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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id ls3-20020a17090b350300b002478d3604aasi21483596pjb.110.2023.05.05.15.34.56; Fri, 05 May 2023 15:35:10 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@gmail.com header.s=20221208 header.b=aEi6sf+F; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=gmail.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232174AbjEEWBv (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 5 May 2023 18:01:51 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:58078 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231835AbjEEWBR (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 May 2023 18:01:17 -0400 Received: from mail-ot1-x331.google.com (mail-ot1-x331.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::331]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7EC5B65A5; Fri, 5 May 2023 15:00:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ot1-x331.google.com with SMTP id 46e09a7af769-6a5f9c1200eso916482a34.1; Fri, 05 May 2023 15:00:59 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20221208; t=1683324059; x=1685916059; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=dD56ADgAG9hcy05znUQK4tP0KK4rxkYRCb+Z9lbBIQU=; b=aEi6sf+FOSYDzANDXurGmsnUxFcwsjaVqeTrcSTMfQ8IztyUO+X0v8TY15V7qbwjQg gFGMfsumfMdR2QK2POu+LBHYYmXVN1+/FK2QgSq3ykuN+Plpa8L5xwFREsV7UctrrZYw PH3538ZMban8qRx6eojeFzR1hvaasVez3rnNDGB9HhpIO8shc3IOKh4TF+mlwcd7zOQK z96Dr9exYvSTVJrPKwCr+znj0p+YpjmkzEqnWxBDOfNVPtGVHVcFEwvP6lqtBrrnIgUc mXWmkZdUDkMtXRorAzebeaQqvpF6XA6tNozgCbWELBbJ1X6JVNmP6tAug0vkX1HMhteM ZFiw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20221208; t=1683324059; x=1685916059; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=dD56ADgAG9hcy05znUQK4tP0KK4rxkYRCb+Z9lbBIQU=; b=hq9a01R7WeBdYBkI5l06t2bVTpUGmfRk8EIJmk/dqA7Vu9WSG2tDOixnZWerMaIi/8 PERpeiMDJ44/LX8vT45gwmcoEmvtu4EfVeBuaj01P7QQ/N3uiEuFfMXtLU3rCCVceUKs RHNKFvd7MwMDuMKvmM5caGIeOU+VhmNJ1EH/LCD8esbGVIYoTDHLCMdsQph2CDMXyRbP XuV96ux0AogqUrTrHjucdsOPYj6InYeE5foTFgrSny6C0PbVXZOqFunApZPQmXjPQd1S SiTjM7RnqDBNvHARd+OvjwtWK7dXT9KHanz36x5UIkW7jvwzBa0LjFQeda9wXdLf9i6B p15g== X-Gm-Message-State: AC+VfDyUHT0A2Cri5vRMDtGk0HsEvRWoiWrGnvWt2rHWHVXulpN1GQgM WEmc9ake9Q0+35oUfdE0yz0= X-Received: by 2002:a05:6830:1e5c:b0:68d:6a1e:46b9 with SMTP id e28-20020a0568301e5c00b0068d6a1e46b9mr1318818otj.26.1683324058647; Fri, 05 May 2023 15:00:58 -0700 (PDT) Received: from grumpy-VECTOR.hsd1.tx.comcast.net ([2601:2c3:480:7390:90cc:2e0a:7522:8ecc]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id w15-20020a056830060f00b006a61bef7968sm1359547oti.53.2023.05.05.15.00.56 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Fri, 05 May 2023 15:00:58 -0700 (PDT) From: Jorge Lopez X-Google-Original-From: Jorge Lopez To: hdegoede@redhat.com, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas@t-8ch.de Subject: [PATCH v12 10/13] HP BIOSCFG driver - spmobj-attributes Date: Fri, 5 May 2023 17:00:40 -0500 Message-Id: <20230505220043.39036-11-jorge.lopez2@hp.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20230505220043.39036-1-jorge.lopez2@hp.com> References: <20230505220043.39036-1-jorge.lopez2@hp.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,FREEMAIL_FROM, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial notebooks. Many features of HP Commercial notebooks can be managed using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMI is an implementation of Web-Based Enterprise Management (WBEM) that provides a standards-based interface for changing and monitoring system settings. HP BIOSCFG driver provides a native Linux solution and the exposed features facilitates the migration to Linux environments. The Linux security features to be provided in hp-bioscfg driver enables managing the BIOS settings and security solutions via sysfs, a virtual filesystem that can be used by user-mode applications. The new documentation cover HP-specific firmware sysfs attributes such Secure Platform Management and Sure Start. Each section provides security feature description and identifies sysfs directories and files exposed by the driver. Many HP Commercial notebooks include a feature called Secure Platform Management (SPM), which replaces older password-based BIOS settings management with public key cryptography. PC secure product management begins when a target system is provisioned with cryptographic keys that are used to ensure the integrity of communications between system management utilities and the BIOS. HP Commercial notebooks have several BIOS settings that control its behaviour and capabilities, many of which are related to security. To prevent unauthorized changes to these settings, the system can be configured to use a cryptographic signature-based authorization string that the BIOS will use to verify authorization to modify the setting. Linux Security components are under development and not published yet. The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time. Other published security components are under Windows. Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez --- Based on the latest platform-drivers-x86.git/for-next --- .../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c | 381 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 381 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f08f7aae9423 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c @@ -0,0 +1,381 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Functions corresponding to secure platform management object type + * attributes under BIOS PASSWORD for use with hp-bioscfg driver + * + * Copyright (c) 2022 HP Development Company, L.P. + */ + +#include "bioscfg.h" + +static const char * const spm_state_types[] = { + "not provisioned", + "provisioned", + "provisioning in progress", +}; + +static const char * const spm_mechanism_types[] = { + "not provisioned", + "signing-key", + "endorsement-key", +}; + +struct secureplatform_provisioning_data { + u8 state; + u8 version[2]; + u8 reserved1; + u32 features; + u32 nonce; + u8 reserved2[28]; + u8 sk_mod[MAX_KEY_MOD]; + u8 kek_mod[MAX_KEY_MOD]; +}; + +int check_spm_is_enabled(void) +{ + /* do we need to check the admin password is also configured */ + return bioscfg_drv.spm_data.is_enabled; +} + +/** + * calculate_security_buffer() - determines size of security buffer + * for authentication scheme + * + * @authentication: the authentication content + * + * Currently only supported type is Admin password + */ +size_t calculate_security_buffer(const char *authentication) +{ + int size; + + if (authentication && strlen(authentication) > 0) { + size = sizeof(u16) + (strlen(authentication) * sizeof(u16)); + if (!strstarts(authentication, BEAM_PREFIX)) + size += strlen(UTF_PREFIX) * sizeof(u16); + + return size; + } + + size = sizeof(u16) * 2; + return size; +} + +/** + * populate_security_buffer() - builds a security buffer for + * authentication scheme + * + * @buffer: the buffer to populate + * @authentication: the authentication content + * + * Currently only supported type is PLAIN TEXT + */ +int populate_security_buffer(u16 *buffer, const char *authentication) +{ + u16 *auth = buffer; + u16 *retbuffer; + char *strprefix = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + if (strstarts(authentication, BEAM_PREFIX)) { + /* + * BEAM_PREFIX is append to buffer when a signature + * is provided and Sure Admin is enabled in BIOS + */ + // BEAM_PREFIX found, convert part to unicode + retbuffer = hp_ascii_to_utf16_unicode(auth, authentication); + if (!retbuffer) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_buffer; + } + auth = retbuffer; + + } else { + /* + * UTF-16 prefix is append to the * buffer when a BIOS + * admin password is configured in BIOS + */ + + // append UTF_PREFIX to part and then convert it to unicode + strprefix = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s%s", UTF_PREFIX, + authentication); + if (!strprefix) + goto out_buffer; + + retbuffer = hp_ascii_to_utf16_unicode(auth, strprefix); + if (!retbuffer) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_buffer; + } + auth = retbuffer; + } + +out_buffer: + kfree(strprefix); + return ret; +} + +static ssize_t update_spm_state(void) +{ + int ret; + struct secureplatform_provisioning_data data; + + ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM_GET_STATE, + HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM, &data, 0, + sizeof(data)); + if (ret < 0) + goto state_exit; + + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism = data.state; + if (bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism) + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.is_enabled = 1; + +state_exit: + return ret; +} + +static ssize_t statusbin(struct kobject *kobj, + struct kobj_attribute *attr, + struct secureplatform_provisioning_data *buf) +{ + int ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM_GET_STATE, + HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM, buf, 0, + sizeof(struct secureplatform_provisioning_data)); + + return ret < 0 ? ret : sizeof(struct secureplatform_provisioning_data); +} + +/* + * status_show - Reads SPM status + */ +static ssize_t status_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute + *attr, char *buf) +{ + int ret, i; + struct secureplatform_provisioning_data data; + + ret = statusbin(kobj, attr, &data); + if (ret < 0) + goto status_exit; + + sysfs_emit(buf, "%s{\n", buf); + sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\t\"State\": \"%s\",\n", buf, + spm_state_types[data.state]); + sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\t\"Version\": \"%d.%d\",\n", buf, data.version[0], + data.version[1]); + + /* + * state == 0 means secure platform management + * feature is not configured in BIOS. + */ + if (data.state == 0) + goto status_exit; + + sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\t\"Nonce\": %d,\n", buf, data.nonce); + sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\t\"FeaturesInUse\": %d,\n", buf, data.features); + sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\t\"EndorsementKeyMod\": \"", buf); + + for (i = 255; i >= 0; i--) + sysfs_emit(buf, "%s %u", buf, data.kek_mod[i]); + + sysfs_emit(buf, "%s \",\n", buf); + sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\t\"SigningKeyMod\": \"", buf); + + for (i = 255; i >= 0; i--) + sysfs_emit(buf, "%s %u", buf, data.sk_mod[i]); + + /* Return buf contents */ + + sysfs_emit(buf, "%s \"\n", buf); + sysfs_emit(buf, "%s}\n", buf); + +status_exit: + return strnlen(buf, PAGE_SIZE); +} + +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_status = __ATTR_RO(status); + +ATTRIBUTE_SPM_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(is_enabled, spm); +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_is_key_enabled = __ATTR_RO(is_enabled); + +static ssize_t key_mechanism_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", + spm_mechanism_types[bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism]); +} + +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_key_mechanism = __ATTR_RO(key_mechanism); + +static ssize_t sk_store(struct kobject *kobj, + struct kobj_attribute *attr, + const char *buf, size_t count) +{ + int ret; + int length; + + length = count; + if (buf[length - 1] == '\n') + length--; + + /* allocate space and copy current signing key */ + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key = kmalloc(length, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto exit_sk; + } + + strscpy(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key, buf, length); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key[length] = '\0'; + + /* submit signing key payload */ + ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM_SET_SK, + HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM, + (void *)bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key, + length, 0); + + if (!ret) { + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism = SIGNING_KEY; + set_reboot_and_signal_event(); + } + +exit_sk: + kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key = NULL; + + return ret ? ret : count; +} + +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_signing_key = __ATTR_WO(sk); + +static ssize_t kek_store(struct kobject *kobj, + struct kobj_attribute *attr, + const char *buf, size_t count) +{ + int ret; + int length; + + length = count; + if (buf[length - 1] == '\n') + length--; + + /* allocate space and copy current signing key */ + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key = kmalloc(length, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto exit_kek; + } + + memcpy(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key, buf, length); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key[length] = '\0'; + + ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM_SET_KEK, + HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM, + (void *)bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key, + count, 0); + + if (!ret) { + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism = ENDORSEMENT_KEY; + set_reboot_and_signal_event(); + } + +exit_kek: + kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key = NULL; + + return ret ? ret : count; +} + +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_endorsement_key = __ATTR_WO(kek); + +static ssize_t role_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", BIOS_SPM); +} + +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_role = __ATTR_RO(role); + +static ssize_t auth_token_store(struct kobject *kobj, + struct kobj_attribute *attr, + const char *buf, size_t count) +{ + int ret = 0; + int length; + + length = count; + if (buf[length - 1] == '\n') + length--; + + /* allocate space and copy current auth token */ + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token = kmalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto exit_token; + } + + memcpy(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token, buf, count); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token[length] = '\0'; + return count; + +exit_token: + kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token = NULL; + + return ret; +} + +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_auth_token = __ATTR_WO(auth_token); + +static struct attribute *secure_platform_attrs[] = { + &password_spm_is_key_enabled.attr, + &password_spm_signing_key.attr, + &password_spm_endorsement_key.attr, + &password_spm_key_mechanism.attr, + &password_spm_status.attr, + &password_spm_role.attr, + &password_spm_auth_token.attr, + NULL, +}; + +static const struct attribute_group secure_platform_attr_group = { + .attrs = secure_platform_attrs, +}; + +void exit_secure_platform_attributes(void) +{ + /* remove secure platform sysfs entry and free key data*/ + + kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key = NULL; + + kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key = NULL; + + kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token = NULL; + + if (bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attr_name_kobj) + sysfs_remove_group(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attr_name_kobj, + &secure_platform_attr_group); +} + +int populate_secure_platform_data(struct kobject *attr_name_kobj) +{ + /* Populate data for Secure Platform Management */ + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attr_name_kobj = attr_name_kobj; + + strscpy(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attribute_name, SPM_STR, + sizeof(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attribute_name)); + + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.is_enabled = 0; + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism = 0; + bioscfg_drv.pending_reboot = false; + update_spm_state(); + + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key = NULL; + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key = NULL; + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token = NULL; + + return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &secure_platform_attr_group); +} -- 2.34.1