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Date:   Tue, 16 May 2023 17:57:33 -0400
From:   Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
To:     Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc:     Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Johannes Thumshirn <Johannes.Thumshirn@wdc.com>,
        "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
        "linux-bcachefs@vger.kernel.org" <linux-bcachefs@vger.kernel.org>,
        Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>,
        "hch@infradead.org" <hch@infradead.org>,
        "linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
        "linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org" <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/32] mm: Bring back vmalloc_exec
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On Tue, May 16, 2023 at 10:47:13PM +0100, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Tue, May 16, 2023 at 05:20:33PM -0400, Kent Overstreet wrote:
> > On Tue, May 16, 2023 at 02:02:11PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > For something that small, why not use the text_poke API?
> > 
> > This looks like it's meant for patching existing kernel text, which
> > isn't what I want - I'm generating new functions on the fly, one per
> > btree node.
> > 
> > I'm working up a new allocator - a (very simple) slab allocator where
> > you pass a buffer, and it gives you a copy of that buffer mapped
> > executable, but not writeable.
> > 
> > It looks like we'll be able to convert bpf, kprobes, and ftrace
> > trampolines to it; it'll consolidate a fair amount of code (particularly
> > in bpf), and they won't have to burn a full page per allocation anymore.
> > 
> > bpf has a neat trick where it maps the same page in two different
> > locations, one is the executable location and the other is the writeable
> > location - I'm stealing that.
> 
> How does that avoid the problem of being able to construct an arbitrary
> gadget that somebody else will then execute?  IOW, what bpf has done
> seems like it's working around & undoing the security improvements.
> 
> I suppose it's an improvement that only the executable address is
> passed back to the caller, and not the writable address.

That's my thinking; grepping around finds several uses of module_alloc()
that are all doing different variations on the page permissions dance.
Let's just do it once and do it right...