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Date:   Thu, 08 Jun 2023 16:18:25 +0300
Message-Id: <CT7AR88TXGRA.3BSYSJFL8C5LR@suppilovahvero>
Cc:     <dhowells@redhat.com>, <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
        <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] keys: Fix linking a duplicate key to a keyring's
 assoc_array
From:   "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
To:     "Petr Pavlu" <petr.pavlu@suse.com>
References: <20230323130412.32097-1-petr.pavlu@suse.com>
 <20230330001355.dyazfwx4tyiyvux2@kernel.org>
 <b45eb4c3-77c6-d0ae-9e90-a120fcab869b@suse.com>
In-Reply-To: <b45eb4c3-77c6-d0ae-9e90-a120fcab869b@suse.com>
Precedence: bulk

On Thu Jun 8, 2023 at 12:55 PM EEST, Petr Pavlu wrote:
> On 3/30/23 02:13, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 23, 2023 at 02:04:12PM +0100, Petr Pavlu wrote:
> >> When making a DNS query inside the kernel using dns_query(), the reque=
st
> >> code can in rare cases end up creating a duplicate index key in the
> >> assoc_array of the destination keyring. It is eventually found by
> >> a BUG_ON() check in the assoc_array implementation and results in
> >> a crash.
> >>
> >> Example report:
> >> [2158499.700025] kernel BUG at ../lib/assoc_array.c:652!
> >> [2158499.700039] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
> >> [2158499.700065] CPU: 3 PID: 31985 Comm: kworker/3:1 Kdump: loaded Not=
 tainted 5.3.18-150300.59.90-default #1 SLE15-SP3
> >> [2158499.700096] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/4=
40BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
> >> [2158499.700351] Workqueue: cifsiod cifs_resolve_server [cifs]
> >> [2158499.700380] RIP: 0010:assoc_array_insert+0x85f/0xa40
> >> [2158499.700401] Code: ff 74 2b 48 8b 3b 49 8b 45 18 4c 89 e6 48 83 e7=
 fe e8 95 ec 74 00 3b 45 88 7d db 85 c0 79 d4 0f 0b 0f 0b 0f 0b e8 41 f2 be=
 ff <0f> 0b 0f 0b 81 7d 88 ff ff ff 7f 4c 89 eb 4c 8b ad 58 ff ff ff 0f
> >> [2158499.700448] RSP: 0018:ffffc0bd6187faf0 EFLAGS: 00010282
> >> [2158499.700470] RAX: ffff9f1ea7da2fe8 RBX: ffff9f1ea7da2fc1 RCX: 0000=
000000000005
> >> [2158499.700492] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000=
000000000000
> >> [2158499.700515] RBP: ffffc0bd6187fbb0 R08: ffff9f185faf1100 R09: 0000=
000000000000
> >> [2158499.700538] R10: ffff9f1ea7da2cc0 R11: 000000005ed8cec8 R12: ffff=
c0bd6187fc28
> >> [2158499.700561] R13: ffff9f15feb8d000 R14: ffff9f1ea7da2fc0 R15: ffff=
9f168dc0d740
> >> [2158499.700585] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f185fac0000(0000)=
 knlGS:0000000000000000
> >> [2158499.700610] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> >> [2158499.700630] CR2: 00007fdd94fca238 CR3: 0000000809d8c006 CR4: 0000=
0000003706e0
> >> [2158499.700702] Call Trace:
> >> [2158499.700741]  ? key_alloc+0x447/0x4b0
> >> [2158499.700768]  ? __key_link_begin+0x43/0xa0
> >> [2158499.700790]  __key_link_begin+0x43/0xa0
> >> [2158499.700814]  request_key_and_link+0x2c7/0x730
> >> [2158499.700847]  ? dns_resolver_read+0x20/0x20 [dns_resolver]
> >> [2158499.700873]  ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
> >> [2158499.700898]  request_key_tag+0x43/0xa0
> >> [2158499.700926]  dns_query+0x114/0x2ca [dns_resolver]
> >> [2158499.701127]  dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x194/0x310 [cifs]
> >> [2158499.701164]  ? scnprintf+0x49/0x90
> >> [2158499.701190]  ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
> >> [2158499.701211]  ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
> >> [2158499.701405]  reconn_set_ipaddr_from_hostname+0x81/0x2a0 [cifs]
> >> [2158499.701603]  cifs_resolve_server+0x4b/0xd0 [cifs]
> >> [2158499.701632]  process_one_work+0x1f8/0x3e0
> >> [2158499.701658]  worker_thread+0x2d/0x3f0
> >> [2158499.701682]  ? process_one_work+0x3e0/0x3e0
> >> [2158499.701703]  kthread+0x10d/0x130
> >> [2158499.701723]  ? kthread_park+0xb0/0xb0
> >> [2158499.701746]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
> >>
> >> The situation occurs as follows:
> >> * Some kernel facility invokes dns_query() to resolve a hostname, for
> >>   example, "abcdef". The function registers its global DNS resolver
> >>   cache as current->cred.thread_keyring and passes the query to
> >>   request_key_net() -> request_key_tag() -> request_key_and_link().
> >> * Function request_key_and_link() creates a keyring_search_context
> >>   object. Its match_data.cmp method gets set via a call to
> >>   type->match_preparse() (resolves to dns_resolver_match_preparse()) t=
o
> >>   dns_resolver_cmp().
> >> * Function request_key_and_link() continues and invokes
> >>   search_process_keyrings_rcu() which returns that a given key was not
> >>   found. The control is then passed to request_key_and_link() ->
> >>   construct_alloc_key().
> >> * Concurrently to that, a second task similarly makes a DNS query for
> >>   "abcdef." and its result gets inserted into the DNS resolver cache.
> >> * Back on the first task, function construct_alloc_key() first runs
> >>   __key_link_begin() to determine an assoc_array_edit operation to
> >>   insert a new key. Index keys in the array are compared exactly as-is=
,
> >>   using keyring_compare_object(). The operation finds that "abcdef" is
> >>   not yet present in the destination keyring.
> >> * Function construct_alloc_key() continues and checks if a given key i=
s
> >>   already present on some keyring by again calling
> >>   search_process_keyrings_rcu(). This search is done using
> >>   dns_resolver_cmp() and "abcdef" gets matched with now present key
> >>   "abcdef.".
> >> * The found key is linked on the destination keyring by calling
> >>   __key_link() and using the previously calculated assoc_array_edit
> >>   operation. This inserts the "abcdef." key in the array but creates
> >>   a duplicity because the same index key is already present.
> >>
> >> Fix the problem by postponing __key_link_begin() in
> >> construct_alloc_key() until an actual key which should be linked into
> >> the destination keyring is determined.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com>
> >> ---
> >>  security/keys/request_key.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
> >>  1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
> >> index 2da4404276f0..04eb7e4cedad 100644
> >> --- a/security/keys/request_key.c
> >> +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
> >> @@ -398,17 +398,21 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_se=
arch_context *ctx,
> >>  	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);
> >> =20
> >>  	if (dest_keyring) {
> >> -		ret =3D __key_link_lock(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key);
> >> +		ret =3D __key_link_lock(dest_keyring, &key->index_key);
> >>  		if (ret < 0)
> >>  			goto link_lock_failed;
> >> -		ret =3D __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, &edit);
> >> -		if (ret < 0)
> >> -			goto link_prealloc_failed;
> >>  	}
> >> =20
> >> -	/* attach the key to the destination keyring under lock, but we do n=
eed
> >> +	/*
> >> +	 * Attach the key to the destination keyring under lock, but we do n=
eed
> >>  	 * to do another check just in case someone beat us to it whilst we
> >> -	 * waited for locks */
> >> +	 * waited for locks.
> >> +	 *
> >> +	 * The caller might specify a comparison function which looks for ke=
ys
> >> +	 * that do not exactly match but are still equivalent from the calle=
r's
> >> +	 * perspective. The __key_link_begin() operation must be done only a=
fter
> >> +	 * an actual key is determined.
> >> +	 */
> >>  	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
> >> =20
> >>  	rcu_read_lock();
> >> @@ -417,12 +421,16 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_se=
arch_context *ctx,
> >>  	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
> >>  		goto key_already_present;
> >> =20
> >> -	if (dest_keyring)
> >> +	if (dest_keyring) {
> >> +		ret =3D __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
> >> +		if (ret < 0)
> >> +			goto link_alloc_failed;
> >>  		__key_link(dest_keyring, key, &edit);
> >> +	}
> >> =20
> >>  	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
> >>  	if (dest_keyring)
> >> -		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, edit);
> >> +		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
> >>  	mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
> >>  	*_key =3D key;
> >>  	kleave(" =3D 0 [%d]", key_serial(key));
> >> @@ -435,10 +443,13 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_se=
arch_context *ctx,
> >>  	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
> >>  	key =3D key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
> >>  	if (dest_keyring) {
> >> +		ret =3D __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
> >> +		if (ret < 0)
> >> +			goto link_alloc_failed_unlocked;
> >>  		ret =3D __key_link_check_live_key(dest_keyring, key);
> >>  		if (ret =3D=3D 0)
> >>  			__key_link(dest_keyring, key, &edit);
> >> -		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, edit);
> >> +		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
> >>  		if (ret < 0)
> >>  			goto link_check_failed;
> >>  	}
> >> @@ -453,8 +464,10 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_sea=
rch_context *ctx,
> >>  	kleave(" =3D %d [linkcheck]", ret);
> >>  	return ret;
> >> =20
> >> -link_prealloc_failed:
> >> -	__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, edit);
> >> +link_alloc_failed:
> >> +	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
> >> +link_alloc_failed_unlocked:
> >> +	__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
> >>  link_lock_failed:
> >>  	mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
> >>  	key_put(key);
> >> --=20
> >> 2.35.3
> >>
> >=20
> > A good catch, thanks.
> >=20
> > Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
>
> Thank you for the review. Can this be picked through your tree?
>
> Cheers,
> Petr

Hi, I pressed send too early in my respose. I was going to say that
I'm picking.

I did recently from mutt to aerc, and sometimes get really confused
what is going on :-)

BR, Jarkko