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Message-ID: <3b3d9106-9e4f-8a76-30ee-29540b06022a@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Mon, 5 Jun 2023 11:31:48 +0800
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] KVM: VMX: Add new ops in kvm_x86_ops for LASS
 violation check
To:     Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Cc:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
        H Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
        x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
References: <20230601142309.6307-1-guang.zeng@intel.com>
 <20230601142309.6307-4-guang.zeng@intel.com>
From:   Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <20230601142309.6307-4-guang.zeng@intel.com>
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On 6/1/2023 10:23 PM, Zeng Guang wrote:
> Intel introduces LASS (Linear Address Separation) feature providing
                       ^
  missing "Space" here
> an independent mechanism to achieve the mode-based protection.
>
> LASS partitions 64-bit linear address space into two halves, user-mode
> address (LA[bit 63]=0) and supervisor-mode address (LA[bit 63]=1). It
> stops any code execution or conditional data access[1]
>      1. from user mode to supervisor-mode address space
>      2. from supervisor mode to user-mode address space
> and generates LASS violation fault accordingly.
>
> [1]A supervisor mode data access causes a LASS violation only if supervisor
> mode access protection is enabled (CR4.SMAP = 1) and either RFLAGS.AC = 0
> or the access implicitly accesses a system data structure.
>
> Following are the rules of LASS violation check on the linear address(LA).
> User access to supervisor-mode address space:
>      LA[bit 63] && (CPL == 3)
> Supervisor access to user-mode address space:
>      Instruction fetch: !LA[bit 63] && (CPL < 3)
>      Data access: !LA[bit 63] && (CR4.SMAP==1) && ((RFLAGS.AC == 0 &&
>                   CPL < 3) || Implicit supervisor access)
>
> Add new ops in kvm_x86_ops to do LASS violation check.
>
> Signed-off-by: Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com>
> Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h |  3 +-
>   arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |  2 ++
>   arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h         |  1 +
>   arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c             | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h             |  2 ++
>   5 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> index 13bc212cd4bc..8980a3bfa687 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> @@ -132,7 +132,8 @@ KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(migrate_timers)
>   KVM_X86_OP(msr_filter_changed)
>   KVM_X86_OP(complete_emulated_msr)
>   KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector)
> -KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons);
> +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons)
> +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(check_lass)
>   
>   #undef KVM_X86_OP
>   #undef KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index 92d8e65fe88c..98666d1e7727 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -1731,6 +1731,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
>   	 * Returns vCPU specific APICv inhibit reasons
>   	 */
>   	unsigned long (*vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> +
> +	bool (*check_lass)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 access, u64 la, u32 flags);
>   };
>   
>   struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
> index 5b9ec610b2cb..f1439ab7c14b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
> @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ struct x86_instruction_info {
>   /* x86-specific emulation flags */
>   #define X86EMUL_F_FETCH			BIT(0)
>   #define X86EMUL_F_WRITE			BIT(1)
> +#define X86EMUL_F_SKIPLASS		BIT(2)
>   
>   struct x86_emulate_ops {
>   	void (*vm_bugged)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index a33205ded85c..876997e8448e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -8130,6 +8130,51 @@ static void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
>   	free_pages((unsigned long)kvm_vmx->pid_table, vmx_get_pid_table_order(kvm));
>   }
>   
> +/*
> + * Determine whether an access to the linear address causes a LASS violation.
> + * LASS protection is only effective in long mode. As a prerequisite, caller
> + * should make sure vCPU running in long mode and invoke this api to do LASS
> + * violation check.
> + */
> +bool vmx_check_lass(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 access, u64 la, u32 flags)
> +{
> +	bool user_mode, user_as, rflags_ac;
> +
> +	if (!!(flags & X86EMUL_F_SKIPLASS) ||
> +	    !kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_LASS))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_long_mode(vcpu));
IMHO, it's better to skip the following checks and return false if it is 
out of long mode.

> +
> +	user_as = !(la >> 63);
It's better to describe how LASS treat linear address in compatibility 
mode in changelog or/and in comment,
i.e. for a linear address with only 32 bits (or 16 bits), the processor 
treats bit 63 as if it were 0.


> +
> +	/*
> +	 * An access is a supervisor-mode access if CPL < 3 or if it implicitly
> +	 * accesses a system data structure. For implicit accesses to system
> +	 * data structure, the processor acts as if RFLAGS.AC is clear.
> +	 */
> +	if (access & PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS) {
> +		user_mode = false;
> +		rflags_ac = false;
> +	} else {
> +		user_mode = vmx_get_cpl(vcpu) == 3;
> +		if (!user_mode)
> +			rflags_ac = !!(kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_AC);
> +	}
> +
> +	if (user_mode == user_as)
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Supervisor-mode _data_ accesses to user address space
> +	 * cause LASS violations only if SMAP is enabled.
> +	 */
> +	if (!user_mode && !(access & PFERR_FETCH_MASK))
> +		return kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMAP) && !rflags_ac;
> +
> +	return true;
> +}
> +
>   static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = {
>   	.name = KBUILD_MODNAME,
>   
> @@ -8269,6 +8314,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = {
>   	.complete_emulated_msr = kvm_complete_insn_gp,
>   
>   	.vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
> +
> +	.check_lass = vmx_check_lass,
>   };
>   
>   static unsigned int vmx_handle_intel_pt_intr(void)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> index 9e66531861cf..f2e775b9849b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> @@ -433,6 +433,8 @@ void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int type);
>   u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>   u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>   
> +bool vmx_check_lass(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 access, u64 la, u32 flags);
> +
>   static inline void vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr,
>   					     int type, bool value)
>   {