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HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial notebooks. Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez --- Based on the latest platform-drivers-x86.git/for-next --- .../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c | 386 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 386 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..02291e32684f --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c @@ -0,0 +1,386 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Functions corresponding to secure platform management object type + * attributes under BIOS PASSWORD for use with hp-bioscfg driver + * + * Copyright (c) 2022 HP Development Company, L.P. + */ + +#include "bioscfg.h" + +static const char * const spm_state_types[] = { + "not provisioned", + "provisioned", + "provisioning in progress", +}; + +static const char * const spm_mechanism_types[] = { + "not provisioned", + "signing-key", + "endorsement-key", +}; + +struct secureplatform_provisioning_data { + u8 state; + u8 version[2]; + u8 reserved1; + u32 features; + u32 nonce; + u8 reserved2[28]; + u8 sk_mod[MAX_KEY_MOD_SIZE]; + u8 kek_mod[MAX_KEY_MOD_SIZE]; +}; + +/** + * hp_calculate_security_buffer() - determines size of security buffer + * for authentication scheme + * + * @authentication: the authentication content + * + * Currently only supported type is Admin password + */ +size_t hp_calculate_security_buffer(const char *authentication) +{ + size_t size, authlen; + + if (!authentication) + return sizeof(u16) * 2; + + authlen = strlen(authentication); + if (!authlen) + return sizeof(u16) * 2; + + size = sizeof(u16) + authlen * sizeof(u16); + if (!strstarts(authentication, BEAM_PREFIX)) + size += strlen(UTF_PREFIX) * sizeof(u16); + + return size; +} + +/** + * hp_populate_security_buffer() - builds a security buffer for + * authentication scheme + * + * @authbuf: the security buffer + * @authentication: the authentication content + * + * Currently only supported type is PLAIN TEXT + */ +int hp_populate_security_buffer(u16 *authbuf, const char *authentication) +{ + u16 *auth = authbuf; + char *strprefix = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + if (strstarts(authentication, BEAM_PREFIX)) { + /* + * BEAM_PREFIX is append to authbuf when a signature + * is provided and Sure Admin is enabled in BIOS + */ + /* BEAM_PREFIX found, convert part to unicode */ + auth = hp_ascii_to_utf16_unicode(auth, authentication); + if (!auth) + return -EINVAL; + + } else { + /* + * UTF-16 prefix is append to the * authbuf when a BIOS + * admin password is configured in BIOS + */ + + /* append UTF_PREFIX to part and then convert it to unicode */ + strprefix = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s%s", UTF_PREFIX, + authentication); + if (!strprefix) + return -ENOMEM; + + auth = hp_ascii_to_utf16_unicode(auth, strprefix); + kfree(strprefix); + + if (!auth) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_buffer; + } + } + +out_buffer: + return ret; +} + +static ssize_t update_spm_state(void) +{ + struct secureplatform_provisioning_data data; + int ret; + + ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM_GET_STATE, + HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM, &data, 0, + sizeof(data)); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism = data.state; + if (bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism) + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.is_enabled = 1; + + return 0; +} + +static ssize_t statusbin(struct kobject *kobj, + struct kobj_attribute *attr, + struct secureplatform_provisioning_data *buf) +{ + int ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM_GET_STATE, + HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM, buf, 0, + sizeof(*buf)); + + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + return sizeof(struct secureplatform_provisioning_data); +} + +/* + * status_show - Reads SPM status + */ +static ssize_t status_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute + *attr, char *buf) +{ + int ret, i; + int len = 0; + struct secureplatform_provisioning_data data; + + ret = statusbin(kobj, attr, &data); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + /* + * 'status' is a read-only file that returns ASCII text in + * JSON format reporting the status information. + * + * "State": "not provisioned | provisioned | provisioning in progress ", + * "Version": " Major. Minor ", + * "Nonce": <16-bit unsigned number display in base 10>, + * "FeaturesInUse": <16-bit unsigned number display in base 10>, + * "EndorsementKeyMod": "<256 bytes in base64>", + * "SigningKeyMod": "<256 bytes in base64>" + */ + + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "{\n"); + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "\t\"State\": \"%s\",\n", + spm_state_types[data.state]); + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "\t\"Version\": \"%d.%d\"", + data.version[0], data.version[1]); + + /* + * state == 0 means secure platform management + * feature is not configured in BIOS. + */ + if (data.state == 0) { + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "\n"); + goto status_exit; + } else { + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, ",\n"); + } + + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "\t\"Nonce\": %d,\n", data.nonce); + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "\t\"FeaturesInUse\": %d,\n", data.features); + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "\t\"EndorsementKeyMod\": \""); + + for (i = 255; i >= 0; i--) + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, " %u", data.kek_mod[i]); + + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, " \",\n"); + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "\t\"SigningKeyMod\": \""); + + for (i = 255; i >= 0; i--) + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, " %u", data.sk_mod[i]); + + /* Return buf contents */ + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, " \"\n"); + +status_exit: + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "}\n"); + + return len; +} + +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_status = __ATTR_RO(status); + +ATTRIBUTE_SPM_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(is_enabled, spm); +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_is_key_enabled = __ATTR_RO(is_enabled); + +static ssize_t key_mechanism_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", + spm_mechanism_types[bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism]); +} + +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_key_mechanism = __ATTR_RO(key_mechanism); + +static ssize_t sk_store(struct kobject *kobj, + struct kobj_attribute *attr, + const char *buf, size_t count) +{ + int ret; + int length; + + length = count; + if (buf[length - 1] == '\n') + length--; + + /* allocate space and copy current signing key */ + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key = kmalloc(length, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key) + return -ENOMEM; + + memcpy(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key, buf, length); + + /* submit signing key payload */ + ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM_SET_SK, + HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM, + (void *)bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key, + count, 0); + + if (!ret) { + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism = SIGNING_KEY; + hp_set_reboot_and_signal_event(); + } + + kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key = NULL; + + return ret ? ret : count; +} + +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_signing_key = __ATTR_WO(sk); + +static ssize_t kek_store(struct kobject *kobj, + struct kobj_attribute *attr, + const char *buf, size_t count) +{ + int ret; + int length; + + length = count; + if (buf[length - 1] == '\n') + length--; + + /* allocate space and copy current signing key */ + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key = kmalloc(length, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto exit_kek; + } + + memcpy(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key, buf, length); + + ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM_SET_KEK, + HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM, + (void *)bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key, + count, 0); + + if (!ret) { + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism = ENDORSEMENT_KEY; + hp_set_reboot_and_signal_event(); + } + +exit_kek: + kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key = NULL; + + return ret ? ret : count; +} + +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_endorsement_key = __ATTR_WO(kek); + +static ssize_t role_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", BIOS_SPM); +} + +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_role = __ATTR_RO(role); + +static ssize_t auth_token_store(struct kobject *kobj, + struct kobj_attribute *attr, + const char *buf, size_t count) +{ + int ret = 0; + int length; + + length = count; + if (buf[length - 1] == '\n') + length--; + + /* allocate space and copy current auth token */ + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token = kmalloc(length, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto exit_token; + } + + memcpy(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token, buf, length); + return count; + +exit_token: + kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token = NULL; + + return ret; +} + +static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_auth_token = __ATTR_WO(auth_token); + +static struct attribute *secure_platform_attrs[] = { + &password_spm_is_key_enabled.attr, + &password_spm_signing_key.attr, + &password_spm_endorsement_key.attr, + &password_spm_key_mechanism.attr, + &password_spm_status.attr, + &password_spm_role.attr, + &password_spm_auth_token.attr, + NULL, +}; + +static const struct attribute_group secure_platform_attr_group = { + .attrs = secure_platform_attrs, +}; + +void hp_exit_secure_platform_attributes(void) +{ + /* remove secure platform sysfs entry and free key data*/ + + kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key = NULL; + + kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key = NULL; + + kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token); + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token = NULL; + + if (bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attr_name_kobj) + sysfs_remove_group(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attr_name_kobj, + &secure_platform_attr_group); +} + +int hp_populate_secure_platform_data(struct kobject *attr_name_kobj) +{ + /* Populate data for Secure Platform Management */ + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attr_name_kobj = attr_name_kobj; + + strscpy(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attribute_name, SPM_STR, + sizeof(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attribute_name)); + + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.is_enabled = 0; + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism = 0; + bioscfg_drv.pending_reboot = false; + update_spm_state(); + + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key = NULL; + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key = NULL; + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token = NULL; + + return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &secure_platform_attr_group); +} -- 2.34.1