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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id bs189-20020a6328c6000000b005136987a02esi15052723pgb.728.2023.04.18.11.36.51; Tue, 18 Apr 2023 11:37:05 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@intel.com header.s=Intel header.b=cYNXaWxp; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232632AbjDRSYD (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 18 Apr 2023 14:24:03 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:53632 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232569AbjDRSYB (ORCPT ); Tue, 18 Apr 2023 14:24:01 -0400 Received: from mga17.intel.com (mga17.intel.com [192.55.52.151]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B7C2976BE; Tue, 18 Apr 2023 11:24:00 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1681842240; x=1713378240; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references: mime-version:in-reply-to; bh=pRPyD6+WTQL2wAAqK/kit61fm9+alLRGx6xYjjpFuI8=; b=cYNXaWxpdW2wgI+5X2DytRRxLMBxS7eQYhcYDyh7+l7okwN0DZT+SQVe ikSgCoY5FkCVMnhHMPo8F/dwVPTkA4wUwz3E2M2wbbaOoumliIfl9hYEk s8pKSRqoC66dwr0UIlG7IA6RWnlCsJSYejygcC9alUL+7UrnCiy8JawNg ovpvZjM5tyeSxbxP45ANCu8LcpYezqollpAOOL/scFEt4SLgDNUEJ6bUx FAgTn9edmJCmDa5ocsrVIYdQytvxChsrBCTRwsOmTc9wb4KaiHCvK8P5z grqW6t/KUEUytAj7mcIne05zWX/s2ZfmQSSCN2cgPw6LTiWO2Uvm47hw/ w==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10684"; a="325587922" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.99,207,1677571200"; d="scan'208";a="325587922" Received: from orsmga007.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.58]) by fmsmga107.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 18 Apr 2023 11:24:00 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10684"; a="684696494" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.99,207,1677571200"; d="scan'208";a="684696494" Received: from agluck-desk3.sc.intel.com ([172.25.222.78]) by orsmga007-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 18 Apr 2023 11:24:00 -0700 Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2023 11:23:58 -0700 From: Tony Luck To: Yazen Ghannam Cc: Borislav Petkov , x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-edac@vger.kernel.org, patches@lists.linux.dev Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/mce: Check that memory address is usable for recovery Message-ID: References: <20230322005131.174499-1-tony.luck@intel.com> <5f833d37-e961-73c4-3629-74884e8b6c59@amd.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <5f833d37-e961-73c4-3629-74884e8b6c59@amd.com> X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.4 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_NONE,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Apr 18, 2023 at 01:51:37PM -0400, Yazen Ghannam wrote: > I agree. And I think all these checks should be baked into the severity. > We'll need additional, fine-grained severity levels though. > > The "m.cs" and "m.kflags" checks could also be baked in. > > Instead of just one AR severity: > ... > MCE_AR_SEVERITY, > MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY, > > replace it with specific cases: > ... > MCE_AR_USER_RECOV, > MCE_AR_USER_KILL, > MCE_AR_KERNEL_COPYIN, > MCE_AR_KERNEL_RECOV, > MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY, > > Then the #MC handler can look like this: > > if (worst < MCE_AR_USER_RECOV) > goto out; > > if (severity == MCE_AR_USER_RECOV) > queue_task_work(&m, msg, kill_me_maybe); > > if (severity == MCE_AR_USER_KILL) > force_sig(SIGBUS); > > if (severity == MCE_AR_KERNEL_COPYIN) > queue_task_work(&m, msg, kill_me_never); > > if (severity == MCE_AR_KERNEL_RECOV) { > if (!fixup_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_MC, 0, 0)) > mce_panic("Failed kernel mode recovery"); > } > > I can take a shot at this if it seems reasonable. That looks much cleaner. There may be some extra MCE_AR_KERNEL* options in the future (I'd like someday to address COPYOUT when the corrupt kernel data is in the page cache). But I don't think the number of cases is going to explode into dozens of cases. > What do you think? Brave person ... you are going to have to tinker with arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c ! Good luck. -Tony