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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id n2-20020a170902d2c200b001a63e4508dcsi9519404plc.411.2023.04.23.02.25.10; Sun, 23 Apr 2023 02:25:25 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@t-8ch.de header.s=mail header.b=gwM8gKEk; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229887AbjDWJIE (ORCPT + 99 others); Sun, 23 Apr 2023 05:08:04 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:52490 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229821AbjDWJIB (ORCPT ); Sun, 23 Apr 2023 05:08:01 -0400 Received: from todd.t-8ch.de (todd.t-8ch.de [159.69.126.157]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 58ADF10D9; Sun, 23 Apr 2023 02:07:56 -0700 (PDT) Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2023 11:07:54 +0200 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=t-8ch.de; s=mail; t=1682240874; bh=gy/XKoseqT62QX+yp4fsqG61ASz7P5OWnXbcQlANPjs=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=gwM8gKEkOW7Dta6AF2DExb3heBfJdi16rlibAWS0zkb2xIsTboM6HE4b5co3DqMvP M9CXskQU3sz59eGIncUeuA9R9vCdDwpuJyeiFhHeZv3OBPxqYz/i+sBJnapqVUQozM KuQ9dBsb+Tt0YlyH1zT635i0Bbx/kSclI30gXTV0= From: thomas@t-8ch.de To: Jorge Lopez Cc: hdegoede@redhat.com, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 06/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - passwdobj-attributes Message-ID: <016a9a6a-cff1-444d-b96a-63eded1ac58a@t-8ch.de> References: <20230420165454.9517-1-jorge.lopez2@hp.com> <20230420165454.9517-7-jorge.lopez2@hp.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20230420165454.9517-7-jorge.lopez2@hp.com> X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 2023-04-20 11:54:46-0500, Jorge Lopez wrote: > --- > .../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c | 669 ++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 669 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c > > diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..c03b3a71e9c4 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c > @@ -0,0 +1,669 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > +/* > + * Functions corresponding to password object type attributes under > + * BIOS PASSWORD for use with hp-bioscfg driver. > + * > + * Copyright (c) 2022 HP Development Company, L.P. > + */ > + > +#include "bioscfg.h" > +#include > + > +GET_INSTANCE_ID(password); > +/* > + * Clear all passwords copied to memory for a particular > + * authentication instance > + */ > +int clear_passwords(const int instance) > +{ > + if (!bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance].is_enabled) > + return 0; > + > + memset(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance].current_password, > + 0, sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance].current_password)); > + memset(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance].new_password, > + 0, sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance].new_password)); > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +/* > + * Clear all credentials copied to memory for both Power-ON and Setup > + * BIOS instances > + */ > +int clear_all_credentials(void) > +{ > + int instance; > + > + /* clear all passwords */ > + for (instance = 0; instance < bioscfg_drv.password_instances_count; instance++) > + clear_passwords(instance); > + > + /* clear auth_token */ > + kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token); > + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token = NULL; > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +int get_password_instance_for_type(const char *name) > +{ > + int count = bioscfg_drv.password_instances_count; > + int instance; > + > + for (instance = 0; instance < count; instance++) { > + if (strcmp(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance].common.display_name, name) == 0) > + return instance; > + } > + return -EINVAL; > +} > + > +int validate_password_input(int instance_id, const char *buf) > +{ > + int length; > + > + length = strlen(buf); > + if (buf[length-1] == '\n') > + length--; > + > + if (length > MAX_PASSWD_SIZE) > + return INVALID_BIOS_AUTH; > + > + if (bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].min_password_length > length || > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].max_password_length < length) > + return INVALID_BIOS_AUTH; > + return SUCCESS; > +} > + > +int password_is_set(const char *name) bool is_password_set(const char *name) > +{ > + int id; > + > + id = get_password_instance_for_type(name); > + if (id < 0) > + return 0; > + > + return bioscfg_drv.password_data[id].is_enabled; > +} > + > +ATTRIBUTE_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(is_enabled, password); > +static struct kobj_attribute password_is_password_set = __ATTR_RO(is_enabled); > + > +static ssize_t current_password_store(struct kobject *kobj, > + struct kobj_attribute *attr, > + const char *buf, size_t count) > +{ > + char *p, *buf_cp; > + int id, ret = 0; > + > + buf_cp = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!buf_cp) { > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + goto exit_password; > + } > + > + p = memchr(buf_cp, '\n', count); > + > + if (p != NULL) > + *p = '\0'; This will also accept input like "foo\nbar" and truncate away the "bar". For something like a password it seems errorprone to try to munge the value. > + > + id = get_password_instance_id(kobj); > + > + if (id >= 0) > + ret = validate_password_input(id, buf_cp); > + > + if (!ret) { > + strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[id].current_password, > + buf_cp, > + sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[id].current_password)); > + /* > + * set pending reboot flag depending on > + * "RequiresPhysicalPresence" value > + */ > + if (bioscfg_drv.password_data[id].common.requires_physical_presence) > + bioscfg_drv.pending_reboot = true; Just setting this to true does not emit the necessary KOBJ_CHANGE event on the class dev kobj which is necessary for userspace to be able to react. > + } > + > +exit_password: > + kfree(buf_cp); > + return ret ? ret : count; > +} > +static struct kobj_attribute password_current_password = __ATTR_WO(current_password); > + > +static ssize_t new_password_store(struct kobject *kobj, > + struct kobj_attribute *attr, > + const char *buf, size_t count) > +{ > + char *p, *buf_cp = NULL; > + int id = 0; > + int ret = -EIO; > + > + buf_cp = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!buf_cp) { > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + goto exit_password; > + } > + > + p = memchr(buf_cp, '\n', count); > + > + if (p != NULL) > + *p = '\0'; Same as above. > + > + id = get_password_instance_id(kobj); > + > + if (id >= 0) > + ret = validate_password_input(id, buf_cp); > + > + if (!ret) > + strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[id].new_password, > + buf_cp, > + sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[id].new_password)); > + > + if (!ret) > + ret = hp_set_attribute(kobj->name, buf_cp); > + > +exit_password: > + /* > + * Regardless of the results both new and current passwords > + * will be set to zero and avoid security issues > + */ > + clear_passwords(id); > + > + kfree(buf_cp); > + return ret ? ret : count; > +} > + > +static struct kobj_attribute password_new_password = __ATTR_WO(new_password); > + > + > +ATTRIBUTE_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(min_password_length, password); > +static struct kobj_attribute password_min_password_length = __ATTR_RO(min_password_length); > + > +ATTRIBUTE_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(max_password_length, password); > +static struct kobj_attribute password_max_password_length = __ATTR_RO(max_password_length); > + > +static ssize_t role_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, > + char *buf) > +{ > + if (strcmp(kobj->name, SETUP_PASSWD) == 0) > + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", BIOS_ADMIN); > + > + if (strcmp(kobj->name, POWER_ON_PASSWD) == 0) > + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", POWER_ON); > + > + return -EIO; > +} > +static struct kobj_attribute password_role = __ATTR_RO(role); > + > +static ssize_t mechanism_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, > + char *buf) > +{ > + int i = get_password_instance_id(kobj); > + > + if (i < 0) > + return i; > + > + if (bioscfg_drv.password_data[i].mechanism != PASSWORD) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", PASSWD_MECHANISM_TYPES); > +} > +static struct kobj_attribute password_mechanism = __ATTR_RO(mechanism); > + > +static ssize_t type_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, > + char *buf) > +{ > + return sysfs_emit(buf, "password\n"); > +} > +static struct kobj_attribute password_type = __ATTR_RO(type); > + > +ATTRIBUTE_S_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(display_name, password); > +static struct kobj_attribute password_display_name = > + __ATTR_RO(display_name); > + > +ATTRIBUTE_S_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(display_name_language_code, password); > +static struct kobj_attribute password_display_langcode = > + __ATTR_RO(display_name_language_code); > + > +ATTRIBUTE_N_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(prerequisites_size, password); > +static struct kobj_attribute password_prerequisites_size_val = > + __ATTR_RO(prerequisites_size); > + > +ATTRIBUTE_V_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(prerequisites, password); > +static struct kobj_attribute password_prerequisites_val = > + __ATTR_RO(prerequisites); > + > +ATTRIBUTE_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(encodings_size, password); > +static struct kobj_attribute password_encodings_size_val = > + __ATTR_RO(encodings_size); As before, these size attribute are fairly pointless for userspace as they can't be relied on. > + > +ATTRIBUTE_VALUES_PROPERTY_SHOW(encodings, password); > +static struct kobj_attribute password_encodings_val = > + __ATTR_RO(encodings); > + > + > +static struct attribute *password_attrs[] = { > + &password_is_password_set.attr, > + &password_min_password_length.attr, > + &password_max_password_length.attr, > + &password_current_password.attr, > + &password_new_password.attr, > + &password_role.attr, > + &password_mechanism.attr, > + &password_type.attr, > + &password_display_name.attr, > + &password_display_langcode.attr, > + &password_prerequisites_size_val.attr, > + &password_prerequisites_val.attr, > + &password_encodings_val.attr, > + &password_encodings_size_val.attr, > + NULL > +}; Many of these attributes are not documented. > + > +static const struct attribute_group bios_password_attr_group = { > + .attrs = password_attrs > +}; > + > +static const struct attribute_group system_password_attr_group = { > + .attrs = password_attrs > +}; These groups are the same, are both needed? > + > +int alloc_password_data(void) > +{ > + int ret = 0; > + > + bioscfg_drv.password_instances_count = get_instance_count(HP_WMI_BIOS_PASSWORD_GUID); > + bioscfg_drv.password_data = kcalloc(bioscfg_drv.password_instances_count, > + sizeof(struct password_data), GFP_KERNEL); sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data) > + if (!bioscfg_drv.password_data) { > + bioscfg_drv.password_instances_count = 0; > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + } > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +/* > + * populate_password_package_data - > + * Populate all properties for an instance under password attribute > + * > + * @password_obj: ACPI object with password data > + * @instance_id: The instance to enumerate > + * @attr_name_kobj: The parent kernel object > + */ > +int populate_password_package_data(union acpi_object *password_obj, int instance_id, > + struct kobject *attr_name_kobj) > +{ > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].attr_name_kobj = attr_name_kobj; > + > + populate_password_elements_from_package(password_obj, > + password_obj->package.count, > + instance_id); > + > + if (strcmp(attr_name_kobj->name, "Setup Password") == 0) { SETUP_PASSWD > + /* Save system authentication instance for easy access */ > + return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &bios_password_attr_group); > + } > + > + return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &system_password_attr_group); > +} > + > +/* Expected Values types associated with each element */ > +static const acpi_object_type expected_password_types[] = { > + [NAME] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING, > + [VALUE] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING, > + [PATH] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING, > + [IS_READONLY] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER, > + [DISPLAY_IN_UI] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER, > + [REQUIRES_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER, > + [SEQUENCE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER, > + [PREREQUISITES_SIZE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER, > + [PREREQUISITES] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING, > + [SECURITY_LEVEL] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER, > + [PSWD_MIN_LENGTH] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER, > + [PSWD_MAX_LENGTH] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER, > + [PSWD_SIZE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER, > + [PSWD_ENCODINGS] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING, > + [PSWD_IS_SET] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER > +}; > + > + > +int populate_password_elements_from_package(union acpi_object *password_obj, > + int password_obj_count, > + int instance_id) > +{ > + char *str_value = NULL; > + int value_len; > + int ret = 0; > + u32 size = 0; > + u32 int_value; > + int elem = 0; > + int reqs; > + int eloc; > + int pos_values; > + > + > + if (!password_obj) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code, > + LANG_CODE_STR, > + sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code)); > + > + for (elem = 1, eloc = 1; elem < password_obj_count; elem++, eloc++) { > + > + /* ONLY look at the first PASSWORD_ELEM_CNT elements */ > + if (eloc == PASSWORD_ELEM_CNT) > + goto exit_package; > + > + switch (password_obj[elem].type) { > + case ACPI_TYPE_STRING: > + > + if (PREREQUISITES != elem && PSWD_ENCODINGS != elem) { > + ret = convert_hexstr_to_str(password_obj[elem].string.pointer, > + password_obj[elem].string.length, > + &str_value, &value_len); > + if (ret) > + continue; > + } > + break; > + case ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER: > + int_value = (u32)password_obj[elem].integer.value; > + break; > + default: > + pr_warn("Unsupported object type [%d]\n", password_obj[elem].type); > + continue; > + } > + > + /* Check that both expected and read object type match */ > + if (expected_password_types[eloc] != password_obj[elem].type) { > + pr_err("Error expected type %d for elem %d, but got type %d instead\n", > + expected_password_types[eloc], elem, password_obj[elem].type); > + return -EIO; > + } > + > + /* Assign appropriate element value to corresponding field*/ > + switch (eloc) { > + case VALUE: > + break; > + case PATH: > + strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.path, str_value, > + sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.path)); > + break; > + case IS_READONLY: > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly = int_value; > + break; > + case DISPLAY_IN_UI: > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.display_in_ui = int_value; > + break; > + case REQUIRES_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE: > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.requires_physical_presence = int_value; > + break; > + case SEQUENCE: > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.sequence = int_value; > + break; > + case PREREQUISITES_SIZE: > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size = int_value; > + if (int_value > MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE) > + pr_warn("Prerequisites size value exceeded the maximum number of elements supported or data may be malformed\n"); > + /* > + * This HACK is needed to keep the expected > + * element list pointing to the right obj[elem].type > + * when the size is zero. PREREQUISITES > + * object is omitted by BIOS when the size is > + * zero. > + */ > + if (int_value == 0) > + eloc++; > + break; > + case PREREQUISITES: > + size = bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size; > + > + for (reqs = 0; reqs < size; reqs++) { > + ret = convert_hexstr_to_str(password_obj[elem + reqs].string.pointer, > + password_obj[elem + reqs].string.length, > + &str_value, &value_len); > + > + if (ret) > + break; > + > + strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs], > + str_value, > + sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs])); > + > + kfree(str_value); > + } > + break; > + > + case SECURITY_LEVEL: > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.security_level = int_value; > + break; > + > + case PSWD_MIN_LENGTH: > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].min_password_length = int_value; > + break; > + case PSWD_MAX_LENGTH: > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].max_password_length = int_value; > + break; > + case PSWD_SIZE: > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].encodings_size = int_value; > + if (int_value > MAX_ENCODINGS_SIZE) > + pr_warn("Password Encoding size value exceeded the maximum number of elements supported or data may be malformed\n"); > + > + /* > + * This HACK is needed to keep the expected > + * element list pointing to the right obj[elem].type > + * when the size is zero. PSWD_ENCODINGS > + * object is omitted by BIOS when the size is > + * zero. > + */ > + if (int_value == 0) > + eloc++; > + break; > + > + case PSWD_ENCODINGS: > + size = bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].encodings_size; > + > + for (pos_values = 0; pos_values < size && pos_values < MAX_ENCODINGS_SIZE; pos_values++) { > + ret = convert_hexstr_to_str(password_obj[elem + pos_values].string.pointer, > + password_obj[elem + pos_values].string.length, > + &str_value, &value_len); > + if (ret) > + break; > + > + strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].encodings[pos_values], > + str_value, > + sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].encodings[pos_values])); > + kfree(str_value); > + } > + break; > + case PSWD_IS_SET: > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].is_enabled = int_value; > + break; > + > + default: > + pr_warn("Invalid element: %d found in Password attribute or data may be malformed\n", elem); > + break; > + } > + kfree(str_value); > + } > + > +exit_package: > + kfree(str_value); > + return 0; > +} > + > +/* > + * populate_password_buffer_data - > + * Populate all properties for an instance under password object attribute > + * > + * @buffer_ptr: Buffer pointer > + * @buffer_size: Buffer size > + * @instance_id: The instance to enumerate > + * @attr_name_kobj: The parent kernel object > + */ > +int populate_password_buffer_data(u8 *buffer_ptr, u32 *buffer_size, int instance_id, > + struct kobject *attr_name_kobj) > +{ > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].attr_name_kobj = attr_name_kobj; > + > + /* Populate Password attributes */ > + populate_password_elements_from_buffer(buffer_ptr, buffer_size, > + instance_id); > + friendly_user_name_update(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.path, > + attr_name_kobj->name, > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.display_name, > + sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.display_name)); > + if (strcmp(attr_name_kobj->name, "Setup Password") == 0) > + return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &bios_password_attr_group); > + > + return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &system_password_attr_group); > +} > + > +int populate_password_elements_from_buffer(u8 *buffer_ptr, u32 *buffer_size, > + int instance_id) > +{ > + int ret; > + char *dst = NULL; > + int elem; > + int reqs; > + int integer; > + int size = 0; > + int values; > + int dst_size = *buffer_size / sizeof(u16); > + > + dst = kcalloc(dst_size, sizeof(char), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!dst) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + elem = 0; > + strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code, > + LANG_CODE_STR, > + sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code)); > + > + for (elem = 1; elem < 3; elem++) { > + > + ret = get_string_from_buffer(&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, dst, dst_size); > + if (ret < 0) > + continue; > + > + switch (elem) { > + case VALUE: > + strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].current_password, > + dst, sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].current_password)); > + break; > + case PATH: > + strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.path, dst, > + sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.path)); > + break; > + default: > + pr_warn("Invalid element: %d found in Password attribute or data may be malformed\n", elem); > + break; > + } > + } > + > + for (elem = 3; elem < PASSWORD_ELEM_CNT; elem++) { > + > + if (elem != PREREQUISITES && elem != PSWD_ENCODINGS) { > + ret = get_integer_from_buffer((int **)&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, (int *)&integer); > + if (ret) > + continue; > + } > + > + switch (elem) { > + case IS_READONLY: > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly = integer; > + break; > + case DISPLAY_IN_UI: > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.display_in_ui = integer; > + break; > + case REQUIRES_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE: > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.requires_physical_presence = integer; > + break; > + case SEQUENCE: > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.sequence = integer; > + break; > + case PREREQUISITES_SIZE: > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size = integer; > + if (integer > MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE) > + pr_warn("Prerequisites size value exceeded the maximum number of elements supported or data may be malformed\n"); > + > + // PREREQUISITES: > + elem++; > + size = bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size; > + for (reqs = 0; reqs < size && reqs > MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE; reqs++) { > + ret = get_string_from_buffer(&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, dst, dst_size); > + if (ret < 0) > + continue; > + > + strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs], > + dst, > + sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs])); > + } > + break; > + case SECURITY_LEVEL: > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.security_level = integer; > + break; > + > + case PSWD_MIN_LENGTH: > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].min_password_length = integer; > + break; > + case PSWD_MAX_LENGTH: > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].max_password_length = integer; > + break; > + case PSWD_SIZE: > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].encodings_size = integer; > + if (integer > MAX_ENCODINGS_SIZE) > + pr_warn("Password Encoding size value exceeded the maximum number of elements supported or data may be malformed\n"); > + > + // PSWD_ENCODINGS: > + elem++; > + size = bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].encodings_size; > + for (values = 0; values < size && values < MAX_ENCODINGS_SIZE; values++) { > + ret = get_string_from_buffer(&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, dst, dst_size); > + if (ret < 0) > + continue; > + > + strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].encodings[values], > + dst, > + sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].encodings[values])); > + > + } > + break; > + case PSWD_IS_SET: > + bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].is_enabled = integer; > + break; > + default: > + pr_warn("Invalid element: %d found in Password attribute or data may be malformed\n", elem); > + break; > + } > + } > + kfree(dst); > + return 0; > +} > + > +/* > + * exit_password_attributes() - Clear all attribute data > + * > + * Clears all data allocated for this group of attributes > + */ > +void exit_password_attributes(void) > +{ > + int instance_id; > + > + for (instance_id = 0; instance_id < bioscfg_drv.password_instances_count; instance_id++) { > + struct kobject *attr_name_kobj = bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].attr_name_kobj; > + > + if (attr_name_kobj) { > + if (strcmp(attr_name_kobj->name, SETUP_PASSWD) == 0) > + sysfs_remove_group(attr_name_kobj, > + &bios_password_attr_group); > + else > + sysfs_remove_group(attr_name_kobj, > + &system_password_attr_group); > + } > + } > + bioscfg_drv.password_instances_count = 0; > + kfree(bioscfg_drv.password_data); > + bioscfg_drv.password_data = NULL; > +} > -- > 2.34.1 >