Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20;
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <20230503064344.45825-1-aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com> <CAHC9VhTx+6f8riuGOG40HZoaYx3F8Kf3Hm7Eb5k3-An91eMWgg@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhTx+6f8riuGOG40HZoaYx3F8Kf3Hm7Eb5k3-An91eMWgg@mail.gmail.com>
From:   Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>
Date:   Tue, 6 Jun 2023 20:50:32 +0200
Message-ID: <CAEivzxcVQoA9rN06BtHJzyHCaN60RG1-cyGEEw-P+dp-tCB=QA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] LSM: SafeSetID: fix UID printed instead of GID
To:     Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc:     mortonm@chromium.org, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Precedence: bulk

On Thu, May 18, 2023 at 8:59=E2=80=AFPM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wr=
ote:
>
> On Wed, May 3, 2023 at 2:44=E2=80=AFAM Alexander Mikhalitsyn
> <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com> wrote:
> >
> > pr_warn message clearly says that GID should be printed,
> > but we have UID there. Let's fix that.
> >
> > Found accidentaly during the work on isolated user namespaces.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.c=
om>
> > ---
> > v2: __kuid_val -> __kgid_val
> > ---
> >  security/safesetid/lsm.c | 2 +-
> >  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> I'm assuming you're going to pick this up Micah?
>
> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Dear Paul!

Thanks for your review!

Gentle ping to Micah Morton :-)

Kind regards,
Alex

>
> > diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> > index e806739f7868..5be5894aa0ea 100644
> > --- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> > +++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> > @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct =
cred *cred,
> >                  * set*gid() (e.g. setting up userns gid mappings).
> >                  */
> >                 pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETGID, which is not av=
ailable to GID %u for operations besides approved set*gid transitions\n",
> > -                       __kuid_val(cred->uid));
> > +                       __kgid_val(cred->gid));
> >                 return -EPERM;
> >         default:
> >                 /* Error, the only capabilities were checking for is CA=
P_SETUID/GID */
> > --
> > 2.34.1
>
> --
> paul-moore.com