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Date:   Tue, 30 May 2023 10:31:50 -0700
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Subject: Re: [patch] x86/smpboot: Disable parallel bootup if cc_vendor != NONE
From:   Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To:     "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, x86@kernel.org,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
        Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
        Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
        Arjan van de Veen <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
        Paul McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>,
        Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>,
        Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>,
        "Guilherme G. Piccoli" <gpiccoli@igalia.com>,
        Piotr Gorski <lucjan.lucjanov@gmail.com>,
        Usama Arif <usama.arif@bytedance.com>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
        xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
        Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
        linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
        Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>,
        linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
        Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>,
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On Tue, May 30, 2023, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Tue, May 30, 2023 at 06:00:46PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > On Tue, May 30 2023 at 15:29, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > > On Tue, May 30, 2023 at 02:09:17PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > >> The decision to allow parallel bringup of secondary CPUs checks
> > >> CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT to detect encrypted guests. Those cannot use
> > >> parallel bootup because accessing the local APIC is intercepted and raises
> > >> a #VC or #VE, which cannot be handled at that point.
> > >> 
> > >> The check works correctly, but only for AMD encrypted guests. TDX does not
> > >> set that flag.
> > >> 
> > >> Check for cc_vendor != CC_VENDOR_NONE instead. That might be overbroad, but
> > >> definitely works for both AMD and Intel.
> > >
> > > It boots fine with TDX, but I think it is wrong. cc_get_vendor() will
> > > report CC_VENDOR_AMD even on bare metal if SME is enabled. I don't think
> > > we want it.
> > 
> > Right. Did not think about that.
> > 
> > But the same way is CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT overbroad for AMD. Only
> > SEV-ES traps RDMSR if I'm understandig that maze correctly.
> 
> I don't know difference between SEV flavours that well.
> 
> I see there's that on SEV-SNP access to x2APIC MSR range (MSR 0x800-0x8FF)
> is intercepted regardless if MSR_AMD64_SNP_ALT_INJ feature is present. But
> I'm not sure what the state on SEV or SEV-ES.

With SEV-ES, if the hypervisor intercepts an MSR access, the VM-Exit is instead
morphed to a #VC (except for EFER).  The guest needs to do an explicit VMGEXIT
(i.e. a hypercall) to explicitly request MSR emulation (this *can* be done in the
#VC handler, but the guest can also do VMGEXIT directly, e.g. in lieu of a RDMSR).

With regular SEV, VM-Exits aren't reflected into the guest.  Register state isn't
encrypted so the hypervisor can emulate MSR accesses (and other instructions)
without needing an explicit hypercall from the guest.