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Date:   Sat, 22 Apr 2023 10:17:50 +0700
From:   Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
To:     Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com>
Cc:     corbet@lwn.net, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, ardb@kernel.org, kraxel@redhat.com,
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        dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, Dhaval.Giani@amd.com,
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        bp@alien8.de, seanjc@google.com, security@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] docs: security: Confidential computing intro and threat
 model
Message-ID: <ZENR3go7UFkd7/0a@debian.me>
References: <20230327141816.2648615-1-carlos.bilbao@amd.com>
 <ZCQVmIKXWXX2xvo-@kroah.com>
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On Wed, Mar 29, 2023 at 12:40:24PM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
> > +   * - Guest malicious configuration
> > +     - A malicious host modifies one of the following guest's
> > +       configuration:
> > +
> > +       1. Guest firmware or bootloader
> > +
> > +       2. Guest kernel or module binaries
> > +
> > +       3. Guest command line parameters
> > +
> > +       This allows the host to break the integrity of the code running
> > +       inside a CoCo guest and violate the CoCo security objectives.
>=20
> So hosts are not allowed to change this?  I don't understand the use of
> "violate" here, sorry.

I think the situation described above is when malicious actors gain
control of a CoCo host.

Thanks.

--=20
An old man doll... just what I always wanted! - Clara

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