Received: by 2002:a05:6358:3188:b0:123:57c1:9b43 with SMTP id q8csp29045907rwd; Wed, 5 Jul 2023 06:31:56 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: APBJJlEN7uDWApTCCKUYvQT5UAqhT031ImlhankkebEwYriajF7KxUGWCpkWqvGxC1C3Ino/s1FY X-Received: by 2002:a05:6a00:3a04:b0:681:4274:eef0 with SMTP id fj4-20020a056a003a0400b006814274eef0mr2658153pfb.1.1688563916217; Wed, 05 Jul 2023 06:31:56 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1688563916; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=NGvLyn8QCL1bT8nveK864TGEHcK+WDOx/HPs1CsB9FLCz8twvLQ9biE0J2gpsA2dYJ KhZiSErNsnh33VSd4m/atr977yBIG9HHZA9yTWAZIX1cDrt/ySG73lANV0PVM1epfe36 FIEWx2P4N49cgw0c8CFC3z44Z78zCE/lvfVH/E6fIAisuYjyyuSKjLIJVgx1W43hRQCO yT4qFmHHjcEKKjJWKv+ZWg6MmBbkyTq+sY/E6UCy932BZ1mR1F5l8Q9lQVa7Kx5oMdvW ECXCPTfYmQYJ9MT8AWVTmfLfElrNQNIL5ByaEoxFKIWwIW3U92an8+jGIuTKO880cA5j S00A== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:in-reply-to:content-disposition:mime-version :references:message-id:subject:cc:to:from:date:dkim-signature; bh=TWx5dC9InoW2nLEmW4Bv+WxNE5ybglN1ShExSZ33wUE=; fh=G7kQIQwUtGz4crITLU42ApxMJodhifwwzib94smvmUw=; b=RWqSzGIQXXW7qQm45FZ1ahsot00Wa6ct4T1Jj4r5eLmuVv00TTAguwzRW0X3ZIZyPy IYofnP2XyXGdqYaoavh48vvd6L/FDSrW1I50ZjZ0dk9i0FUOYqnuPmQboNIz+V00VMpW 6m/RZ+i5uJaNb0XLVOyoChxv/zeGOJY9LZfrIwd5HzbHGd9NbU+vvy51HMDB3kqtPqpq gPdGNFXgsNmUfrtVM8jxyZY38/+gP9IzBYnIR+yjdc76X1B4JTQwRXtImVG36QvQDjLq akfI5ZUMY52/EH0bq42qWT6qqLFgUSDSmMZBGSe/NzhBK8TT2OxjMXqBXuIVAdYFbxpL EYBw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b=TawbnDLo; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from out1.vger.email (out1.vger.email. [2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id s10-20020a056a00194a00b0068094fd547esi16798080pfk.99.2023.07.05.06.31.38; Wed, 05 Jul 2023 06:31:56 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b=TawbnDLo; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231871AbjGENGH (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 5 Jul 2023 09:06:07 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:58864 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231594AbjGENGG (ORCPT ); Wed, 5 Jul 2023 09:06:06 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 86CEBE3; Wed, 5 Jul 2023 06:06:01 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 21C4D61568; Wed, 5 Jul 2023 13:06:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B991BC433C7; Wed, 5 Jul 2023 13:05:58 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1688562360; bh=ja36A00KP89J4F9k+2cHt5w5k39DDIqRvniutcQAd2E=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=TawbnDLogKq88cEIeyVZB630NQVK0Jq95eJYO240DO7xfCzhDZWdtYbpA753E0JEM PK2SmNO4uxphy+8e4ym5qtx6BtT7p7/BvlbBQSC0YpnTBDYFKgJfV0oQnMhondq4Cy UIpmNKG4/0ianD60RifnCAd9VXv5aDAoP9qlQErMlWzAYman1ERTXVXaU0Cic+zeSd RG4aB5HYplMu1WSQvtcI9KIePGy14sbQqIlH6B0biTJ4OFWr5ZCU4s9HYizP8lrS+G Cbmhx7m5xLi4oLgFas18wbdzMtRf8OUXCVBwPNpIt+gKafdimOSA7h5rra2dO2L4lZ CEN8YPbD05nVA== Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2023 15:05:56 +0200 From: Christian Brauner To: syzbot , Jeff Layton , amir73il@gmail.com Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, miklos@szeredi.hu, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: [syzbot] [overlayfs?] general protection fault in d_path Message-ID: <20230705-aufgearbeitet-kaffee-44ff4731a7dd@brauner> References: <0000000000004f34d705ffbc2604@google.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <0000000000004f34d705ffbc2604@google.com> X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Jul 05, 2023 at 05:00:45AM -0700, syzbot wrote: > Hello, > > syzbot found the following issue on: > > HEAD commit: d528014517f2 Revert ".gitignore: ignore *.cover and *.mbx" > git tree: upstream > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=14fad002a80000 > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=1085b4238c9eb6ba > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a67fc5321ffb4b311c98 > compiler: Debian clang version 15.0.7, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2 > > Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this issue yet. > > Downloadable assets: > disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/fef94e788067/disk-d5280145.raw.xz > vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/576412ea518b/vmlinux-d5280145.xz > kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/685a0e4be06b/bzImage-d5280145.xz > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: > Reported-by: syzbot+a67fc5321ffb4b311c98@syzkaller.appspotmail.com > > general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000a: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN > KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000050-0x0000000000000057] > CPU: 1 PID: 10127 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.4.0-syzkaller-11478-gd528014517f2 #0 > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023 > RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x10d/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5012 > Code: 85 75 18 00 00 83 3d 15 c8 2c 0d 00 48 89 9c 24 10 01 00 00 0f 84 f8 0f 00 00 83 3d 5c de b3 0b 00 74 34 48 89 d0 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 00 00 74 1a 48 89 d7 e8 b4 51 79 00 48 8b 94 24 80 00 00 > RSP: 0018:ffffc900169be9e0 EFLAGS: 00010006 > RAX: 000000000000000a RBX: 1ffff92002d37d60 RCX: 0000000000000002 > RDX: 0000000000000050 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000050 > RBP: ffffc900169beca8 R08: dffffc0000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 > R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1d2fe76 R12: 0000000000000000 > R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff88802091d940 > FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > CR2: 00007fa22a3fe000 CR3: 000000004b5e1000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > Call Trace: > > lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 > seqcount_lockdep_reader_access+0x139/0x220 include/linux/seqlock.h:102 > get_fs_root_rcu fs/d_path.c:244 [inline] > d_path+0x2f0/0x6e0 fs/d_path.c:286 > audit_log_d_path+0xd3/0x310 kernel/audit.c:2139 > dump_common_audit_data security/lsm_audit.c:224 [inline] > common_lsm_audit+0x7cf/0x1a90 security/lsm_audit.c:458 > smack_log+0x421/0x540 security/smack/smack_access.c:383 > smk_tskacc+0x2ff/0x360 security/smack/smack_access.c:253 > smack_inode_getattr+0x203/0x270 security/smack/smack_lsm.c:1202 > security_inode_getattr+0xd3/0x120 security/security.c:2114 > vfs_getattr+0x25/0x70 fs/stat.c:167 > ovl_getattr+0x1b1/0xf70 fs/overlayfs/inode.c:174 > ima_check_last_writer security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:171 [inline] > ima_file_free+0x26e/0x4b0 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:203 Ugh, I think the root of this might all be the call back into vfs_getattr() that happens on overlayfs: __fput() -> ima_file_free() -> mutex_lock() -> vfs_getattr_nosec() -> i_op->getattr() == ovl_getattr() -> vfs_getattr() -> security_inode_getattr() -> mutex_unlock() So either overlayfs needs to call vfs_getattr_nosec() when the request comes from vfs_getattr_nosec() or this needs to use backing_file_real_path() to operate on the real underlying path. Thoughts? > __fput+0x36a/0x950 fs/file_table.c:378 > task_work_run+0x24a/0x300 kernel/task_work.c:179 > exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline] > do_exit+0x68f/0x2290 kernel/exit.c:874 > do_group_exit+0x206/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1024 > get_signal+0x1709/0x17e0 kernel/signal.c:2877 > arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x91/0x670 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:308 > exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x6a/0x100 kernel/entry/common.c:168 > exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xb1/0x140 kernel/entry/common.c:204 > __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline] > syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x64/0x280 kernel/entry/common.c:297 > do_syscall_64+0x4d/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd > RIP: 0033:0x7f7f3ca8c389 > Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f7f3ca8c35f. > RSP: 002b:00007f7f3d741168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000052 > RAX: fffffffffffffffb RBX: 00007f7f3cbac050 RCX: 00007f7f3ca8c389 > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000020000180 > RBP: 00007f7f3cad7493 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 > R13: 00007fff8432555f R14: 00007f7f3d741300 R15: 0000000000022000 > > Modules linked in: > ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- > RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x10d/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5012 > Code: 85 75 18 00 00 83 3d 15 c8 2c 0d 00 48 89 9c 24 10 01 00 00 0f 84 f8 0f 00 00 83 3d 5c de b3 0b 00 74 34 48 89 d0 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 00 00 74 1a 48 89 d7 e8 b4 51 79 00 48 8b 94 24 80 00 00 > RSP: 0018:ffffc900169be9e0 EFLAGS: 00010006 > RAX: 000000000000000a RBX: 1ffff92002d37d60 RCX: 0000000000000002 > RDX: 0000000000000050 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000050 > RBP: ffffc900169beca8 R08: dffffc0000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 > R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1d2fe76 R12: 0000000000000000 > R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff88802091d940 > FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > CR2: 00007fa22a3fe000 CR3: 000000004b5e1000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > ---------------- > Code disassembly (best guess): > 0: 85 75 18 test %esi,0x18(%rbp) > 3: 00 00 add %al,(%rax) > 5: 83 3d 15 c8 2c 0d 00 cmpl $0x0,0xd2cc815(%rip) # 0xd2cc821 > c: 48 89 9c 24 10 01 00 mov %rbx,0x110(%rsp) > 13: 00 > 14: 0f 84 f8 0f 00 00 je 0x1012 > 1a: 83 3d 5c de b3 0b 00 cmpl $0x0,0xbb3de5c(%rip) # 0xbb3de7d > 21: 74 34 je 0x57 > 23: 48 89 d0 mov %rdx,%rax > 26: 48 c1 e8 03 shr $0x3,%rax > * 2a: 42 80 3c 00 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rax,%r8,1) <-- trapping instruction > 2f: 74 1a je 0x4b > 31: 48 89 d7 mov %rdx,%rdi > 34: e8 b4 51 79 00 callq 0x7951ed > 39: 48 rex.W > 3a: 8b .byte 0x8b > 3b: 94 xchg %eax,%esp > 3c: 24 80 and $0x80,%al > > > --- > This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors. > See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot. > syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com. > > syzbot will keep track of this issue. See: > https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot. > > If the bug is already fixed, let syzbot know by replying with: > #syz fix: exact-commit-title > > If you want to change bug's subsystems, reply with: > #syz set subsystems: new-subsystem > (See the list of subsystem names on the web dashboard) > > If the bug is a duplicate of another bug, reply with: > #syz dup: exact-subject-of-another-report > > If you want to undo deduplication, reply with: > #syz undup