Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753328AbXI3XXm (ORCPT ); Sun, 30 Sep 2007 19:23:42 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1752252AbXI3XXf (ORCPT ); Sun, 30 Sep 2007 19:23:35 -0400 Received: from dsl081-033-126.lax1.dsl.speakeasy.net ([64.81.33.126]:58127 "EHLO bifrost.lang.hm" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751990AbXI3XXe (ORCPT ); Sun, 30 Sep 2007 19:23:34 -0400 Date: Sun, 30 Sep 2007 16:24:00 -0700 (PDT) From: david@lang.hm X-X-Sender: dlang@asgard To: Andi Kleen cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, Andrew Morton , torvalds@linux-foundation.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , Paul Moore Subject: Re: [PATCH] Version 3 (2.6.23-rc8) Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel In-Reply-To: <200709301934.01442.ak@suse.de> Message-ID: References: <984405.24264.qm@web36601.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <200709301934.01442.ak@suse.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1727 Lines: 41 On Sun, 30 Sep 2007, Andi Kleen wrote: >> The authentication issues are very real, but a separate issue. > > First rule of network security: don't trust the network. This I agree with > Without authentication it's completely useless. I don't understand > how you can disregard that as "separate issue". Security is only > secure if you plugged all applicable holes; without that it's useless > and you might as well not bother. but this is so silly that I have to object. saying that any security short of perfect security is worthless and we shouldn't bother is wrong, and needs to be countered every time it's said. as ted pointed out in response to your other comments, it very much depends on where the trust boundry is. so from the point of view of absolute security you are wrong. but even more then that, the vast majority of the time absolute security isn't what matters, relative security is what matters (the model of "I don't have to outrun the bear, I only have to outrun you") and in these envrionments things that are less then absolute can still be very useful. how useful they are depends on a lot of details, and in the case of the network security being discussed it sure sounds like it's pretty close to useless if you can't trust the network and the other machines on it, but that is seperate from the mentality that "anything less then perfect security is worthless and shouldn't be bothered with" which is what I'm objecting to. David Lang - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/