Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1757687AbXJCO4l (ORCPT ); Wed, 3 Oct 2007 10:56:41 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1754250AbXJCO4d (ORCPT ); Wed, 3 Oct 2007 10:56:33 -0400 Received: from [122.1.235.145] ([122.1.235.145]:55978 "EHLO smtp.wine.ocn.ne.jp" rhost-flags-FAIL-FAIL-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750876AbXJCO4c (ORCPT ); Wed, 3 Oct 2007 10:56:32 -0400 To: yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org, a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl Cc: kaigai@kaigai.gr.jp, jmorris@namei.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, chrisw@sous-sol.org Subject: Re: [TOMOYO 05/15](repost) Domain transition handler functions. From: Tetsuo Handa References: <200710032259.HJF90663.OFMLOJtQHOFVSF@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> <1191420442.5599.12.camel@lappy> <200710032326.FJF32915.OQOOHLMtFSFJFV@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> <20071003.233249.126777093.yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> In-Reply-To: <20071003.233249.126777093.yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Message-Id: <200710032356.JIH05236.JQSMOOHFLVFFOt@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> X-Mailer: Winbiff [Version 2.50 PL2] X-Accept-Language: ja,en Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2007 23:56:28 +0900 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1040 Lines: 29 Hello. YOSHIFUJI Hideaki wrote: > It is not a good practice. Please free such objects. > BTW, how many objects do you have in the list? It varies from 0 to some thousands, depending on the policy supplied by the administrator and/or the policy appended by "learning mode". Peter Zijlstra wrote: > sounds like a might fine memory leak / dos attack. TOMOYO Linux keeps the policy in CD-R's manner. Thus, once an entry is written, it's pointer is valid forever. TOMOYO Linux's simplicity (singly-linked list with no read_lock) comes from this "keep the policy in CD-R's manner". Yes, it is a kind of memory leak, but is controllable. The kernel no longer requires memory after entering into "enforcing mode". So, attackers can't do DoS attack after entering into "enforcing mode". Regards. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/