Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9694AC678D5 for ; Tue, 7 Mar 2023 19:49:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229769AbjCGTtb (ORCPT ); Tue, 7 Mar 2023 14:49:31 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:41920 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229780AbjCGTtO (ORCPT ); Tue, 7 Mar 2023 14:49:14 -0500 Received: from mail-pl1-x62f.google.com (mail-pl1-x62f.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::62f]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5C359B9513 for ; Tue, 7 Mar 2023 11:40:08 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-pl1-x62f.google.com with SMTP id a2so15327608plm.4 for ; Tue, 07 Mar 2023 11:40:08 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; t=1678217988; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:message-id:date:subject:cc :to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=5UOGTv/sy1Z+ufcDr3CebSp0hI8rsj2NGTtQtmuZSfA=; b=QIrfJlu6S37fKNAv22docAWgHY3owh5hjxGStkQD+zcP6y5HVNAOduzN3cqkwlT1Qb FVeZ8IeWE74wbr2IORGJ3Yxc2r0r6Q6FBVkg2aSDbWttcf1Spq14EoYLt7smmvODiMRp zEQdMdWFN9U9IrrSK4FbpZ9xLe/gl9NIe+1bY= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; t=1678217988; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:message-id:date:subject:cc :to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=5UOGTv/sy1Z+ufcDr3CebSp0hI8rsj2NGTtQtmuZSfA=; b=giy0HhnzqVQyrQ9/SW9WqGI9StBjxx23sFE+ULFxS46xEkYeN6lQIlek4qBicTWX8D WiNt+/pbQ/kW0NB8dQQWimI9NuFGx3+NZAdN21oGw3EGG3A/Oo4XyXUiIonSoUTCPFsj s3xKz09eVrSHPTfUSoZOWHSLTYFwKw9TlMvn307F1W8fDNTn56a3XWQzlugRHZM0ET2I xIB/mtNWlhDVkOczCUwndfE2o++tWGoNuwRs4XhuiiENdrimPWvDSKD2kNNebH0XxGuu 1/70ZB7WtHh8gjW75iQnrgT2w6cj0WDvz8vBqe5XNBr2pzpqarCjF3mYy4KMjFEXpt4s HlIA== X-Gm-Message-State: AO0yUKU1GzhENPLj1vS8NwbG1gAX8IVp/UMDTMnAfPwuLc1N2s/qTkok mQTgfBqccdMgIy4lsr2kRv/ooA== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AK7set9g7oaRbQRae01HvxBX6jSuJS5skRqs3cOn0tc8nijeYP1Ulwxv0TauaSOBe1glLA52Kf66qA== X-Received: by 2002:a17:903:1d2:b0:19d:19fb:55fd with SMTP id e18-20020a17090301d200b0019d19fb55fdmr20015596plh.20.1678217987896; Tue, 07 Mar 2023 11:39:47 -0800 (PST) Received: from wafflehead.lan ([47.144.140.44]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id kt4-20020a170903088400b00186cf82717fsm8811725plb.165.2023.03.07.11.39.46 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 07 Mar 2023 11:39:47 -0800 (PST) From: Jeffrey Kardatzke X-Google-Original-From: Jeffrey Kardatzke To: op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: Jeffrey Kardatzke , Jeffrey Kardatzke , Jens Wiklander , Sumit Garg , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v5] tee: optee: Add SMC for loading OP-TEE image Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 11:39:43 -0800 Message-Id: <20230307113921.v5.1.I8e7f9b01d9ac940507d78e15368e200a6a69bedb@changeid> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.40.0.rc0.216.gc4246ad0f0-goog MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Adds an SMC call that will pass an OP-TEE binary image to EL3 and instruct it to load it as the BL32 payload. This works in conjunction with a feature added to Trusted Firmware for ARMv8 and above architectures that supports this. The main purpose of this change is to facilitate updating the OP-TEE component on devices via a rootfs change rather than having to do a firmware update. Further details are linked to in the Kconfig file. Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Kardatzke Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Kardatzke --- Changes in v5: - Renamed config option - Added runtime warning when config is used Changes in v4: - Update commit message - Added more documentation - Renamed config option, added ARM64 dependency Changes in v3: - Removed state tracking for driver reload - Check UID of service to verify it needs image load Changes in v2: - Fixed compile issue when feature is disabled - Addressed minor comments - Added state tracking for driver reload drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig | 13 +++++ drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h | 12 +++++ drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h | 24 +++++++++ drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 146 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig index f121c224e682..fc5b0d6fbf3a 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig @@ -7,3 +7,16 @@ config OPTEE help This implements the OP-TEE Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) driver. + +config OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE + bool "Load OP-TEE image as firmware" + default n + depends on OPTEE && ARM64 + help + This loads the BL32 image for OP-TEE as firmware when the driver is probed. + This returns -EPROBE_DEFER until the firmware is loadable from the + filesystem which is determined by checking the system_state until it is in + SYSTEM_RUNNING. This also requires enabling the corresponding option in + Trusted Firmware for Arm. The documentation there explains the security + threat associated with enabling this as well as mitigations. + https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/threat_model/threat_model.html diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h index 70e9cc2ee96b..e8840a82b983 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h @@ -241,11 +241,23 @@ struct optee_msg_arg { * 384fb3e0-e7f8-11e3-af63-0002a5d5c51b. * Represented in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_UID_0, OPTEE_MSG_UID_1, * OPTEE_MSG_UID_2, OPTEE_MSG_UID_3. + * + * In the case where the OP-TEE image is loaded by the kernel, this will + * initially return an alternate UID to reflect that we are communicating with + * the TF-A image loading service at that time instead of OP-TEE. That UID is: + * a3fbeab1-1246-315d-c7c4-06b9c03cbea4. + * Represented in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0, + * OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1, OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2, + * OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3. */ #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_0 0x384fb3e0 #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_1 0xe7f811e3 #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_2 0xaf630002 #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_3 0xa5d5c51b +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 0xa3fbeab1 +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 0x1246315d +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 0xc7c406b9 +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3 0xc03cbea4 #define OPTEE_MSG_FUNCID_CALLS_UID 0xFF01 /* diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h index 73b5e7760d10..7d9fa426505b 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h @@ -104,6 +104,30 @@ struct optee_smc_call_get_os_revision_result { unsigned long reserved1; }; +/* + * Load Trusted OS from optee/tee.bin in the Linux firmware. + * + * WARNING: Use this cautiously as it could lead to insecure loading of the + * Trusted OS. + * This SMC instructs EL3 to load a binary and execute it as the Trusted OS. + * + * Call register usage: + * a0 SMC Function ID, OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE + * a1 Upper 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload + * a2 Lower 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload + * a3 Upper 32bit of the physical address for the payload + * a4 Lower 32bit of the physical address for the payload + * + * The payload is in the OP-TEE image format. + * + * Returns result in a0, 0 on success and an error code otherwise. + */ +#define OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE 2 +#define OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE \ + ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \ + ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_TRUSTED_OS_END, \ + OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE) + /* * Call with struct optee_msg_arg as argument * diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c index a1c1fa1a9c28..00b6b69b6f79 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c @@ -8,9 +8,11 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -1149,6 +1151,22 @@ static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) return false; } +#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE +static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) +{ + struct arm_smccc_res res; + + invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALLS_UID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &res); + + if (res.a0 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 && + res.a1 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 && + res.a2 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 && + res.a3 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3) + return true; + return false; +} +#endif + static void optee_msg_get_os_revision(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) { union { @@ -1354,6 +1372,81 @@ static void optee_shutdown(struct platform_device *pdev) optee_disable_shm_cache(optee); } +#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE + +#define OPTEE_FW_IMAGE "optee/tee.bin" + +static int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *pdev, + optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) +{ + const struct firmware *fw = NULL; + struct arm_smccc_res res; + phys_addr_t data_pa; + u8 *data_buf = NULL; + u64 data_size; + u32 data_pa_high, data_pa_low; + u32 data_size_high, data_size_low; + int rc; + + if (!optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(invoke_fn)) + return 0; + + rc = request_firmware(&fw, OPTEE_FW_IMAGE, &pdev->dev); + if (rc) { + /* + * The firmware in the rootfs will not be accessible until we + * are in the SYSTEM_RUNNING state, so return EPROBE_DEFER until + * that point. + */ + if (system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING) + return -EPROBE_DEFER; + goto fw_err; + } + + data_size = fw->size; + /* + * This uses the GFP_DMA flag to ensure we are allocated memory in the + * 32-bit space since TF-A cannot map memory beyond the 32-bit boundary. + */ + data_buf = kmalloc(fw->size, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA); + if (!data_buf) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto fw_err; + } + memcpy(data_buf, fw->data, fw->size); + data_pa = virt_to_phys(data_buf); + reg_pair_from_64(&data_pa_high, &data_pa_low, data_pa); + reg_pair_from_64(&data_size_high, &data_size_low, data_size); + goto fw_load; + +fw_err: + pr_warn("image loading failed\n"); + data_pa_high = data_pa_low = data_size_high = data_size_low = 0; + +fw_load: + /* + * Always invoke the SMC, even if loading the image fails, to indicate + * to EL3 that we have passed the point where it should allow invoking + * this SMC. + */ + pr_warn("OP-TEE image loaded from kernel, this can be insecure"); + invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE, data_size_high, data_size_low, + data_pa_high, data_pa_low, 0, 0, 0, &res); + if (!rc) + rc = res.a0; + if (fw) + release_firmware(fw); + kfree(data_buf); + + return rc; +} +#else +static inline int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *__unused1, + optee_invoke_fn *__unused2) { + return 0; +} +#endif + static int optee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) { optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn; @@ -1372,6 +1465,10 @@ static int optee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (IS_ERR(invoke_fn)) return PTR_ERR(invoke_fn); + rc = optee_load_fw(pdev, invoke_fn); + if (rc) + return rc; + if (!optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(invoke_fn)) { pr_warn("api uid mismatch\n"); return -EINVAL; -- 2.40.0.rc0.216.gc4246ad0f0-goog