From: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Organization: SUSE Linux Products GmbH, Nuernberg, GF: Markus Rex, HRB 16746 (AG Nuernberg)
To: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Version 3 (2.6.23-rc8) Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel
Date: Sun, 30 Sep 2007 19:39:57 +0200
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Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
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       linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
       Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
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> CIPSO is supported on SELinux as well.

That's no reason to extend that design mistake.

> It certainly has uses where IPSec  
> is excessive. One example is someone I talked to recently that basically 
> has a set of blade systems connected with a high speed backplane that 
> looks like a network interface. CIPSO is useful in this case because 
> they can't afford the overhead of IPSec but need to transfer the level 
> of the connection to the other machines. The backplane is a trusted 
> network and that isn't a dangerous assumption in this case.

If one of the boxes gets broken in all are compromised this way? 

> CIPSO also lets systems like SELinux and SMACK talk to other trusted 
> systems (eg., trusted solaris) in a way they understand. 

Perhaps, but is the result secure? I have severe doubts.

> I don't  
> regularly support CIPSO as I believe IPSec labeling is more useful in 
> more situations but that doesn't mean CIPSO is never useful.

Security that isn't secure is not really useful. You might as well not
bother.

-Andi

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