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From:   Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
To:     <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
CC:     <x86@kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
        "Alexey Kardashevskiy" <aik@amd.com>,
        Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com>,
        "Santosh Shukla" <santosh.shukla@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH kernel 2/9] KVM: SEV: Move SEV's GP_VECTOR intercept setup to SEV
Date:   Thu, 15 Jun 2023 16:37:50 +1000
Message-ID: <20230615063757.3039121-3-aik@amd.com>
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Currently SVM setup is done sequentially in
init_vmcb() -> sev_init_vmcb() -> sev_es_init_vmcb() and tries
keeping SVM/SEV/SEV-ES bits separated. One of the exceptions
is #GP intercept which init_vmcb() skips setting for SEV guests and
then sev_es_init_vmcb() needlessly clears it.

Remove the SEV check from init_vmcb(). Clear the #GP intercept in
sev_init_vmcb(). SEV-ES will use the SEV setting.

No functional change intended.

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com>
---
Changes:
v5:
* new in the series
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 ++++++---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 5 ++---
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 69ae5e1b3120..c03bd063aecf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -2971,9 +2971,6 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR4_WRITE);
 	svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR8_WRITE);
 
-	/* No support for enable_vmware_backdoor */
-	clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
-
 	/* Can't intercept XSETBV, HV can't modify XCR0 directly */
 	svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
 
@@ -2999,6 +2996,12 @@ void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE;
 	clr_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
 
+	/*
+	 * Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests, e.g. for the VMware backdoor, as
+	 * KVM can't decrypt guest memory to decode the faulting instruction.
+	 */
+	clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
+
 	if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
 		sev_es_init_vmcb(svm);
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 980faf460bfe..9c1b191aed4b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1256,10 +1256,9 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
 	 * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
 	 * We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
-	 * as VMware does.  Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests as KVM can't
-	 * decrypt guest memory to decode the faulting instruction.
+	 * as VMware does.
 	 */
-	if (enable_vmware_backdoor && !sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+	if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
 		set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
 
 	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR);
-- 
2.40.1