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Date:   Thu, 29 Jun 2023 13:22:08 +0200
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 04/22] x86/cpu: Detect TDX partial write machine check
 erratum
To:     Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     linux-mm@kvack.org, x86@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com,
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        reinette.chatre@intel.com, len.brown@intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
        isaku.yamahata@intel.com, ying.huang@intel.com, chao.gao@intel.com,
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References: <cover.1687784645.git.kai.huang@intel.com>
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From:   David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Organization: Red Hat
In-Reply-To: <0f701502157029989617bcb3f5940ff48e19a2b2.1687784645.git.kai.huang@intel.com>
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On 26.06.23 16:12, Kai Huang wrote:
> TDX memory has integrity and confidentiality protections.  Violations of
> this integrity protection are supposed to only affect TDX operations and
> are never supposed to affect the host kernel itself.  In other words,
> the host kernel should never, itself, see machine checks induced by the
> TDX integrity hardware.
> 
> Alas, the first few generations of TDX hardware have an erratum.  A
> partial write to a TDX private memory cacheline will silently "poison"
> the line.  Subsequent reads will consume the poison and generate a
> machine check.  According to the TDX hardware spec, neither of these
> things should have happened.
> 
> Virtually all kernel memory accesses operations happen in full
> cachelines.  In practice, writing a "byte" of memory usually reads a 64
> byte cacheline of memory, modifies it, then writes the whole line back.
> Those operations do not trigger this problem.
> 
> This problem is triggered by "partial" writes where a write transaction
> of less than cacheline lands at the memory controller.  The CPU does
> these via non-temporal write instructions (like MOVNTI), or through
> UC/WC memory mappings.  The issue can also be triggered away from the
> CPU by devices doing partial writes via DMA.
> 
> With this erratum, there are additional things need to be done.  Similar
> to other CPU bugs, use a CPU bug bit to indicate this erratum, and
> detect this erratum during early boot.  Note this bug reflects the
> hardware thus it is detected regardless of whether the kernel is built
> with TDX support or not.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> ---

Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>

-- 
Cheers,

David / dhildenb