT\)") Message-ID: User-Agent: Gnus/5.110006 (No Gnus v0.6) Emacs/22.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 966 Lines: 23 Brent Casavant writes: > I could mmap a temporary tmpfs file (tmpfs so that if there is a > machine crash no sensitive data persists) which is created with > permissions of 0, immediately unlink it, and pass the file > descriptor through an AF_UNIX socket. This does open up a very > small window of vulnerability if another process is able to chmod > the file and open it before the unlink. Only the owner can chmod a file, so why is that a vulnerability? Andreas. -- Andreas Schwab, SuSE Labs, schwab@suse.de SuSE Linux Products GmbH, Maxfeldstra?e 5, 90409 N?rnberg, Germany PGP key fingerprint = 58CA 54C7 6D53 942B 1756 01D3 44D5 214B 8276 4ED5 "And now for something completely different." - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/