Received: by 2002:a05:6358:11c7:b0:104:8066:f915 with SMTP id i7csp1762042rwl; Thu, 6 Apr 2023 00:22:17 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AKy350b6KZCM8CyXgGrwYpQ5f7+TKB0G/S9932IC3pqhjfOUSgx832qqcg+CuUEDYYyrul6anSmU X-Received: by 2002:a17:90b:1c86:b0:23b:3699:b8a9 with SMTP id oo6-20020a17090b1c8600b0023b3699b8a9mr9878907pjb.17.1680765737378; Thu, 06 Apr 2023 00:22:17 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1680765737; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=bL4LZGGuhYbwVX2KBnga3NJgYkJhMAZl0s6VBoqejATXRu5qfwVrTHsYsaMaujG6gY ggu4m/cEzUekkTAmnqneeiZYUdCK8gwCnlsOg6Q+DfyMok/NDjDiOYqn+DMBasyWLBdH SOeiw92ZYB/pYn5wC9VFCyKnaxChx+BcarY2Cv0ffadtkmJmfJfM9wGiE5w9yFVOLMs1 f6TXOSLoqNKyS0iaT1TCyDcxyyWyry9sWD0bQQBltzyCwaetX7Z9Ky5Sj3FndjQDb2Qd DSoWdp1ADs4V0iPk89QnbEMVXTRUAgr1QABZztoIcYhcBLguBZW+8ji26taGaya/BF0l DmqA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from; bh=Vm/l/XGcrGd4NSEfYBJ7ow+wZeJ72hGDipP3c31XatE=; b=dfaAmNpAYaWlN7F/jkXjRehSmBrk+gjivGvTBKzXX8TD+glLE0oLd1HAFSX1/K2eBy bMg+KMuJJ1upHN7DXkzKry3qddeySEIMCtkDMEiVphhsDfCHg5HmuiHUCdkOro7F03uM eX6M0FdC3meQfQnP4W0ytsLd61kq41mfYCyIpmDMKwwPTkrhWOkDuOhSGVt35PniHsqy R/EjdVv/eSpXnVsvSA7UU3Ci9p0vxwaQ5RGSZkuQKrnGEDP4vL3kYyhIQgW81De6hQST 440OKrwIk30NUBxASMw/hmrKFziweA/8nNTRuAtRdtauRWwIEHnqMbqVKWSvPj5MixMp IBCg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=QUARANTINE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=huawei.com Return-Path: Received: from out1.vger.email (out1.vger.email. [2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id x7-20020a17090a8a8700b00219f65e19fcsi3184624pjn.170.2023.04.06.00.22.06; Thu, 06 Apr 2023 00:22:17 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=QUARANTINE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=huawei.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235978AbjDFHNt (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 6 Apr 2023 03:13:49 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:58334 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S235626AbjDFHNp (ORCPT ); Thu, 6 Apr 2023 03:13:45 -0400 Received: from szxga03-in.huawei.com (szxga03-in.huawei.com [45.249.212.189]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 554D910D7 for ; Thu, 6 Apr 2023 00:13:43 -0700 (PDT) Received: from dggpemm100009.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.30.72.55]) by szxga03-in.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4PsXlM65T3zKr98; Thu, 6 Apr 2023 15:13:03 +0800 (CST) Received: from huawei.com (10.175.101.6) by dggpemm100009.china.huawei.com (7.185.36.113) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2507.23; Thu, 6 Apr 2023 15:13:41 +0800 From: ZhaoLong Wang To: , , CC: , , , Subject: [PATCH 1/2] ubi: fix slab-out-of-bounds in ubi_eba_get_ldesc+0xfb/0x130 Date: Thu, 6 Apr 2023 15:13:30 +0800 Message-ID: <20230406071331.1247429-2-wangzhaolong1@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.31.1 In-Reply-To: <20230406071331.1247429-1-wangzhaolong1@huawei.com> References: <20230406071331.1247429-1-wangzhaolong1@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII X-Originating-IP: [10.175.101.6] X-ClientProxiedBy: dggems704-chm.china.huawei.com (10.3.19.181) To dggpemm100009.china.huawei.com (7.185.36.113) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.3 required=5.0 tests=RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Guo Xuenan When using ioctl interface to resize ubi volume, ubi_resize_volume will resize eba table first, but not change vol->reserved_pebs in the same atomic context which may cause concurrency access eba table. For example, When user do shrink ubi volume A calling ubi_resize_volume, while the other thread is writing (volume B) and triggering wear-leveling, which may calling ubi_write_fastmap, under these circumstances, KASAN may report: slab-out-of-bounds in ubi_eba_get_ldesc+0xfb/0x130. The main work of this patch include: 1. fix races in ubi_resize_volume and ubi_update_fastmap, to avoid eba_tbl read out of bounds. first, we make eba_tbl and reserved_pebs updating under the protect of vol->volumes_lock. second, rollback volume in case of resize failure. Also mention that for volume shrinking failure, since part of volume has been shrunk and unmapped, there is no need to recover {rsvd/avail}_pebs. 2. fix some memleak in error path of ubi_resize_volume when destroy new_eba_tbl. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ubi_eba_get_ldesc+0xfb/0x130 [ubi] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800f43f570 by task kworker/u16:0/7 CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc7 #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-ubifs_0_0) Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x4d/0x66 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x41/0x60 kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf ubi_eba_get_ldesc+0xfb/0x130 [ubi] ubi_update_fastmap.cold+0x60f/0xc7d [ubi] ubi_wl_get_peb+0x25b/0x4f0 [ubi] try_write_vid_and_data+0x9a/0x4d0 [ubi] ubi_eba_write_leb+0x7e4/0x17d0 [ubi] ubi_leb_map+0x1a0/0x2c0 [ubi] ubifs_leb_map+0x139/0x270 [ubifs] ubifs_add_bud_to_log+0xb40/0xf30 [ubifs] make_reservation+0x86e/0xb00 [ubifs] ubifs_jnl_write_data+0x430/0x9d0 [ubifs] do_writepage+0x1d1/0x550 [ubifs] ubifs_writepage+0x37c/0x670 [ubifs] __writepage+0x67/0x170 write_cache_pages+0x259/0xa90 do_writepages+0x277/0x5d0 __writeback_single_inode+0xb8/0x850 writeback_sb_inodes+0x4b3/0xb20 __writeback_inodes_wb+0xc1/0x220 wb_writeback+0x59f/0x740 wb_workfn+0x6d0/0xca0 process_one_work+0x711/0xfc0 worker_thread+0x95/0xd00 kthread+0x3a6/0x490 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Allocated by task 711: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x50 __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 ubi_eba_create_table+0x88/0x1a0 [ubi] ubi_resize_volume.cold+0x175/0xae7 [ubi] ubi_cdev_ioctl+0x57f/0x1a60 [ubi] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x13a/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x50 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb7/0xc0 call_rcu+0xd6/0x1000 blk_stat_free_callback+0x28/0x30 blk_release_queue+0x8a/0x2e0 kobject_put+0x186/0x4c0 scsi_device_dev_release_usercontext+0x620/0xbd0 execute_in_process_context+0x2f/0x120 device_release+0xa4/0x240 kobject_put+0x186/0x4c0 put_device+0x20/0x30 __scsi_remove_device+0x1c3/0x300 scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x2140/0x2eb0 __scsi_scan_target+0x1f2/0xbb0 scsi_scan_channel+0x11b/0x1a0 scsi_scan_host_selected+0x24c/0x310 do_scsi_scan_host+0x1e0/0x250 do_scan_async+0x45/0x490 async_run_entry_fn+0xa2/0x530 process_one_work+0x711/0xfc0 worker_thread+0x95/0xd00 kthread+0x3a6/0x490 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800f43f500 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128 The buggy address is located 112 bytes inside of 128-byte region [ffff88800f43f500, ffff88800f43f580) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00003d0f00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xf43c head:ffffea00003d0f00 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x1fffff80010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 001fffff80010200 ffffea000046ba08 ffffea0000457208 ffff88810004d1c0 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88800f43f400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88800f43f480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88800f43f500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc ^ ffff88800f43f580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88800f43f600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc The following steps can used to reproduce: Process 1: write and trigger ubi wear-leveling ubimkvol /dev/ubi0 -s 5000MiB -N v1 ubimkvol /dev/ubi0 -s 2000MiB -N v2 ubimkvol /dev/ubi0 -s 10MiB -N v3 mount -t ubifs /dev/ubi0_0 /mnt/ubifs while true; do filename=/mnt/ubifs/$((RANDOM)) dd if=/dev/random of=${filename} bs=1M count=$((RANDOM % 1000)) rm -rf ${filename} sync /mnt/ubifs/ done Process 2: do random resize struct ubi_rsvol_req req; req.vol_id = 1; req.bytes = (rand() % 50) * 512KB; ioctl(fd, UBI_IOCRSVOL, &req); Signed-off-by: Guo Xuenan Signed-off-by: ZhaoLong Wang --- drivers/mtd/ubi/vmt.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/ubi/vmt.c b/drivers/mtd/ubi/vmt.c index 2c867d16f89f..97294def01eb 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/ubi/vmt.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/ubi/vmt.c @@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ int ubi_resize_volume(struct ubi_volume_desc *desc, int reserved_pebs) struct ubi_device *ubi = vol->ubi; struct ubi_vtbl_record vtbl_rec; struct ubi_eba_table *new_eba_tbl = NULL; + struct ubi_eba_table *old_eba_tbl = NULL; int vol_id = vol->vol_id; if (ubi->ro_mode) @@ -453,10 +454,13 @@ int ubi_resize_volume(struct ubi_volume_desc *desc, int reserved_pebs) err = -ENOSPC; goto out_free; } + ubi->avail_pebs -= pebs; ubi->rsvd_pebs += pebs; ubi_eba_copy_table(vol, new_eba_tbl, vol->reserved_pebs); - ubi_eba_replace_table(vol, new_eba_tbl); + old_eba_tbl = vol->eba_tbl; + vol->eba_tbl = new_eba_tbl; + vol->reserved_pebs = reserved_pebs; spin_unlock(&ubi->volumes_lock); } @@ -471,7 +475,9 @@ int ubi_resize_volume(struct ubi_volume_desc *desc, int reserved_pebs) ubi->avail_pebs -= pebs; ubi_update_reserved(ubi); ubi_eba_copy_table(vol, new_eba_tbl, reserved_pebs); - ubi_eba_replace_table(vol, new_eba_tbl); + old_eba_tbl = vol->eba_tbl; + vol->eba_tbl = new_eba_tbl; + vol->reserved_pebs = reserved_pebs; spin_unlock(&ubi->volumes_lock); } @@ -493,7 +499,6 @@ int ubi_resize_volume(struct ubi_volume_desc *desc, int reserved_pebs) if (err) goto out_acc; - vol->reserved_pebs = reserved_pebs; if (vol->vol_type == UBI_DYNAMIC_VOLUME) { vol->used_ebs = reserved_pebs; vol->last_eb_bytes = vol->usable_leb_size; @@ -501,19 +506,24 @@ int ubi_resize_volume(struct ubi_volume_desc *desc, int reserved_pebs) (long long)vol->used_ebs * vol->usable_leb_size; } + /* destroy old table */ + ubi_eba_destroy_table(old_eba_tbl); ubi_volume_notify(ubi, vol, UBI_VOLUME_RESIZED); self_check_volumes(ubi); return err; out_acc: + spin_lock(&ubi->volumes_lock); + vol->reserved_pebs = reserved_pebs - pebs; if (pebs > 0) { - spin_lock(&ubi->volumes_lock); ubi->rsvd_pebs -= pebs; ubi->avail_pebs += pebs; - spin_unlock(&ubi->volumes_lock); + ubi_eba_copy_table(vol, old_eba_tbl, vol->reserved_pebs); + } else { + ubi_eba_copy_table(vol, old_eba_tbl, reserved_pebs); } - return err; - + vol->eba_tbl = old_eba_tbl; + spin_unlock(&ubi->volumes_lock); out_free: ubi_eba_destroy_table(new_eba_tbl); return err; -- 2.31.1