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From:   =?UTF-8?Q?Christian_G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date:   Tue, 23 May 2023 20:33:22 +0200
Message-ID: <CAJ2a_DfRGq+Cg_U7+Rsie9Bywxquu9CuMwYUGNv3+Sg9=wt9Og@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security: keys: perform capable check only on privileged operations
To:     Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc:     selinux@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
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On Fri, 19 May 2023 at 23:08, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, May 11, 2023 at 8:33=E2=80=AFAM Christian G=C3=B6ttsche
> <cgzones@googlemail.com> wrote:
> >
> > If the current task fails the check for the queried capability via
> > `capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)` LSMs like SELinux generate a denial message.
> > Issuing such denial messages unnecessarily can lead to a policy author
> > granting more privileges to a subject than needed to silence them.
> >
> > Reorder CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks after the check whether the operation is
> > actually privileged.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Christian G=C3=B6ttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
> > ---
> >  security/keys/keyctl.c | 11 ++++++++---
> >  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
> > index d54f73c558f7..19be69fa4d05 100644
> > --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
> > +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
> > @@ -980,14 +980,19 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user=
, gid_t group)
> >         ret =3D -EACCES;
> >         down_write(&key->sem);
> >
> > -       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
> > +       {
> > +               bool is_privileged_op =3D false;
> > +
> >                 /* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID =
*/
> >                 if (user !=3D (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(key->uid, uid))
> > -                       goto error_put;
> > +                       is_privileged_op =3D true;
> >
> >                 /* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group o=
ther
> >                  * than one of those that the current process subscribe=
s to */
> >                 if (group !=3D (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(gid, key->gid) && =
!in_group_p(gid))
> > +                       is_privileged_op =3D true;
> > +
> > +               if (is_privileged_op && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> >                         goto error_put;
> >         }
>
> Hmm.  Using braces just to create a new scope is a bit hacky; I'll
> admit to using it to quickly create new local variables, but I only do
> so in debug/test situations, not production code.
>
> What if you move the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check down into the if-conditional
> where the code checks to see if CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed when changing
> the UID?  It should be possible to structure the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check
> such that it is only executed if needed.  It's a little more
> complicated in the GID case, but I believe it should be doable.

This complication I exactly wanted to avoid.  For me the inner scope
encapsulates the all the logic around the capability check just fine
and is quite readable.  An alternative would be to create a new
function performing the checks and call it via

    if (!chown_key_capable(key, user, uid, group, gid))
        got error_put;

A minor inconvenience is the number of needed arguments (and the
actual code after inlining should be the same to the inner scope in
the end).

>
> --
> paul-moore.com