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Date:   Tue, 4 Apr 2023 11:25:07 +0300
From:   "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
To:     Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mm: restrictedmem: Allow userspace to specify
 mount for memfd_restricted
Message-ID: <20230404082507.sbyfahwc4gdupmya@box.shutemov.name>
References: <cover.1680306489.git.ackerleytng@google.com>
 <592ebd9e33a906ba026d56dc68f42d691706f865.1680306489.git.ackerleytng@google.com>
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In-Reply-To: <592ebd9e33a906ba026d56dc68f42d691706f865.1680306489.git.ackerleytng@google.com>
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On Fri, Mar 31, 2023 at 11:50:39PM +0000, Ackerley Tng wrote:
> By default, the backing shmem file for a restrictedmem fd is created
> on shmem's kernel space mount.
> 
> With this patch, an optional tmpfs mount can be specified via an fd,
> which will be used as the mountpoint for backing the shmem file
> associated with a restrictedmem fd.
> 
> This will help restrictedmem fds inherit the properties of the
> provided tmpfs mounts, for example, hugepage allocation hints, NUMA
> binding hints, etc.
> 
> Permissions for the fd passed to memfd_restricted() is modeled after
> the openat() syscall, since both of these allow creation of a file
> upon a mount/directory.
> 
> Permission to reference the mount the fd represents is checked upon fd
> creation by other syscalls (e.g. fsmount(), open(), or open_tree(),
> etc) and any process that can present memfd_restricted() with a valid
> fd is expected to have obtained permission to use the mount
> represented by the fd. This behavior is intended to parallel that of
> the openat() syscall.
> 
> memfd_restricted() will check that the tmpfs superblock is
> writable, and that the mount is also writable, before attempting to
> create a restrictedmem file on the mount.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/syscalls.h           |  2 +-
>  include/uapi/linux/restrictedmem.h |  8 ++++
>  mm/restrictedmem.c                 | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>  3 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/restrictedmem.h
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
> index f9e9e0c820c5..a23c4c385cd3 100644
> --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
> +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
> @@ -1056,7 +1056,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_memfd_secret(unsigned int flags);
>  asmlinkage long sys_set_mempolicy_home_node(unsigned long start, unsigned long len,
>  					    unsigned long home_node,
>  					    unsigned long flags);
> -asmlinkage long sys_memfd_restricted(unsigned int flags);
> +asmlinkage long sys_memfd_restricted(unsigned int flags, int mount_fd);
> 
>  /*
>   * Architecture-specific system calls
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/restrictedmem.h b/include/uapi/linux/restrictedmem.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..22d6f2285f6d
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/restrictedmem.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
> +#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_RESTRICTEDMEM_H
> +#define _UAPI_LINUX_RESTRICTEDMEM_H
> +
> +/* flags for memfd_restricted */
> +#define RMFD_USERMNT		0x0001U
> +
> +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_RESTRICTEDMEM_H */
> diff --git a/mm/restrictedmem.c b/mm/restrictedmem.c
> index c5d869d8c2d8..f7b62364a31a 100644
> --- a/mm/restrictedmem.c
> +++ b/mm/restrictedmem.c
> @@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
>  // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> -#include "linux/sbitmap.h"
> +#include <linux/namei.h>
>  #include <linux/pagemap.h>
>  #include <linux/pseudo_fs.h>
>  #include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
>  #include <linux/syscalls.h>
>  #include <uapi/linux/falloc.h>
>  #include <uapi/linux/magic.h>
> +#include <uapi/linux/restrictedmem.h>
>  #include <linux/restrictedmem.h>
> 
>  struct restrictedmem {
> @@ -189,19 +190,20 @@ static struct file *restrictedmem_file_create(struct file *memfd)
>  	return file;
>  }
> 
> -SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_restricted, unsigned int, flags)
> +static int restrictedmem_create(struct vfsmount *mount)
>  {
>  	struct file *file, *restricted_file;
>  	int fd, err;
> 
> -	if (flags)
> -		return -EINVAL;
> -
>  	fd = get_unused_fd_flags(0);
>  	if (fd < 0)
>  		return fd;
> 
> -	file = shmem_file_setup("memfd:restrictedmem", 0, VM_NORESERVE);
> +	if (mount)
> +		file = shmem_file_setup_with_mnt(mount, "memfd:restrictedmem", 0, VM_NORESERVE);
> +	else
> +		file = shmem_file_setup("memfd:restrictedmem", 0, VM_NORESERVE);
> +
>  	if (IS_ERR(file)) {
>  		err = PTR_ERR(file);
>  		goto err_fd;
> @@ -223,6 +225,66 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_restricted, unsigned int, flags)
>  	return err;
>  }
> 
> +static bool is_shmem_mount(struct vfsmount *mnt)
> +{
> +	return mnt && mnt->mnt_sb && mnt->mnt_sb->s_magic == TMPFS_MAGIC;
> +}
> +
> +static bool is_mount_root(struct file *file)
> +{
> +	return file->f_path.dentry == file->f_path.mnt->mnt_root;
> +}
> +
> +static int restrictedmem_create_on_user_mount(int mount_fd)
> +{
> +	int ret;
> +	struct fd f;
> +	struct vfsmount *mnt;
> +
> +	f = fdget_raw(mount_fd);
> +	if (!f.file)
> +		return -EBADF;
> +
> +	ret = -EINVAL;
> +	if (!is_mount_root(f.file))
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	mnt = f.file->f_path.mnt;
> +	if (!is_shmem_mount(mnt))
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	ret = file_permission(f.file, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);

Why MAY_EXEC?

> +	if (ret)
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	ret = mnt_want_write(mnt);
> +	if (unlikely(ret))
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	ret = restrictedmem_create(mnt);
> +
> +	mnt_drop_write(mnt);
> +out:
> +	fdput(f);
> +
> +	return ret;
> +}

We need review from fs folks. Look mostly sensible, but I have no
experience in fs.

> +
> +SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_restricted, unsigned int, flags, int, mount_fd)
> +{
> +	if (flags & ~RMFD_USERMNT)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	if (flags == RMFD_USERMNT) {
> +		if (mount_fd < 0)
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +
> +		return restrictedmem_create_on_user_mount(mount_fd);
> +	} else {
> +		return restrictedmem_create(NULL);
> +	}

Maybe restructure with single restrictedmem_create() call?

	struct vfsmount *mnt = NULL;

	if (flags == RMFD_USERMNT) {
		...
		mnt = ...();
	}

	return restrictedmem_create(mnt);
> +}
> +
>  int restrictedmem_bind(struct file *file, pgoff_t start, pgoff_t end,
>  		       struct restrictedmem_notifier *notifier, bool exclusive)
>  {
> --
> 2.40.0.348.gf938b09366-goog

-- 
  Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov