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Date:   Tue, 27 Jun 2023 12:00:57 +0000
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Message-ID: <20230627120058.2214509-1-matteorizzo@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 0/1] Add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
From:   Matteo Rizzo <matteorizzo@google.com>
To:     linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        io-uring@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     matteorizzo@google.com, jordyzomer@google.com, evn@google.com,
        poprdi@google.com, corbet@lwn.net, axboe@kernel.dk,
        asml.silence@gmail.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
        keescook@chromium.org, rostedt@goodmis.org,
        dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ribalda@chromium.org,
        chenhuacai@kernel.org, steve@sk2.org, gpiccoli@igalia.com,
        ldufour@linux.ibm.com
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Over the last few years we've seen many critical vulnerabilities in
io_uring (https://goo.gle/limit-iouring) which could be exploited by
an unprivileged process. There is currently no way to disable io_uring
system-wide except by compiling it out of the kernel entirely. The only
way to prevent a process from accessing io_uring is to use a seccomp
filter, but seccomp cannot be applied system-wide. This patch introduces a
new sysctl which disables the creation of new io_uring instances
system-wide. This gives system admins a way to reduce the kernel's attack
surface on systems where io_uring is not used.


Matteo Rizzo (1):
  Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide

 Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 14 ++++++++++++
 io_uring/io_uring.c                         | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)

-- 
2.41.0.162.gfafddb0af9-goog