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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id s30-20020a63925e000000b0052c62c3e1acsi2787458pgn.441.2023.05.17.08.59.16; Wed, 17 May 2023 08:59:30 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@gmail.com header.s=20221208 header.b=s5npefvM; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=gmail.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232010AbjEQPvT (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 17 May 2023 11:51:19 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:49128 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231866AbjEQPu4 (ORCPT ); Wed, 17 May 2023 11:50:56 -0400 Received: from mail-oa1-x2c.google.com (mail-oa1-x2c.google.com [IPv6:2001:4860:4864:20::2c]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3E8E09EFF; Wed, 17 May 2023 08:50:41 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-oa1-x2c.google.com with SMTP id 586e51a60fabf-19674cab442so665129fac.3; Wed, 17 May 2023 08:50:41 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20221208; t=1684338640; x=1686930640; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=GmJiBF9aZ/rjxXh674y9zjBZAdGcTZ4RoPDtWUhq39g=; b=s5npefvMtZ2Mb30C/rH0MmkstBTHJgj101AQ5Mxvuspljo5Y4eyq7TWDqAhHyelMES AZZxqrk65632USmis3ce0mzsyOMRLVaifalyJ+YUvCONJSVR0m67NriRUlPUOD06meHb 80QV4XMcF/KMduG60jumr/nUPcuyIFkaDLiQwJWozYr4koldLG0bk2i6myLI3cdiqq5T SnLnKh+YjrJgfytWXHw6RriCcqQZSQp86yzTJ8LjPJPKH7SYXMZHLlfmDAHiYXuZcIHs Qe0fiAqTb/w2uPUFCRvh2Dmd3bpAZH4VrYGIapp/qG0YaW+ZMyV7mt1n6YtM0tLS9x9w VAqg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20221208; t=1684338640; x=1686930640; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=GmJiBF9aZ/rjxXh674y9zjBZAdGcTZ4RoPDtWUhq39g=; b=DfFWQ1CPSBe0vksqDePgab0x1M5ceticTa9HQDBCgWRmEGHFaVgXGvUxIDoFevocno NyUGfatoztaAq/rdn7n2TklqHwOtlvJ27NK//sBloGN3Kc0qe8ObZnRQ+d5Mve+ho76i e1QY+S1jHUVm/H43l0rnZ5pYDYwoikyvUoZvLaK1h1h5ArdlFRsUNqE0fIMXcDEmScIz hqchUVarlLEnuRMB8QcXksdMKr+kvKlJ5pEng0qR048dJQ9ZRVNKrG68K9UiSbs5kMfA yqM4aQR0N14Ar4dD92n8yXc4KhG3r6mN2ravue/H5Ww+2/x6OGtawFYSHjaIFper3lAk jRyA== X-Gm-Message-State: AC+VfDxpjMejPYINopHEA69y3QbAy6X6YG+40TRYeYKhpfbKQ4MZ5Upi 5svchZasX5hwSBhWBO28+T4= X-Received: by 2002:a05:6870:b146:b0:196:51e7:6454 with SMTP id a6-20020a056870b14600b0019651e76454mr12366576oal.51.1684338640459; Wed, 17 May 2023 08:50:40 -0700 (PDT) Received: from grumpy-VECTOR.hsd1.tx.comcast.net ([2601:2c3:480:7390:3754:4771:3b5:e909]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id j5-20020a056870a48500b0018b12e3a392sm14214468oal.42.2023.05.17.08.50.39 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 17 May 2023 08:50:40 -0700 (PDT) From: Jorge Lopez X-Google-Original-From: Jorge Lopez To: hdegoede@redhat.com, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas@t-8ch.de, ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com Subject: [PATCH v14 09/13] hp-bioscfg: spmobj-attributes Date: Wed, 17 May 2023 10:50:22 -0500 Message-Id: <20230517155026.28535-10-jorge.lopez2@hp.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20230517155026.28535-1-jorge.lopez2@hp.com> References: <20230517155026.28535-1-jorge.lopez2@hp.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,FREEMAIL_FROM, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial notebooks. Many features of HP Commercial notebooks can be managed using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMI is an implementation of Web-Based Enterprise Management (WBEM) that provides a standards-based interface for changing and monitoring system settings. HP BIOSCFG driver provides a native Linux solution and the exposed features facilitates the migration to Linux environments. The Linux security features to be provided in hp-bioscfg driver enables managing the BIOS settings and security solutions via sysfs, a virtual filesystem that can be used by user-mode applications. The new documentation cover HP-specific firmware sysfs attributes such Secure Platform Management and Sure Start. Each section provides security feature description and identifies sysfs directories and files exposed by the driver. Many HP Commercial notebooks include a feature called Secure Platform Management (SPM), which replaces older password-based BIOS settings management with public key cryptography. PC secure product management begins when a target system is provisioned with cryptographic keys that are used to ensure the integrity of communications between system management utilities and the BIOS. HP Commercial notebooks have several BIOS settings that control its behaviour and capabilities, many of which are related to security. To prevent unauthorized changes to these settings, the system can be configured to use a cryptographic signature-based authorization string that the BIOS will use to verify authorization to modify the setting. Linux Security components are under development and not published yet. The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time. Other published security components are under Windows. Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez --- Based on the latest platform-drivers-x86.git/for-next --- .../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c | 389 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 389 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..66f025b5d113 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c @@ -0,0 +1,389 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Functions corresponding to secure platform management object type + * attributes under BIOS PASSWORD for use with hp-bioscfg driver + * + * Copyright (c) 2022 HP Development Company, L.P. + */ + +#include "bioscfg.h" + +static const char * const spm_state_types[] = { + "not provisioned", + "provisioned", + "provisioning in progress", +}; + +static const char * const spm_mechanism_types[] = { + "not provisioned", + "signing-key", + "endorsement-key", +}; + +struct secureplatform_provisioning_data { + u8 state; + u8 version[2]; + u8 reserved1; + u32 features; + u32 nonce; + u8 reserved2[28]; + u8 sk_mod[MAX_KEY_MOD_SIZE]; + u8 kek_mod[MAX_KEY_MOD_SIZE]; +}; + +/** + * hp_calculate_security_buffer() - determines size of security buffer + * for authentication scheme + * + * @authentication: the authentication content + * + * Currently only supported type is Admin password + */ +size_t hp_calculate_security_buffer(const char *authentication) +{ + size_t size, authlen; + + if (!authentication) + return sizeof(u16) * 2; + + authlen = strlen(authentication); + if (!authlen) + return sizeof(u16) * 2; + + size = sizeof(u16) + authlen * sizeof(u16); + if (!strstarts(authentication, BEAM_PREFIX)) + size += strlen(UTF_PREFIX) * sizeof(u16); + + return size; +} + +/** + * hp_populate_security_buffer() - builds a security buffer for + * authentication scheme + * + * @authbuf: the security buffer + * @authentication: the authentication content + * + * Currently only supported type is PLAIN TEXT + */ +int hp_populate_security_buffer(u16 *authbuf, const char *authentication) +{ + u16 *auth = authbuf; + char *strprefix = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + if (strstarts(authentication, BEAM_PREFIX)) { + /* + * BEAM_PREFIX is append to authbuf when a signature + * is provided and Sure Admin is enabled in BIOS + */ + /* BEAM_PREFIX found, convert part to unicode */ + auth = hp_ascii_to_utf16_unicode(auth, authentication); + if (!auth) + return -EINVAL; + + } else { + /* + * UTF-16 prefix is append to the * authbuf when a BIOS + * admin password is configured in BIOS + */ + + /* append UTF_PREFIX to part and then convert it to unicode */ + strprefix = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s%s", UTF_PREFIX, + authentication); + if (!strprefix) + return -ENOMEM; + + auth = hp_ascii_to_utf16_unicode(auth, strprefix); + kfree(strprefix); + + if (!auth) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_buffer; + } + } + +out_buffer: + return ret; +} + +static ssize_t update_spm_state(void) +{ + struct secureplatform_provisioning_data data; + int ret; + + ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM_GET_STATE, + HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM, &data, 0, + sizeof(data)); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism = data.state; + if (bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism) + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.is_enabled = 1; + + return 0; +} + +static ssize_t statusbin(struct kobject *kobj, + struct kobj_attribute *attr, + struct secureplatform_provisioning_data *buf) +{ + int ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM_GET_STATE, + HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM, buf, 0, + sizeof(*buf)); + + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + return sizeof(struct secureplatform_provisioning_data); +} + +/* + * status_show - Reads SPM status + */ +static ssize_t status_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute + *attr, char *buf) +{ + int ret, i; + int len = 0; + struct secureplatform_provisioning_data data; + + ret = statusbin(kobj, attr, &data); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + /* + * 'status' is a read-only file that returns ASCII text in + * JSON format reporting the status information. + * + * "State": "not provisioned | provisioned | provisioning in progress ", + * "Version": " Major. Minor ", + * "Nonce": <16-bit unsigned number display in base 10>, + * "FeaturesInUse": <16-bit unsigned number display in base 10>, + * "EndorsementKeyMod": "<256 bytes in base64>", + * "SigningKeyMod": "<256 bytes in base64>" + */ + + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "{\n"); + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "\t\"State\": \"%s\",\n", + spm_state_types[data.state]); + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "\t\"Version\": \"%d.%d\"", + data.version[0], data.version[1]); + + /* + * state == 0 means secure platform management + * feature is not configured in BIOS. + */ + if (data.state == 0) { + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "\n"); + goto status_exit; + } else { + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, ",\n"); + } + + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "\t\"Nonce\": %d,\n", data.nonce); + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "\t\"FeaturesInUse\": %d,\n", data.features); + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "\t\"EndorsementKeyMod\": \""); + + for (i = 255; i >= 0; i--) + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, " %u", data.kek_mod[i]); + + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, " \",\n"); + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "\t\"SigningKeyMod\": \""); + + for (i = 255; i >= 0; i--) + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, " %u", data.sk_mod[i]); + + /* Return buf contents */ + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, " \"\n"); + +status_exit: + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "}\n"); + + return len; +} + +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_status = __ATTR_RO(status); + +ATTRIBUTE_SPM_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(is_enabled, spm); +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_is_key_enabled = __ATTR_RO(is_enabled); + +static ssize_t key_mechanism_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", + spm_mechanism_types[bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism]); +} + +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_key_mechanism = __ATTR_RO(key_mechanism); + +static ssize_t sk_store(struct kobject *kobj, + struct kobj_attribute *attr, + const char *buf, size_t count) +{ + int ret; + int length; + + length = count; + if (buf[length - 1] == '\n') + length--; + + /* allocate space and copy current signing key */ + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key = kmalloc(length, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key) + return -ENOMEM; + + strscpy(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key, buf, length); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key[length] = '\0'; + + /* submit signing key payload */ + ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM_SET_SK, + HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM, + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key, + length, 0); + + if (!ret) { + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism = SIGNING_KEY; + hp_set_reboot_and_signal_event(); + } + + kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key = NULL; + + return ret ? ret : count; +} + +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_signing_key = __ATTR_WO(sk); + +static ssize_t kek_store(struct kobject *kobj, + struct kobj_attribute *attr, + const char *buf, size_t count) +{ + int ret; + int length; + + length = count; + if (buf[length - 1] == '\n') + length--; + + /* allocate space and copy current signing key */ + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key = kmalloc(length, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto exit_kek; + } + + memcpy(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key, buf, length); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key[length] = '\0'; + + ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM_SET_KEK, + HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM, + (void *)bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key, + count, 0); + + if (!ret) { + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism = ENDORSEMENT_KEY; + hp_set_reboot_and_signal_event(); + } + +exit_kek: + kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key = NULL; + + return ret ? ret : count; +} + +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_endorsement_key = __ATTR_WO(kek); + +static ssize_t role_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", BIOS_SPM); +} + +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_role = __ATTR_RO(role); + +static ssize_t auth_token_store(struct kobject *kobj, + struct kobj_attribute *attr, + const char *buf, size_t count) +{ + int ret = 0; + int length; + + length = count; + if (buf[length - 1] == '\n') + length--; + + /* allocate space and copy current auth token */ + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token = kmalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto exit_token; + } + + memcpy(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token, buf, count); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token[length] = '\0'; + return count; + +exit_token: + kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token = NULL; + + return ret; +} + +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_auth_token = __ATTR_WO(auth_token); + +static struct attribute *secure_platform_attrs[] = { + &password_spm_is_key_enabled.attr, + &password_spm_signing_key.attr, + &password_spm_endorsement_key.attr, + &password_spm_key_mechanism.attr, + &password_spm_status.attr, + &password_spm_role.attr, + &password_spm_auth_token.attr, + NULL, +}; + +static const struct attribute_group secure_platform_attr_group = { + .attrs = secure_platform_attrs, +}; + +void hp_exit_secure_platform_attributes(void) +{ + /* remove secure platform sysfs entry and free key data*/ + + kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key = NULL; + + kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key = NULL; + + kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token = NULL; + + if (bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attr_name_kobj) + sysfs_remove_group(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attr_name_kobj, + &secure_platform_attr_group); +} + +int hp_populate_secure_platform_data(struct kobject *attr_name_kobj) +{ + /* Populate data for Secure Platform Management */ + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attr_name_kobj = attr_name_kobj; + + strscpy(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attribute_name, SPM_STR, + sizeof(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attribute_name)); + + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.is_enabled = 0; + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism = 0; + bioscfg_drv.pending_reboot = false; + update_spm_state(); + + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key = NULL; + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key = NULL; + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token = NULL; + + return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &secure_platform_attr_group); +} -- 2.34.1