Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CD078C6FD1E for ; Mon, 6 Mar 2023 09:22:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229948AbjCFJWj (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Mar 2023 04:22:39 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:59736 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229842AbjCFJWh (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Mar 2023 04:22:37 -0500 Received: from frasgout12.his.huawei.com (frasgout12.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.154]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E4050BDFA; Mon, 6 Mar 2023 01:22:33 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.229]) by frasgout12.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4PVXtQ5ygTz9xGWJ; Mon, 6 Mar 2023 17:13:18 +0800 (CST) Received: from roberto-ThinkStation-P620 (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP2 (Coremail) with SMTP id GxC2BwD3xl22sAVkoGh0AQ--.34080S2; Mon, 06 Mar 2023 10:22:10 +0100 (CET) Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH 26/28] evm: Move to LSM infrastructure From: Roberto Sassu To: Casey Schaufler , viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org, brauner@kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stefanb@linux.ibm.com, Roberto Sassu Date: Mon, 06 Mar 2023 10:21:56 +0100 In-Reply-To: <688527a9-c164-581e-ae60-f82bd8ccccad@schaufler-ca.com> References: <20230303181842.1087717-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> <20230303182602.1088032-4-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> <688527a9-c164-581e-ae60-f82bd8ccccad@schaufler-ca.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" User-Agent: Evolution 3.36.5-0ubuntu1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-CM-TRANSID: GxC2BwD3xl22sAVkoGh0AQ--.34080S2 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvAXoWfuF48Gryktr13WFy8GFy7trb_yoW8trW8Ao WIqwn7tFWkWr13A3y5G3W7KFZFgayrG3y5Aas5A39ru3W2yw1jk34akFy3JF45XF1rGrW7 K3s2q34j9FWUXwn5n29KB7ZKAUJUUUUU529EdanIXcx71UUUUU7v73VFW2AGmfu7bjvjm3 AaLaJ3UjIYCTnIWjp_UUUYj7kC6x804xWl14x267AKxVW5JVWrJwAFc2x0x2IEx4CE42xK 8VAvwI8IcIk0rVWrJVCq3wAFIxvE14AKwVWUJVWUGwA2ocxC64kIII0Yj41l84x0c7CEw4 AK67xGY2AK021l84ACjcxK6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r1j6r1xM28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY6xkF 7I0E14v26r4j6F4UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I 0E14v26r4j6r4UJwAS0I0E0xvYzxvE52x082IY62kv0487Mc02F40EFcxC0VAKzVAqx4xG 6I80ewAv7VC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUGVWUXwAv7VC2z280aVAFwI0_Jr0_Gr1lOx8S6xCaFV Cjc4AY6r1j6r4UM4x0Y48IcVAKI48JM4IIrI8v6xkF7I0E8cxan2IY04v7MxAIw28IcxkI 7VAKI48JMxC20s026xCaFVCjc4AY6r1j6r4UMI8I3I0E5I8CrVAFwI0_Jr0_Jr4lx2IqxV Cjr7xvwVAFwI0_JrI_JrWlx4CE17CEb7AF67AKxVW8ZVWrXwCIc40Y0x0EwIxGrwCI42IY 6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r1j6r1xMIIF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxVW8JVWxJwCI42IY6x AIw20EY4v20xvaj40_Wr1j6rW3Jr1lIxAIcVC2z280aVAFwI0_Jr0_Gr1lIxAIcVC2z280 aVCY1x0267AKxVW8JVW8JrUvcSsGvfC2KfnxnUUI43ZEXa7IUbG2NtUUUUU== X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAgAIBF1jj4Y7UQABsS X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Sat, 2023-03-04 at 13:36 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote: > On 3/3/2023 10:26 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > From: Roberto Sassu > > > > As for IMA, remove hardcoded EVM function calls from the LSM infrastructure > > and the VFS. Make EVM functions as static (except for > > evm_inode_init_security(), which is exported), and register them as hook > > implementations in init_evm_lsm(), called from integrity_lsm_init(). > > > > Finally, switch to the LSM reservation mechanism for the EVM xattr, by > > setting the lbs_xattr field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure, and > > consequently decrement the number of xattrs to allocate in > > security_inode_init_security(). > > > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu > > --- > > fs/attr.c | 2 - > > fs/posix_acl.c | 3 - > > fs/xattr.c | 2 - > > include/linux/evm.h | 116 ------------------------------ > > security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- > > security/integrity/iint.c | 7 ++ > > security/integrity/integrity.h | 9 +++ > > security/security.c | 41 +++-------- > > 8 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 171 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c > > index 406d782dfab..1b911a627fe 100644 > > --- a/fs/attr.c > > +++ b/fs/attr.c > > @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ > > #include > > #include > > #include > > -#include > > > > #include "internal.h" > > > > @@ -485,7 +484,6 @@ int notify_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > > if (!error) { > > fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid); > > security_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid); > > - evm_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid); > > } > > > > return error; > > diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c > > index 5b8c92fce0c..608cb0a9f84 100644 > > --- a/fs/posix_acl.c > > +++ b/fs/posix_acl.c > > @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ > > #include > > #include > > #include > > -#include > > #include > > #include > > > > @@ -1103,7 +1102,6 @@ int vfs_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > > if (!error) { > > fsnotify_xattr(dentry); > > security_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl); > > - evm_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl); > > } > > > > out_inode_unlock: > > @@ -1214,7 +1212,6 @@ int vfs_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > > if (!error) { > > fsnotify_xattr(dentry); > > security_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); > > - evm_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); > > } > > > > out_inode_unlock: > > diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c > > index 10c959d9fc6..7708ffdacca 100644 > > --- a/fs/xattr.c > > +++ b/fs/xattr.c > > @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ > > #include > > #include > > #include > > -#include > > #include > > #include > > #include > > @@ -535,7 +534,6 @@ __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > if (!error) { > > fsnotify_xattr(dentry); > > security_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); > > - evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); > > } > > > > out: > > diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h > > index 8c043273552..61794299f09 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/evm.h > > +++ b/include/linux/evm.h > > @@ -21,46 +21,6 @@ extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, > > void *xattr_value, > > size_t xattr_value_len, > > struct integrity_iint_cache *iint); > > -extern int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > - struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr); > > -extern void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > - struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid); > > -extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > - struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, > > - const void *value, size_t size, int flags); > > -extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, > > - const char *xattr_name, > > - const void *xattr_value, > > - size_t xattr_value_len, > > - int flags); > > -extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > - struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); > > -extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, > > - const char *xattr_name); > > -static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > - struct dentry *dentry, > > - const char *acl_name) > > -{ > > - evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name); > > -} > > -extern int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > - struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, > > - struct posix_acl *kacl); > > -static inline int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > - struct dentry *dentry, > > - const char *acl_name) > > -{ > > - return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL); > > -} > > -static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, > > - const char *acl_name, > > - struct posix_acl *kacl) > > -{ > > - return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0); > > -} > > -extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, > > - const struct qstr *qstr, > > - struct xattr *xattrs); > > extern bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name); > > extern int evm_protected_xattr_if_enabled(const char *req_xattr_name); > > extern int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer, > > @@ -92,82 +52,6 @@ static inline enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, > > } > > #endif > > > > -static inline int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > - struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) > > -{ > > - return 0; > > -} > > - > > -static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > - struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) > > -{ > > - return; > > -} > > - > > -static inline int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > - struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, > > - const void *value, size_t size, int flags) > > -{ > > - return 0; > > -} > > - > > -static inline void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, > > - const char *xattr_name, > > - const void *xattr_value, > > - size_t xattr_value_len, > > - int flags) > > -{ > > - return; > > -} > > - > > -static inline int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > - struct dentry *dentry, > > - const char *xattr_name) > > -{ > > - return 0; > > -} > > - > > -static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, > > - const char *xattr_name) > > -{ > > - return; > > -} > > - > > -static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > - struct dentry *dentry, > > - const char *acl_name) > > -{ > > - return; > > -} > > - > > -static inline int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > - struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, > > - struct posix_acl *kacl) > > -{ > > - return 0; > > -} > > - > > -static inline int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > - struct dentry *dentry, > > - const char *acl_name) > > -{ > > - return 0; > > -} > > - > > -static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, > > - const char *acl_name, > > - struct posix_acl *kacl) > > -{ > > - return; > > -} > > - > > -static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, > > - const struct qstr *qstr, > > - struct xattr *xattrs) > > -{ > > - return 0; > > -} > > - > > static inline bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name) > > { > > return false; > > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c > > index 8b5c472f78b..c45bc97277c 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c > > +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c > > @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ > > #include > > #include > > #include > > +#include > > #include > > #include > > > > @@ -566,9 +567,9 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > * userspace from writing HMAC value. Writing 'security.evm' requires > > * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. > > */ > > -int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > > - const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, > > - size_t xattr_value_len, int flags) > > +static int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > > + const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, > > + size_t xattr_value_len, int flags) > > { > > const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value; > > > > @@ -598,8 +599,8 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > > * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that > > * the current value is valid. > > */ > > -int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > - struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) > > +static int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > > + const char *xattr_name) > > { > > /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though > > * there's no HMAC key loaded > > @@ -649,9 +650,11 @@ static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > * Prevent modifying posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated > > * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is > > * valid. > > + * > > + * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure. > > */ > > -int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > > - const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) > > +static int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > > + const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) > > { > > enum integrity_status evm_status; > > > > @@ -690,6 +693,24 @@ int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > > return -EPERM; > > } > > > > +/** > > + * evm_inode_remove_acl - Protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls > > + * @idmap: idmap of the mount > > + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry > > + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl > > + * > > + * Prevent removing posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated > > + * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is > > + * valid. > > + * > > + * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure. > > + */ > > +static int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > > + const char *acl_name) > > +{ > > + return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL); > > +} > > + > > static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) > > { > > struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; > > @@ -738,9 +759,11 @@ bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name) > > * __vfs_setxattr_noperm(). The caller of which has taken the inode's > > * i_mutex lock. > > */ > > -void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, > > - const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, > > - int flags) > > +static void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, > > + const char *xattr_name, > > + const void *xattr_value, > > + size_t xattr_value_len, > > + int flags) > > { > > if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) > > return; > > @@ -756,6 +779,21 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, > > evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); > > } > > > > +/** > > + * evm_inode_post_set_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls > > + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry > > + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl > > + * @kacl: pointer to the posix acls > > + * > > + * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after setting > > + * posix acls. > > + */ > > +static void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, > > + struct posix_acl *kacl) > > +{ > > + return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0); > > +} > > + > > /** > > * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr > > * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry > > @@ -766,7 +804,8 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, > > * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from > > * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex. > > */ > > -void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) > > +static void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, > > + const char *xattr_name) > > { > > if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) > > return; > > @@ -782,6 +821,22 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) > > evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); > > } > > > > +/** > > + * evm_inode_post_remove_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls > > + * @idmap: idmap of the mount > > + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry > > + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl > > + * > > + * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after > > + * removing posix acls. > > + */ > > +static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > + struct dentry *dentry, > > + const char *acl_name) > > +{ > > + evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name); > > +} > > + > > static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) > > { > > @@ -805,8 +860,8 @@ static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature, > > * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature. > > */ > > -int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > > - struct iattr *attr) > > +static int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > > + struct iattr *attr) > > { > > unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid; > > enum integrity_status evm_status; > > @@ -853,8 +908,8 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > > * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller > > * to lock the inode's i_mutex. > > */ > > -void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > > - int ia_valid) > > +static void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > + struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) > > { > > if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL)) > > return; > > @@ -892,7 +947,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, > > if (!evm_protected_xattrs) > > return -EOPNOTSUPP; > > > > - evm_xattr = xattr; > > + evm_xattr = xattrs + integrity_blob_sizes.lbs_xattr; > > Please don't do this inline. Convention is to use a function, > intergrity_xattrs() for this. Ok. > > > > xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS); > > if (!xattr_data) > > @@ -952,4 +1007,23 @@ static int __init init_evm(void) > > return error; > > } > > > > +static struct security_hook_list evm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, evm_inode_setattr), > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, evm_inode_post_setattr), > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, evm_inode_setxattr), > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, evm_inode_set_acl), > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_set_acl, evm_inode_post_set_acl), > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, evm_inode_remove_acl), > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_remove_acl, evm_inode_post_remove_acl), > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr), > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, evm_inode_removexattr), > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_removexattr, evm_inode_post_removexattr), > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, evm_inode_init_security), > > +}; > > + > > +void __init init_evm_lsm(void) > > +{ > > + security_add_hooks(evm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(evm_hooks), "integrity"); > > +} > > + > > late_initcall(init_evm); > > diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c > > index bbadf974b31..952d5ea4e18 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/iint.c > > +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c > > @@ -179,12 +179,19 @@ static int __init integrity_lsm_init(void) > > 0, SLAB_PANIC, init_once); > > > > init_ima_lsm(); > > + init_evm_lsm(); > > return 0; > > } > > + > > +struct lsm_blob_sizes integrity_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { > > + .lbs_xattr = 1, > > Really? 1 byte? Don't even think of storing number of elements in lbs_xattr. > The linux_blob_size structure contains sizes of blobs, not number of elements. Oh, I see it can be confusing. However, lbs_xattr does not help to position in the security blob but in the new_xattrs array, allocated in security_inode_init_security() (see below). Any suggestion on how to make this part better? Thanks Roberto > > +}; > > + > > DEFINE_LSM(integrity) = { > > .name = "integrity", > > .init = integrity_lsm_init, > > .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST, > > + .blobs = &integrity_blob_sizes, > > }; > > > > /* > > diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h > > index c72d375a356..76e7eda6651 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h > > +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h > > @@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset, > > #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX 4 > > > > extern struct dentry *integrity_dir; > > +extern struct lsm_blob_sizes integrity_blob_sizes; > > > > struct modsig; > > > > @@ -199,6 +200,14 @@ static inline void __init init_ima_lsm(void) > > } > > #endif > > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_EVM > > +void __init init_evm_lsm(void); > > +#else > > +static inline void __init init_evm_lsm(void) > > +{ > > +} > > +#endif > > + > > #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE > > > > int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, > > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > > index 9bc6a4ef758..74abf04feef 100644 > > --- a/security/security.c > > +++ b/security/security.c > > @@ -20,13 +20,13 @@ > > #include > > #include > > #include > > -#include > > #include > > #include > > #include > > #include > > #include > > #include > > +#include > > #include > > #include > > > > @@ -1662,8 +1662,8 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, > > if (!initxattrs) > > return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, > > dir, qstr, NULL); > > - /* Allocate +1 for EVM and +1 as terminator. */ > > - new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr + 2, sizeof(*new_xattrs), > > + /* Allocate +1 for terminator. */ > > + new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr + 1, sizeof(*new_xattrs), > > GFP_NOFS); > > if (!new_xattrs) > > return -ENOMEM; > > @@ -1699,9 +1699,6 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, > > if (!num_filled_xattrs) > > goto out; > > > > - ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs); > > - if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP) > > - goto out; > > ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); > > out: > > for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++) > > @@ -2201,14 +2198,9 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) > > int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) > > { > > - int ret; > > - > > if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) > > return 0; > > - ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr); > > - if (ret) > > - return ret; > > - return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr); > > + return call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr); > > } > > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr); > > > > @@ -2272,9 +2264,7 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > > > if (ret == 1) > > ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); > > - if (ret) > > - return ret; > > - return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags); > > + return ret; > > } > > > > /** > > @@ -2293,15 +2283,10 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, > > struct posix_acl *kacl) > > { > > - int ret; > > - > > if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) > > return 0; > > - ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name, > > - kacl); > > - if (ret) > > - return ret; > > - return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); > > + return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name, > > + kacl); > > } > > > > /** > > @@ -2354,14 +2339,9 @@ int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) > > { > > - int ret; > > - > > if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) > > return 0; > > - ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); > > - if (ret) > > - return ret; > > - return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); > > + return call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); > > } > > > > /** > > @@ -2397,7 +2377,6 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, > > if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) > > return; > > call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); > > - evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); > > } > > > > /** > > @@ -2458,9 +2437,7 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > > ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name); > > if (ret == 1) > > ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); > > - if (ret) > > - return ret; > > - return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); > > + return ret; > > } > > > > /**