Received: by 2002:a05:6358:9144:b0:117:f937:c515 with SMTP id r4csp472633rwr; Thu, 20 Apr 2023 01:55:56 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AKy350YGy5iT0wJUFav1s83QOaVik4sylyXtsxG0MFIaN195mk280ct57XYFvXUSHdVbbBr9fC2S X-Received: by 2002:a17:90a:de02:b0:247:2d9d:4722 with SMTP id m2-20020a17090ade0200b002472d9d4722mr1198622pjv.0.1681980956475; Thu, 20 Apr 2023 01:55:56 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1681980956; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=LaGOFZBnwwuaG95AX6/Np3KUAYIOVmTNuA+jZrE9XiqzTVUfhrYuJuYn0roYwkcdZJ x0Tu/qYWnPp0QgtBkzWhCwUwdJ1BQFVcIf6AEwa7B//hSmFCtbkHv0FMO0slCNK3eao8 +LeknJ84sNfv4ZI/mGWu6h2BfARFNvWxBWdn4H5llakP2J9T9CrNwcrbIIr0T74ir++6 LOIHjaroe0Jar/SWJR4lThuxmt9qyxKpgXHOx/xUVWEsGKEaFuMa5/mjTmpawT8Qdnr+ ULSCJdt2IBfx7io//GYCS8EQ/8Bk0JvK91wsY/DEWnZHzccsL5NjXllc/biGWZQC8TuJ SHdA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :user-agent:references:in-reply-to:date:cc:to:from:subject :message-id; bh=VEh4qS2WbQtMwDCPvUt2MtWI4eOFIIyH0Qm0qghfuvk=; b=vrQ0TlhlrbnPWCyQVoVxszjrv1hdsqTGUDtNFD/LEASKdhf5ekAmuwQG93jFfVVHqu ngMcBbVq7S43/yUJU7uwATExSTtEp+Nwi/MTn+6LDIzjVe9VlLw2RWpF9eM5I9xabApN 8yi3gmPCotguOZrvQ4U12ssgTZnMJMcFaKWM8X1UTLe0pSbqzVP2d03tuPECkVbY/05i 0Y3SSo9Yv0QwXbaorc3ciL4cyN6MNceDZjV6qCvCiSvP2ikthX8VDX+USvyzm1O8aFht OOTF1Ts22kui4yabzNsWWUysMSJ9inUalS0Bfm8PuzFt3VNox1osdakKJNvUB3aeljdl 5Ukg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from out1.vger.email (out1.vger.email. [2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id j35-20020a635523000000b00519a8f54d2esi1025328pgb.479.2023.04.20.01.55.45; Thu, 20 Apr 2023 01:55:56 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234546AbjDTIvq (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 20 Apr 2023 04:51:46 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:43062 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234179AbjDTIuy (ORCPT ); Thu, 20 Apr 2023 04:50:54 -0400 Received: from frasgout13.his.huawei.com (frasgout13.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.46]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DC4F34C18; Thu, 20 Apr 2023 01:49:11 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.228]) by frasgout13.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4Q2B0T5nZ7z9v7Gw; Thu, 20 Apr 2023 16:39:21 +0800 (CST) Received: from roberto-ThinkStation-P620 (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP2 (Coremail) with SMTP id GxC2BwAXxTtK_EBkfX87Ag--.1933S2; Thu, 20 Apr 2023 09:48:24 +0100 (CET) Message-ID: <2f90828cc8e9e1ab369790a3da687790c4348b0f.camel@huaweicloud.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH] Smack modifications for: security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook From: Roberto Sassu To: Mengchi Cheng Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org, jmorris@namei.org, kamatam@amazon.com, keescook@chromium.org, kpsingh@kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, miklos@szeredi.hu, nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org, paul@paul-moore.com, reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org, roberto.sassu@huawei.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org, serge@hallyn.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, yoonjaeh@amazon.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2023 10:48:06 +0200 In-Reply-To: <20230419192516.757220-1-mengcc@amazon.com> References: <0fccab67e496f10f4ee7bf2220e70a655013935f.camel@huaweicloud.com> <20230419192516.757220-1-mengcc@amazon.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" User-Agent: Evolution 3.36.5-0ubuntu1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-CM-TRANSID: GxC2BwAXxTtK_EBkfX87Ag--.1933S2 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoW3Gw18ur43Cw13Kr48AF4ktFb_yoW7Aw4xpF Z8Ga43Krs5Jw17CayvvF47AF4F9rWkGa15XFnFgry7AF13Kr1Igr98Xr12kryxJrsY93Wq vF4jvr9xZr4Uu37anT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUkjb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26ryj6rWUM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28lY4IEw2IIxxk0rwA2F7IY1VAKz4 vEj48ve4kI8wA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jr0_JF4l84ACjcxK6xIIjxv20xvEc7Cj xVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv67AKxVW8JVWxJwA2z4x0Y4vEx4A2jsIEc7CjxV AFwI0_Gr0_Gr1UM2AIxVAIcxkEcVAq07x20xvEncxIr21l5I8CrVACY4xI64kE6c02F40E x7xfMcIj6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r1j6r18McIj6I8E87Iv67AKxVWUJVW8JwAm72CE4IkC6x 0Yz7v_Jr0_Gr1lF7xvr2IY64vIr41lFIxGxcIEc7CjxVA2Y2ka0xkIwI1l42xK82IYc2Ij 64vIr41l4I8I3I0E4IkC6x0Yz7v_Jr0_Gr1lx2IqxVAqx4xG67AKxVWUJVWUGwC20s026x 8GjcxK67AKxVWUGVWUWwC2zVAF1VAY17CE14v26r4a6rW5MIIYrxkI7VAKI48JMIIF0xvE 2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jr0_JF4lIxAIcVC0I7IYx2IY6xkF7I0E14v26r4j6F4UMIIF0xvE42 xK8VAvwI8IcIk0rVWrZr1j6s0DMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE c7CjxVAFwI0_Gr0_Gr1UYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x07UZ18PUUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAgANBF1jj4hE8wAAsF X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, 2023-04-19 at 12:25 -0700, Mengchi Cheng wrote: > > I got some errors during xattr removal, so not sure if my patch was > > working properly or not (it happened also without it, didn't > > investigate more). > > > > However, I saw another discussion related to transmute: > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20230419002338.566487-1-mengcc@amazon.com/ > > > > I add the people in CC. > > > > The steps described were so easy to understand and executed, I tried > > without and with overlayfs. > > > > Without: > > > > # echo "_ system rwxatl" > /sys/fs/smackfs/load2 > > # mkdir /data > > # chsmack -a "system" /data > > # chsmack -t /data > > # mkdir -p /data/dir1/dir2 > > # chsmack /data/dir1 > > /data/dir1 access="system" transmute="TRUE" > > # chsmack /data/dir1/dir2 > > /data/dir1/dir2 access="system" transmute="TRUE" > > > > It seems to work, right? > > > > With overlay fs it didn't work, same result as the one Mengchi > > reported. Since Mengchi's solution was to set SMK_INODE_CHANGED, and I > > want to get rid of it, I thought to investigate more. > > > > Looking at smack_dentry_create_files_as(), I see that the label of the > > process is overwritten with the label of the transmuting directory. > > > > That causes smack_inode_init_security() to lookup the transmuting rule > > on the overridden credential, and not on the original one. > > > > In the example above, it means that, when overlayfs is creating the new > > inode, the label of the process is system, not _. So no transmute > > permission, and also the xattr will not be added, as observed by > > Mengchi. > > > > Hopefully I undertood the code, so in this particular case we would not > > need to override the label of the process in smack_dentry_create_files_ > > as(). > > > > If you see smack_inode_init_security(): > > > > struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); > > struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode); > > struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir); > > > > [...] > > > > if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) && > > smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) { > > isp = dsp; > > [...] > > > > xattr->value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS); > > > > This code is telling, if there is a transmute rule, and the directory > > is transmuting, set the label of the new inode to the label of the > > directory. That should be already the result that we wanted to obtain. > > > > The current code should have been doing it by overriding the label of > > the process in smack_dentry_create_files_as() with the label of the > > parent directory, and letting the inode being created with the > > overridden label of the process. The transmute xattr is not set due to > > the problem described above. > > > > So, as a quick test, I kept this patch with the change to xattr2->name, > > and skipped the label override in smack_dentry_create_files_as(). It > > worked, I get the same result as without overlayfs. Wondering if the > > process label override is necessary in other cases. > > If I understand correctly, removing the if block below is what you suggested. Yes, more or less is what I did. > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index cfcbb748da25..a867288e9de9 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -4769,8 +4769,8 @@ static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, > * providing access is transmuting use the containing > * directory label instead of the process label. > */ > - if (may > 0 && (may & MAY_TRANSMUTE)) > - ntsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode; > +// if (may > 0 && (may & MAY_TRANSMUTE)) > +// ntsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode; > } > return 0; > } > > This way will have issue in the following situation on the vanila kernel. > data in the lowerdir has "_" label before overlay and dir1 is already > created in the lowerdir. > # chsmack /data > /data access="_" > # chsmack /data/dir1 > /data/dir1 access="system" transmute="TRUE" > Apply overlay on data directory and set the smack rule in the same way. > data has the same smack label. > # chsmack /data > /data access="system" transmute="TRUE" I'm using an older kernel, but I get _ instead of system. > After that, remove dir1 and mkdir dir1 again. dir1 did not get the correct > label. > # rm -r /data/dir1 > # mkdir -p /data/dir1 > # chsmack /data/dir1 > /data/dir1 access="_" Unfortunately, it cannot work: Thread 3 hit Breakpoint 1, smack_inode_init_security (...) at security/smack/smack_lsm.c:959 959 { (gdb) p dir->i_ino $12 = 9169116 (gdb) p dsp $13 = (struct smack_known *) 0xffffffff831fc0a0 ls -i /home/root/data_work/ 9169116 work So, transmuting is decided on the working directory. If I do: # chsmack -a system -t /home/root/data_work/work/ # mkdir /data/dir1 # chsmack /data/dir1 /data/dir1 access="system" transmute="TRUE" I obtain the expected result. However, this problem is due to how overlayfs works: static int ovl_create_over_whiteout(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, struct ovl_cattr *cattr) { [...] newdentry = ovl_create_temp(ofs, workdir, cattr); err = PTR_ERR(newdentry); if (IS_ERR(newdentry)) goto out_dput; The good news seems to be that, once you set the label to the correct directory, transmuting works with the changes I proposed. Roberto > Since I am not very familiar your change. Could you help check with your > patch will this issue also happen? > > > Best, > Mengchi > > > > > Roberto