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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id o16-20020a635a10000000b0051b3d5543c3si12150038pgb.130.2023.04.24.19.53.16; Mon, 24 Apr 2023 19:53:30 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@intel.com header.s=Intel header.b=H3yJmSLU; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231687AbjDYCwg (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 24 Apr 2023 22:52:36 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:36912 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229629AbjDYCwf (ORCPT ); Mon, 24 Apr 2023 22:52:35 -0400 Received: from mga02.intel.com (mga02.intel.com [134.134.136.20]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7126049F8; Mon, 24 Apr 2023 19:52:33 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1682391153; x=1713927153; h=message-id:date:mime-version:subject:to:cc:references: from:in-reply-to:content-transfer-encoding; bh=xYB3Y4qQl0O4hmoYZvL3xT0WVRszCO80tbNb3JjWM7g=; b=H3yJmSLUZLhcnigpuo+ytpetbGKVs3bz7Hqt8HFSGPR++RLrxauF/ZLH Dcib7l6EK4Nv0HsSfT55pTfXXQJPml/fMbY0xMK2DC/1Qu4WUsoz2UdXt r9wmCe0/RP+X0YvpnOxqKvV1trAdKfR3jZMBQNlUKyMNo2Ubybbt3hc7Y riDvLh47YZ1PbwQx2Jbpq+3ep8+SzTHBJK+SxB24Kcadiq/qzZDGKZFB+ bXWafTfkBEQS/beDHQ469KhJ3kyH+reBrbZsdzzPg5L1eElMfUZc0k5FG 1IQrwW7sjdLohJdz+Gudgk2LonuHcMP+PjluAgJ9oWam9LEMnrlOUrBTf A==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10690"; a="335531191" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.99,224,1677571200"; d="scan'208";a="335531191" Received: from fmsmga004.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.48]) by orsmga101.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 24 Apr 2023 19:52:32 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10690"; a="762692854" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.99,224,1677571200"; d="scan'208";a="762692854" Received: from binbinwu-mobl.ccr.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.238.10.34]) ([10.238.10.34]) by fmsmga004-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 24 Apr 2023 19:52:25 -0700 Message-ID: <45b25ffe-8268-5efa-751b-c8cdd7b98988@linux.intel.com> Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2023 10:52:24 +0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/102.10.0 Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] KVM: x86: LASS protection on KVM emulation when LASS enabled To: Zeng Guang , Paolo Bonzini , Sean Christopherson , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , H Peter Anvin , kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Gao Chao References: <20230420133724.11398-1-guang.zeng@intel.com> <20230420133724.11398-5-guang.zeng@intel.com> From: Binbin Wu In-Reply-To: <20230420133724.11398-5-guang.zeng@intel.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_EF,NICE_REPLY_A,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3,RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_NONE, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 4/20/2023 9:37 PM, Zeng Guang wrote: > Do LASS violation check for instructions emulated by KVM. Note that for > instructions executed in the guest directly, hardware will perform the > check. > > Not all instruction emulation leads to accesses to guest linear addresses > because 1) some instrutions like CPUID, RDMSR, don't take memory as /s/instrutions/instructions > operands 2) instruction fetch in most cases is already done inside the > guest. What are the instruction fetch cases not covered in non-root mode? And IIUC, the patch actually doesn't distinguish them and alway checks LASS voilation for instruction fetch in instruction emulation, right? > > Four cases in which kvm may access guest linear addresses are identified > by code inspection: > - KVM emulator uses segmented address for instruction fetches or data > accesses. > - For implicit data access, KVM emulator gets address to a system data to or from? > structure(GDT/LDT/IDT/TR). > - For VMX instruction emulation, KVM gets the address from "VM-exit > instruction information" field in VMCS. > - For SGX ENCLS instruction emulation, KVM gets the address from registers. > > LASS violation check applies to these linear address so as to enforce address -> addresses > mode-based protections as hardware behaves. > > As exceptions, the target memory address of emulation of invlpg, branch > and call instructions doesn't require LASS violation check. > > Signed-off-by: Zeng Guang > --- > arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 3 +++ > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 2 ++ > 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c > index 5cc3efa0e21c..a9a022fd712e 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c > @@ -687,7 +687,8 @@ static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, > struct segmented_address addr, > unsigned *max_size, unsigned size, > bool write, bool fetch, > - enum x86emul_mode mode, ulong *linear) > + enum x86emul_mode mode, ulong *linear, > + u64 flags) > { > struct desc_struct desc; > bool usable; > @@ -695,6 +696,7 @@ static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, > u32 lim; > u16 sel; > u8 va_bits; > + u64 access = fetch ? PFERR_FETCH_MASK : 0; > > la = seg_base(ctxt, addr.seg) + addr.ea; > *max_size = 0; > @@ -740,6 +742,10 @@ static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, > } > break; > } > + > + if (ctxt->ops->check_lass(ctxt, access, *linear, flags)) > + goto bad; > + > if (la & (insn_alignment(ctxt, size) - 1)) > return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0); > return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; > @@ -757,7 +763,7 @@ static int linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, > { > unsigned max_size; > return __linearize(ctxt, addr, &max_size, size, write, false, > - ctxt->mode, linear); > + ctxt->mode, linear, 0); > } > > static inline int assign_eip(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst) > @@ -770,7 +776,10 @@ static inline int assign_eip(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst) > > if (ctxt->op_bytes != sizeof(unsigned long)) > addr.ea = dst & ((1UL << (ctxt->op_bytes << 3)) - 1); > - rc = __linearize(ctxt, addr, &max_size, 1, false, true, ctxt->mode, &linear); > + > + /* LASS doesn't apply to address for branch and call instructions */ > + rc = __linearize(ctxt, addr, &max_size, 1, false, true, ctxt->mode, > + &linear, KVM_X86_EMULFLAG_SKIP_LASS); > if (rc == X86EMUL_CONTINUE) > ctxt->_eip = addr.ea; > return rc; > @@ -845,6 +854,13 @@ static inline int jmp_rel(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int rel) > static int linear_read_system(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong linear, > void *data, unsigned size) > { > + if (ctxt->ops->check_lass(ctxt, PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS, linear, 0)) { > + ctxt->exception.vector = GP_VECTOR; > + ctxt->exception.error_code = 0; > + ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = true; > + return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT; > + } > + > return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, true); > } > > @@ -852,6 +868,13 @@ static int linear_write_system(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, > ulong linear, void *data, > unsigned int size) > { > + if (ctxt->ops->check_lass(ctxt, PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS, linear, 0)) { > + ctxt->exception.vector = GP_VECTOR; > + ctxt->exception.error_code = 0; > + ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = true; > + return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT; > + } > + > return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, true); > } > > @@ -907,7 +930,7 @@ static int __do_insn_fetch_bytes(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int op_size) > * against op_size. > */ > rc = __linearize(ctxt, addr, &max_size, 0, false, true, ctxt->mode, > - &linear); > + &linear, 0); > if (unlikely(rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)) > return rc; > > @@ -3432,8 +3455,11 @@ static int em_invlpg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) > { > int rc; > ulong linear; > + unsigned max_size; > > - rc = linearize(ctxt, ctxt->src.addr.mem, 1, false, &linear); > + /* LASS doesn't apply to the memory address for invlpg */ > + rc = __linearize(ctxt, ctxt->src.addr.mem, &max_size, 1, false, false, > + ctxt->mode, &linear, KVM_X86_EMULFLAG_SKIP_LASS); > if (rc == X86EMUL_CONTINUE) > ctxt->ops->invlpg(ctxt, linear); > /* Disable writeback. */ > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c > index c8ae9d0e59b3..55c88c4593a6 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c > @@ -4974,6 +4974,9 @@ int get_vmx_mem_address(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long exit_qualification, > * destination for long mode! > */ > exn = is_noncanonical_address(*ret, vcpu); > + > + if (!exn) > + exn = __vmx_check_lass(vcpu, 0, *ret, 0); > } else { > /* > * When not in long mode, the virtual/linear address is > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c > index b12da2a6dec9..30cb5d0980be 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c > @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ static int sgx_get_encls_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long offset, > fault = true; > } else if (likely(is_long_mode(vcpu))) { > fault = is_noncanonical_address(*gva, vcpu); > + if (!fault) > + fault = __vmx_check_lass(vcpu, 0, *gva, 0); > } else { > *gva &= 0xffffffff; > fault = (s.unusable) ||