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From:   Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
To:     kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com>,
        maz@kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
        yuzenghui@huawei.com, tabba@google.com, kaleshsingh@google.com,
        suzuki.poulose@arm.com, will@kernel.org, james.morse@arm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KVM: arm64: Use different pointer authentication keys for pKVM
Date:   Wed, 14 Jun 2023 15:31:28 +0000
Message-ID: <168675651878.3255755.17510485264525909343.b4-ty@linux.dev>
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On Wed, 14 Jun 2023 12:25:59 +0000, Mostafa Saleh wrote:
> When the use of pointer authentication is enabled in the kernel it
> applies to both the kernel itself as well as KVM's nVHE hypervisor. The
> same keys are used for both the kernel and the nVHE hypervisor, which is
> less than desirable for pKVM as the host is not trusted at runtime.
> 
> Naturally, the fix is to use a different set of keys for the hypervisor
> when running in protected mode. Have the host generate a new set of keys
> for the hypervisor before deprivileging the kernel. While there might be
> other sources of random directly available at EL2, this keeps the
> implementation simple, and the host is trusted anyways until it is
> deprivileged.
> 
> [...]

Applied to kvmarm/next, thanks!

[1/1] KVM: arm64: Use different pointer authentication keys for pKVM
      https://git.kernel.org/kvmarm/kvmarm/c/8c15c2a02810

--
Best,
Oliver