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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id hr36-20020a1709073fa400b00932b2915d60si24987716ejc.681.2023.03.23.19.29.15; Thu, 23 Mar 2023 19:29:39 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@intel.com header.s=Intel header.b=eSK6FBgn; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230021AbjCXC1z (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 23 Mar 2023 22:27:55 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:36580 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229600AbjCXC1x (ORCPT ); Thu, 23 Mar 2023 22:27:53 -0400 Received: from mga04.intel.com (mga04.intel.com [192.55.52.120]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 707CEF940; Thu, 23 Mar 2023 19:27:51 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1679624871; x=1711160871; h=message-id:date:mime-version:subject:to:cc:references: from:in-reply-to:content-transfer-encoding; bh=2dl0eddcM3V6lcQ9QRzFb8Ziqg9qOaiatZS/pk0/Rlg=; b=eSK6FBgnApu9bfqZ42tcEXC6liecwTJmGD2tbGdmYY3yeEA/0dPCSGqv kSp9xbmS9VeP5Ub59P2LHl4ukgrb/6IMNf+3U5gRMUVsWKF/HwEJt+pig HKMMgyUhaUrVxESmnduVRwmM/58HzTBfOFtgsRwaASL9M3EzwE6P4G9Mq 2EBRmbPfj6dJMKuJT1uWs36aV8peakjj023x8/mMJjIM6/4WUWilaetfg lD2tna2ePrPIUwnhsVMvluLX57/V9S23FfLPMQNChcMp7m60pOUVgniog OA8M7v+pf2QqhbjlRTGPNprhaAnvSZXHn05g5W1XSH0ho7y/TR8f0xW/Z Q==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10658"; a="338402065" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.98,286,1673942400"; d="scan'208";a="338402065" Received: from fmsmga004.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.48]) by fmsmga104.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 23 Mar 2023 19:27:51 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10658"; a="751721617" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.98,286,1673942400"; d="scan'208";a="751721617" Received: from leiwang7-mobl.ccr.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.238.212.107]) ([10.238.212.107]) by fmsmga004-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 23 Mar 2023 19:27:48 -0700 Message-ID: Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2023 10:27:46 +0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0 Thunderbird/102.9.0 Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 019/113] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure Content-Language: en-US To: isaku.yamahata@intel.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: isaku.yamahata@gmail.com, Paolo Bonzini , erdemaktas@google.com, Sean Christopherson , Sagi Shahar , David Matlack , Kai Huang , Zhi Wang , Sean Christopherson References: <7c011a5c9dd92cfb9074297af22d132a4e57fd11.1678643052.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com> From: "Wang, Lei" In-Reply-To: <7c011a5c9dd92cfb9074297af22d132a4e57fd11.1678643052.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.5 required=5.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,NICE_REPLY_A,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_NONE autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 3/13/2023 1:55, isaku.yamahata@intel.com wrote: > From: Isaku Yamahata > > As the first step to create TDX guest, create/destroy VM struct. Assign > TDX private Host Key ID (HKID) to the TDX guest for memory encryption and > allocate extra pages for the TDX guest. On destruction, free allocated > pages, and HKID. > > Before tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some resources of the > guest TD to be destroyed (i.e. HKID must have been reclaimed, etc). Add > flush_shadow_all_private callback before tearing down private page tables > for it. > > Add vm_free() of kvm_x86_ops hook at the end of kvm_arch_destroy_vm() > because some per-VM TDX resources, e.g. TDR, need to be freed after other > TDX resources, e.g. HKID, were freed. > > Co-developed-by: Kai Huang > Signed-off-by: Kai Huang > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson > Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata > > --- > Changes v11 -> v12: > - use cpu_feature_enabled(). > > Changes v10 -> v11: > - Fix doule free in tdx_vm_free() by setting NULL. > - replace struct tdx_td_page tdr and tdcs from struct kvm_tdx with > unsigned long > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 2 + > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 + > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 35 ++- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 442 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 6 +- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 9 + > arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 + > 7 files changed, 498 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h > index 7522c193f2b4..c30d2d2ad686 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h > @@ -24,7 +24,9 @@ KVM_X86_OP(is_vm_type_supported) > KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(max_vcpus); > KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_enable_cap) > KVM_X86_OP(vm_init) > +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(flush_shadow_all_private) > KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_destroy) > +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_free) > KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_precreate) > KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_create) > KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_free) > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > index d98d61e5213d..15f7c0d45082 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > @@ -1566,7 +1566,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops { > unsigned int vm_size; > int (*vm_enable_cap)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap); > int (*vm_init)(struct kvm *kvm); > + void (*flush_shadow_all_private)(struct kvm *kvm); > void (*vm_destroy)(struct kvm *kvm); > + void (*vm_free)(struct kvm *kvm); > > /* Create, but do not attach this VCPU */ > int (*vcpu_precreate)(struct kvm *kvm); > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c > index 68bb320d0b6d..08ed6fc8cc3d 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c > @@ -62,14 +62,41 @@ static int vt_vm_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap) > return -EINVAL; > } > > +static void vt_hardware_unsetup(void) > +{ > + if (enable_tdx) > + tdx_hardware_unsetup(); > + vmx_hardware_unsetup(); > +} > + > static int vt_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) > { > if (is_td(kvm)) > - return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* Not ready to create guest TD yet. */ > + return tdx_vm_init(kvm); > > return vmx_vm_init(kvm); > } > > +static void vt_flush_shadow_all_private(struct kvm *kvm) > +{ > + if (is_td(kvm)) > + tdx_mmu_release_hkid(kvm); > +} > + > +static void vt_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) > +{ > + if (is_td(kvm)) > + return; > + > + vmx_vm_destroy(kvm); > +} > + > +static void vt_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm) > +{ > + if (is_td(kvm)) > + tdx_vm_free(kvm); > +} > + > static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > { > if (!is_td(kvm)) > @@ -94,7 +121,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { > > .check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compat, > > - .hardware_unsetup = vmx_hardware_unsetup, > + .hardware_unsetup = vt_hardware_unsetup, > > .hardware_enable = vt_hardware_enable, > .hardware_disable = vmx_hardware_disable, > @@ -105,7 +132,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { > .vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx), > .vm_enable_cap = vt_vm_enable_cap, > .vm_init = vt_vm_init, > - .vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy, > + .flush_shadow_all_private = vt_flush_shadow_all_private, > + .vm_destroy = vt_vm_destroy, > + .vm_free = vt_vm_free, > > .vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate, > .vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create, > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c > index 8b02e605cfb5..3ede8a726b47 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c > @@ -5,8 +5,9 @@ > > #include "capabilities.h" > #include "x86_ops.h" > -#include "x86.h" > #include "tdx.h" > +#include "tdx_ops.h" > +#include "x86.h" > > #undef pr_fmt > #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt > @@ -46,11 +47,276 @@ int tdx_vm_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap) > return r; > } > > +struct tdx_info { > + u8 nr_tdcs_pages; > +}; > + > +/* Info about the TDX module. */ > +static struct tdx_info tdx_info; > + > +/* > + * Some TDX SEAMCALLs (TDH.MNG.CREATE, TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB, > + * TDH.MNG.KEY.RECLAIMID, TDH.MNG.KEY.FREEID etc) tries to acquire a global lock > + * internally in TDX module. If failed, TDX_OPERAND_BUSY is returned without > + * spinning or waiting due to a constraint on execution time. It's caller's > + * responsibility to avoid race (or retry on TDX_OPERAND_BUSY). Use this mutex > + * to avoid race in TDX module because the kernel knows better about scheduling. > + */ > +static DEFINE_MUTEX(tdx_lock); > +static struct mutex *tdx_mng_key_config_lock; > + > +static __always_inline hpa_t set_hkid_to_hpa(hpa_t pa, u16 hkid) > +{ > + return pa | ((hpa_t)hkid << boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits); > +} > + > +static inline bool is_td_created(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx) > +{ > + return kvm_tdx->tdr_pa; > +} > + > +static inline void tdx_hkid_free(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx) > +{ > + tdx_guest_keyid_free(kvm_tdx->hkid); > + kvm_tdx->hkid = 0; > +} > + > +static inline bool is_hkid_assigned(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx) > +{ > + return kvm_tdx->hkid > 0; > +} > + > int tdx_hardware_enable(void) > { > return tdx_cpu_enable(); > } > > +static void tdx_clear_page(unsigned long page_pa) > +{ > + const void *zero_page = (const void *) __va(page_to_phys(ZERO_PAGE(0))); > + void *page = __va(page_pa); > + unsigned long i; > + > + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B)) { > + clear_page(page); > + return; > + } > + > + /* > + * Zeroing the page is only necessary for systems with MKTME-i: > + * when re-assign one page from old keyid to a new keyid, MOVDIR64B is > + * required to clear/write the page with new keyid to prevent integrity > + * error when read on the page with new keyid. > + * > + * clflush doesn't flush cache with HKID set. > + * The cache line could be poisoned (even without MKTME-i), clear the > + * poison bit. > + */ > + for (i = 0; i < PAGE_SIZE; i += 64) > + movdir64b(page + i, zero_page); > + /* > + * MOVDIR64B store uses WC buffer. Prevent following memory reads > + * from seeing potentially poisoned cache. > + */ > + __mb(); > +} > + > +static int tdx_reclaim_page(hpa_t pa, bool do_wb, u16 hkid) > +{ > + struct tdx_module_output out; > + u64 err; > + > + do { > + err = tdh_phymem_page_reclaim(pa, &out); > + /* > + * TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.RECLAIM is allowed only when TD is shutdown. > + * state. i.e. destructing TD. > + * TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.RECLAIM requires TDR and target page. > + * Because we're destructing TD, it's rare to contend with TDR. > + */ > + } while (err == (TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_RCX)); > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) { > + pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM, err, &out); > + return -EIO; > + } > + > + if (do_wb) { > + /* > + * Only TDR page gets into this path. No contention is expected > + * because of the last page of TD. > + */ > + err = tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd(set_hkid_to_hpa(pa, hkid)); > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) { > + pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, err, NULL); > + return -EIO; > + } > + } > + > + tdx_clear_page(pa); > + return 0; > +} > + > +static void tdx_reclaim_td_page(unsigned long td_page_pa) > +{ > + if (!td_page_pa) > + return; > + /* > + * TDCX are being reclaimed. TDX module maps TDCX with HKID > + * assigned to the TD. Here the cache associated to the TD > + * was already flushed by TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB before here, So > + * cache doesn't need to be flushed again. > + */ > + if (tdx_reclaim_page(td_page_pa, false, 0)) > + /* > + * Leak the page on failure: > + * tdx_reclaim_page() returns an error if and only if there's an > + * unexpected, fatal error, e.g. a SEAMCALL with bad params, > + * incorrect concurrency in KVM, a TDX Module bug, etc. > + * Retrying at a later point is highly unlikely to be > + * successful. > + * No log here as tdx_reclaim_page() already did. > + */ > + return; > + free_page((unsigned long)__va(td_page_pa)); > +} > + > +static int tdx_do_tdh_phymem_cache_wb(void *param) > +{ > + u64 err = 0; > + > + do { > + err = tdh_phymem_cache_wb(!!err); > + } while (err == TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE); > + > + /* Other thread may have done for us. */ > + if (err == TDX_NO_HKID_READY_TO_WBCACHE) > + err = TDX_SUCCESS; > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) { > + pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_CACHE_WB, err, NULL); > + return -EIO; > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm) > +{ > + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm); > + cpumask_var_t packages; > + bool cpumask_allocated; > + u64 err; > + int ret; > + int i; > + > + if (!is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx)) > + return; > + > + if (!is_td_created(kvm_tdx)) > + goto free_hkid; > + > + cpumask_allocated = zalloc_cpumask_var(&packages, GFP_KERNEL); > + cpus_read_lock(); > + for_each_online_cpu(i) { > + if (cpumask_allocated && > + cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i), > + packages)) > + continue; > + > + /* > + * We can destroy multiple the guest TDs simultaneously. > + * Prevent tdh_phymem_cache_wb from returning TDX_BUSY by > + * serialization. > + */ > + mutex_lock(&tdx_lock); > + ret = smp_call_on_cpu(i, tdx_do_tdh_phymem_cache_wb, NULL, 1); > + mutex_unlock(&tdx_lock); > + if (ret) > + break; > + } > + cpus_read_unlock(); > + free_cpumask_var(packages); > + > + mutex_lock(&tdx_lock); > + err = tdh_mng_key_freeid(kvm_tdx->tdr_pa); > + mutex_unlock(&tdx_lock); > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) { > + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_KEY_FREEID, err, NULL); > + pr_err("tdh_mng_key_freeid failed. HKID %d is leaked.\n", > + kvm_tdx->hkid); > + return; > + } > + > +free_hkid: > + tdx_hkid_free(kvm_tdx); > +} > + > +void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm) > +{ > + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm); > + int i; > + > + /* Can't reclaim or free TD pages if teardown failed. */ > + if (is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx)) > + return; > + > + if (kvm_tdx->tdcs_pa) { > + for (i = 0; i < tdx_info.nr_tdcs_pages; i++) > + tdx_reclaim_td_page(kvm_tdx->tdcs_pa[i]); > + kfree(kvm_tdx->tdcs_pa); > + kvm_tdx->tdcs_pa = NULL; > + } > + > + if (!kvm_tdx->tdr_pa) > + return; > + /* > + * TDX module maps TDR with TDX global HKID. TDX module may access TDR > + * while operating on TD (Especially reclaiming TDCS). Cache flush with > + * TDX global HKID is needed. > + */ > + if (tdx_reclaim_page(kvm_tdx->tdr_pa, true, tdx_global_keyid)) > + return; > + > + free_page((unsigned long)__va(kvm_tdx->tdr_pa)); > + kvm_tdx->tdr_pa = 0; > +} > + > +static int tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config(void *param) > +{ > + hpa_t *tdr_p = param; > + u64 err; > + > + do { > + err = tdh_mng_key_config(*tdr_p); > + > + /* > + * If it failed to generate a random key, retry it because this > + * is typically caused by an entropy error of the CPU's random > + * number generator. > + */ > + } while (err == TDX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILED); > + > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) { > + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_KEY_CONFIG, err, NULL); > + return -EIO; > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int __tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm); > + > +int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) > +{ > + /* > + * TDX has its own limit of the number of vcpus in addition to > + * KVM_MAX_VCPUS. > + */ > + kvm->max_vcpus = min(kvm->max_vcpus, TDX_MAX_VCPUS); > + > + /* Place holder for TDX specific logic. */ > + return __tdx_td_init(kvm); > +} > + > int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp) > { > struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps; > @@ -102,6 +368,160 @@ int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp) > return 0; > } > > +static int __tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm) > +{ > + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm); > + cpumask_var_t packages; > + unsigned long *tdcs_pa = NULL; > + unsigned long tdr_pa = 0; > + unsigned long va; > + int ret, i; > + u64 err; > + > + ret = tdx_guest_keyid_alloc(); > + if (ret < 0) > + return ret; > + kvm_tdx->hkid = ret; > + > + va = __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); > + if (!va) > + goto free_hkid; > + tdr_pa = __pa(va); > + > + tdcs_pa = kcalloc(tdx_info.nr_tdcs_pages, sizeof(*kvm_tdx->tdcs_pa), > + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO); > + if (!tdcs_pa) > + goto free_tdr; > + for (i = 0; i < tdx_info.nr_tdcs_pages; i++) { > + va = __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); > + if (!va) > + goto free_tdcs; > + tdcs_pa[i] = __pa(va); > + } > + > + if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&packages, GFP_KERNEL)) { > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + goto free_tdcs; > + } > + cpus_read_lock(); > + /* > + * Need at least one CPU of the package to be online in order to > + * program all packages for host key id. Check it. > + */ > + for_each_present_cpu(i) > + cpumask_set_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i), packages); > + for_each_online_cpu(i) > + cpumask_clear_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i), packages); > + if (!cpumask_empty(packages)) { > + ret = -EIO; > + /* > + * Because it's hard for human operator to figure out the > + * reason, warn it. > + */ > + pr_warn("All packages need to have online CPU to create TD. Online CPU and retry.\n"); > + goto free_packages; > + } > + > + /* > + * Acquire global lock to avoid TDX_OPERAND_BUSY: > + * TDH.MNG.CREATE and other APIs try to lock the global Key Owner > + * Table (KOT) to track the assigned TDX private HKID. It doesn't spin > + * to acquire the lock, returns TDX_OPERAND_BUSY instead, and let the > + * caller to handle the contention. This is because of time limitation > + * usable inside the TDX module and OS/VMM knows better about process > + * scheduling. > + * > + * APIs to acquire the lock of KOT: > + * TDH.MNG.CREATE, TDH.MNG.KEY.FREEID, TDH.MNG.VPFLUSHDONE, and > + * TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB. > + */ > + mutex_lock(&tdx_lock); > + err = tdh_mng_create(tdr_pa, kvm_tdx->hkid); In the latest (March 2023 ver.) IntelĀ® TDX Module v1.5 ABI Specification, error code 0x80000203 represents TDX_RND_NO_ENTROPY: Random number generation (e.g., RDRAND or RDSEED) failed because the hardware random number generator did not have enough entropy. The caller should retry the operation. > + mutex_unlock(&tdx_lock); > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) { > + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_CREATE, err, NULL); > + ret = -EIO; > + goto free_packages; > + } > + kvm_tdx->tdr_pa = tdr_pa; > + > + for_each_online_cpu(i) { > + int pkg = topology_physical_package_id(i); > + > + if (cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(pkg, packages)) > + continue; > + > + /* > + * Program the memory controller in the package with an > + * encryption key associated to a TDX private host key id > + * assigned to this TDR. Concurrent operations on same memory > + * controller results in TDX_OPERAND_BUSY. Avoid this race by > + * mutex. > + */ > + mutex_lock(&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[pkg]); > + ret = smp_call_on_cpu(i, tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config, > + &kvm_tdx->tdr_pa, true); > + mutex_unlock(&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[pkg]); > + if (ret) > + break; > + } > + cpus_read_unlock(); > + free_cpumask_var(packages); > + if (ret) > + goto teardown; > + > + kvm_tdx->tdcs_pa = tdcs_pa; > + for (i = 0; i < tdx_info.nr_tdcs_pages; i++) { > + err = tdh_mng_addcx(kvm_tdx->tdr_pa, tdcs_pa[i]); > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) { > + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_ADDCX, err, NULL); > + for (i++; i < tdx_info.nr_tdcs_pages; i++) { > + free_page((unsigned long)__va(tdcs_pa[i])); > + tdcs_pa[i] = 0; > + } > + ret = -EIO; > + goto teardown; > + } > + } > + > + /* > + * Note, TDH_MNG_INIT cannot be invoked here. TDH_MNG_INIT requires a dedicated > + * ioctl() to define the configure CPUID values for the TD. > + */ > + return 0; > + > + /* > + * The sequence for freeing resources from a partially initialized TD > + * varies based on where in the initialization flow failure occurred. > + * Simply use the full teardown and destroy, which naturally play nice > + * with partial initialization. > + */ > +teardown: > + tdx_mmu_release_hkid(kvm); > + tdx_vm_free(kvm); > + return ret; > + > +free_packages: > + cpus_read_unlock(); > + free_cpumask_var(packages); > +free_tdcs: > + for (i = 0; i < tdx_info.nr_tdcs_pages; i++) { > + if (tdcs_pa[i]) > + free_page((unsigned long)__va(tdcs_pa[i])); > + } > + kfree(tdcs_pa); > + kvm_tdx->tdcs_pa = NULL; > + > +free_tdr: > + if (tdr_pa) > + free_page((unsigned long)__va(tdr_pa)); > + kvm_tdx->tdr_pa = 0; > +free_hkid: > + if (is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx)) > + tdx_hkid_free(kvm_tdx); > + return ret; > +} > + > int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > { > struct kvm_tdx_cmd tdx_cmd; > @@ -142,9 +562,11 @@ static int __init tdx_module_setup(void) > return ret; > } > > - /* Sanitary check just in case. */ > tdsysinfo = tdx_get_sysinfo(); > WARN_ON(tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config > TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS); > + tdx_info = (struct tdx_info) { > + .nr_tdcs_pages = tdsysinfo->tdcs_base_size / PAGE_SIZE, > + }; > > pr_info("TDX is supported.\n"); > return 0; > @@ -163,6 +585,8 @@ static int __init tdx_cpu_enable_cpu(void *unused) > > int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) > { > + int max_pkgs; > + int i; > int r; > > if (!enable_ept) { > @@ -170,6 +594,14 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) > return -EINVAL; > } > > + max_pkgs = topology_max_packages(); > + tdx_mng_key_config_lock = kcalloc(max_pkgs, sizeof(*tdx_mng_key_config_lock), > + GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!tdx_mng_key_config_lock) > + return -ENOMEM; > + for (i = 0; i < max_pkgs; i++) > + mutex_init(&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[i]); > + > /* tdx_enable() in tdx_module_setup() requires cpus lock. */ > cpus_read_lock(); > /* TDX requires VMX. */ > @@ -193,3 +625,9 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) > > return r; > } > + > +void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void) > +{ > + /* kfree accepts NULL. */ > + kfree(tdx_mng_key_config_lock); > +} > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h > index 3860aa351bd9..4b790503e43e 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h > @@ -8,7 +8,11 @@ > > struct kvm_tdx { > struct kvm kvm; > - /* TDX specific members follow. */ > + > + unsigned long tdr_pa; > + unsigned long *tdcs_pa; > + > + int hkid; > }; > > struct vcpu_tdx { > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h > index 8118647aa8ca..8f87eeeab97c 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h > @@ -139,19 +139,28 @@ void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); > > #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST > int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops); > +void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void); > int tdx_hardware_enable(void); > bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type); > int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp); > > int tdx_vm_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap); > +int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm); > +void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm); > +void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm); > int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp); > #else > static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return -ENOSYS; } > +static inline void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void) {} > static inline int tdx_hardware_enable(void) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } > static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) { return false; } > static inline int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }; > > static inline int tdx_vm_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enable_cap *cap) { return -EINVAL; }; > +static inline int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } > +static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm) {} > +static inline void tdx_flush_shadow_all_private(struct kvm *kvm) {} > +static inline void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm) {} > static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } > #endif > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > index 7b02dd40ef21..89fd8074c20c 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > @@ -12398,6 +12398,7 @@ void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm) > kvm_page_track_cleanup(kvm); > kvm_xen_destroy_vm(kvm); > kvm_hv_destroy_vm(kvm); > + static_call_cond(kvm_x86_vm_free)(kvm); > } > > static void memslot_rmap_free(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) > @@ -12710,6 +12711,13 @@ void kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > > void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all(struct kvm *kvm) > { > + /* > + * kvm_mmu_zap_all() zaps both private and shared page tables. Before > + * tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some TD resources to > + * be destroyed (i.e. keyID must have been reclaimed, etc). Invoke > + * kvm_x86_flush_shadow_all_private() for this. > + */ > + static_call_cond(kvm_x86_flush_shadow_all_private)(kvm); > kvm_mmu_zap_all(kvm); > } >