Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3CCA3C61DA4 for ; Mon, 6 Mar 2023 12:35:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229940AbjCFMe7 (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Mar 2023 07:34:59 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:60462 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229918AbjCFMev (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Mar 2023 07:34:51 -0500 Received: from mail-ua1-x92b.google.com (mail-ua1-x92b.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::92b]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5CCE22596B for ; Mon, 6 Mar 2023 04:34:49 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ua1-x92b.google.com with SMTP id v48so6300779uad.6 for ; Mon, 06 Mar 2023 04:34:49 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linaro.org; s=google; t=1678106088; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=ns1gy7fo3P7FsWXDSeDIgeuTGnGTqEoXNUlxd/X7EAw=; b=e+VgJwXh5yHL5wzg1Bt6cprw/F8rX8qCqt55X7vfuuDGYfdDby1/n1q4tag500CSdJ JGIHxeNCGH8s7SMuKCT0KBKWDfNEenLeh6tAFYQs03p9TaRYzO/vQ+o2A0Caw+trgm2i XD1PlzhqSUpxz8Rfz12J/xIq9cY7M5tY7FkCxjZnG91eO6KqnPZB178qyJs1osJOO/0A 7fJTCWrujCWYKvofotbXEI7Z6kp43yhYWo7I3WWJpPsLwNy+GPzQMx/P3Ug2SxjKyMOJ uiolV0gotm+k/wfKNEf7sJxZZld1z8iWJiDnh6+BH2DoMle73X7eywOnRiHnXmp37+am vl+Q== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; t=1678106088; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=ns1gy7fo3P7FsWXDSeDIgeuTGnGTqEoXNUlxd/X7EAw=; b=OC8PQv0NUW5qNRAUxoN+iBup+eOldq+0xLXoiLJNtl4/kbB3Htdd3YNlgd6jB3yZb3 fRvRNXqhC15dJPIV2o54OhmQiHJnMhP72c9GeoWtp21Q92j6/HZ2Ny/QJyvQGJLyyL4O Bhf8E+qWx9vAaTidxcQ1Hmw7Q5BWmuJ27j4ffqhQGQ+VtmxQadSVgHqSEdBE8sHMZyrV HkfiRFdg97p+i/6yIutse4LBiEan1TgwsZ9x0qI55QReILCkJQbzqgaOiOH6lp8u2peS KaQkfS/kHjCTA9b1FBIKSJkYdkkUQZfCp3UhJOLyDdbNHR1RSOdvmFad0uyOjlinBtpR lMig== X-Gm-Message-State: AO0yUKWBUeRP26OIJlwFPPtnimWTy07T9CH5LzK5Po9jUakkoW9FrGyo 7/VIfyQuDeupXBtK9XqPz2+Wl+KrN1m3cZveJWWmyA== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AK7set8bkKE44A6LpLbaFkx/id0WBO0Pz9iRc0FaC7g6t8pqzEilwWHLxIampiwKDGvT3R9I/3xB6OeRc4W/DwVVeMQ= X-Received: by 2002:ab0:4714:0:b0:68b:90f4:1d8c with SMTP id h20-20020ab04714000000b0068b90f41d8cmr897588uac.1.1678106088377; Mon, 06 Mar 2023 04:34:48 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20230302120648.v3.1.I8e7f9b01d9ac940507d78e15368e200a6a69bedb@changeid> In-Reply-To: <20230302120648.v3.1.I8e7f9b01d9ac940507d78e15368e200a6a69bedb@changeid> From: Sumit Garg Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 18:04:37 +0530 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] tee: optee: Add SMC for loading OP-TEE image To: Jeffrey Kardatzke Cc: op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org, Jeffrey Kardatzke , Jens Wiklander , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, 3 Mar 2023 at 01:37, Jeffrey Kardatzke wrote: > > Adds an SMC call that will pass an OP-TEE binary image to EL3 and > instruct it to load it as the BL32 payload. This works in conjunction > with a feature added to Trusted Firmware for ARM that supports this. s/Trusted Firmware for ARM/Trusted Firmware for Armv8 and above architectures/ This commit description tells me what you have implemented but not why? The motivation for this change should be included here along with security implications. > > Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Kardatzke > Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Kardatzke > --- > > Changes in v3: > - Removed state tracking for driver reload > - Check UID of service to verify it needs image load > > Changes in v2: > - Fixed compile issue when feature is disabled > - Addressed minor comments > - Added state tracking for driver reload > > drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig | 10 ++++ > drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h | 12 +++++ > drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h | 24 +++++++++ > drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 96 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 142 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig > index f121c224e682..f0f12b146add 100644 > --- a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig > +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig > @@ -7,3 +7,13 @@ config OPTEE > help > This implements the OP-TEE Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) > driver. > + > +config OPTEE_LOAD_IMAGE Given the warning text attached to this config option, this should be renamed as OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE. Also, the help text should be updated to reflect the security implication of this. I would also like to see documentation updates regarding how your platform is mitigating potential threats in order to enable this option. It would enable others to make a concious decision if their threat model allows this option. > + bool "Load OP-TEE image as firmware" > + default n > + depends on OPTEE IIRC, from earlier review threads you mentioned that this option is enabled when OP-TEE driver is built-in rather than loadable. Shouldn't we make that dependency explicit? Also, this option only makes sense for ARM64 as in case of ARM the secure monitor is bundled into OP-TEE image and hence can't be loaded dynamically. We should make that dependency explicit too. > + help > + This loads the BL32 image for OP-TEE as firmware when the driver is probed. > + This returns -EPROBE_DEFER until the firmware is loadable from the > + filesystem which is determined by checking the system_state until it is in > + SYSTEM_RUNNING. > diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h > index 70e9cc2ee96b..237d6fa9a6e8 100644 > --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h > +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h > @@ -241,11 +241,23 @@ struct optee_msg_arg { > * 384fb3e0-e7f8-11e3-af63-0002a5d5c51b. > * Represented in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_UID_0, OPTEE_MSG_UID_1, > * OPTEE_MSG_UID_2, OPTEE_MSG_UID_3. > + * > + * In the case where the OP-TEE image is loaded by the kernel, this will > + * initially return an alternate UID to reflect that we are communicating with > + * the TF-A image loading service at that time instead of OP-TEE. That UID is: > + * a3fbeab1-1246-315d-c7c4-06b9c03cbea4. > + * Represetned in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0, s/Represetned/Represented/ > + * OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1, OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2, > + * OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3. > */ > #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_0 0x384fb3e0 > #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_1 0xe7f811e3 > #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_2 0xaf630002 > #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_3 0xa5d5c51b > +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 0xa3fbeab1 > +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 0x1246315d > +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 0xc7c406b9 > +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3 0xc03cbea4 > #define OPTEE_MSG_FUNCID_CALLS_UID 0xFF01 > > /* > diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h > index 73b5e7760d10..7d9fa426505b 100644 > --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h > +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h > @@ -104,6 +104,30 @@ struct optee_smc_call_get_os_revision_result { > unsigned long reserved1; > }; > > +/* > + * Load Trusted OS from optee/tee.bin in the Linux firmware. > + * > + * WARNING: Use this cautiously as it could lead to insecure loading of the > + * Trusted OS. > + * This SMC instructs EL3 to load a binary and execute it as the Trusted OS. > + * > + * Call register usage: > + * a0 SMC Function ID, OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE > + * a1 Upper 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload > + * a2 Lower 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload > + * a3 Upper 32bit of the physical address for the payload > + * a4 Lower 32bit of the physical address for the payload > + * > + * The payload is in the OP-TEE image format. > + * > + * Returns result in a0, 0 on success and an error code otherwise. > + */ > +#define OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE 2 > +#define OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE \ > + ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \ > + ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_TRUSTED_OS_END, \ > + OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE) > + > /* > * Call with struct optee_msg_arg as argument > * > diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c > index a1c1fa1a9c28..14612edef8f2 100644 > --- a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c > +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c > @@ -8,9 +8,11 @@ > > #include > #include > +#include > #include > #include > #include > +#include > #include > #include > #include > @@ -1149,6 +1151,22 @@ static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) > return false; > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_LOAD_IMAGE > +static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) > +{ > + struct arm_smccc_res res; > + > + invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALLS_UID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &res); > + > + if (res.a0 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 && > + res.a1 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 && > + res.a2 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 && > + res.a3 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3) > + return true; > + return false; > +} > +#endif > + > static void optee_msg_get_os_revision(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) > { > union { > @@ -1354,6 +1372,80 @@ static void optee_shutdown(struct platform_device *pdev) > optee_disable_shm_cache(optee); > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_LOAD_IMAGE > + > +#define OPTEE_FW_IMAGE "optee/tee.bin" > + > +static int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *pdev, > + optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) > +{ > + const struct firmware *fw = NULL; > + struct arm_smccc_res res; > + phys_addr_t data_pa; > + u8 *data_buf = NULL; > + u64 data_size; > + u32 data_pa_high, data_pa_low; > + u32 data_size_high, data_size_low; > + int rc; > + > + if (!optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(invoke_fn)) > + return 0; > + > + rc = request_firmware(&fw, OPTEE_FW_IMAGE, &pdev->dev); > + if (rc) { > + /* > + * The firmware in the rootfs will not be accessible until we > + * are in the SYSTEM_RUNNING state, so return EPROBE_DEFER until > + * that point. > + */ > + if (system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING) > + return -EPROBE_DEFER; > + goto fw_err; > + } > + > + data_size = fw->size; > + /* > + * This uses the GFP_DMA flag to ensure we are allocated memory in the > + * 32-bit space since TF-A cannot map memory beyond the 32-bit boundary. > + */ > + data_buf = kmalloc(fw->size, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA); > + if (!data_buf) { > + rc = -ENOMEM; > + goto fw_err; > + } > + memcpy(data_buf, fw->data, fw->size); > + data_pa = virt_to_phys(data_buf); > + reg_pair_from_64(&data_pa_high, &data_pa_low, data_pa); > + reg_pair_from_64(&data_size_high, &data_size_low, data_size); > + goto fw_load; > + > +fw_err: > + pr_warn("image loading failed\n"); > + data_pa_high = data_pa_low = data_size_high = data_size_low = 0; > + > +fw_load: > + /* > + * Always invoke the SMC, even if loading the image fails, to indicate > + * to EL3 that we have passed the point where it should allow invoking > + * this SMC. > + */ > + invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE, data_size_high, data_size_low, > + data_pa_high, data_pa_low, 0, 0, 0, &res); > + if (!rc) > + rc = res.a0; > + if (fw) > + release_firmware(fw); > + kfree(data_buf); > + > + return rc; > +} > +#else > +static inline int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *__unused1, > + optee_invoke_fn *__unused2) { > + return 0; > +} > +#endif > + > static int optee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) > { > optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn; > @@ -1372,6 +1464,10 @@ static int optee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) > if (IS_ERR(invoke_fn)) > return PTR_ERR(invoke_fn); > > + rc = optee_load_fw(pdev, invoke_fn); > + if (rc) > + return rc; > + > if (!optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(invoke_fn)) { > pr_warn("api uid mismatch\n"); > return -EINVAL; > -- > 2.40.0.rc0.216.gc4246ad0f0-goog >