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From:   Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To:     Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
        Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Cc:     Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
        "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com>,
        Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>,
        Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>, Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>,
        Paulo Miguel Almeida <paulo.miguel.almeida.rodenas@gmail.com>,
        Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>,
        Dawei Li <set_pte_at@outlook.com>,
        Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>,
        =?UTF-8?q?Thomas=20Wei=C3=9Fschuh?= <linux@weissschuh.net>,
        linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, linux-input@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] HID: hyperv: avoid struct memcpy overrun warning
Date:   Wed,  5 Jul 2023 16:02:24 +0200
Message-Id: <20230705140242.844167-1-arnd@kernel.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

A previous patch addressed the fortified memcpy warning for most
builds, but I still see this one with gcc-9:

In file included from include/linux/string.h:254,
                 from drivers/hid/hid-hyperv.c:8:
In function 'fortify_memcpy_chk',
    inlined from 'mousevsc_on_receive' at drivers/hid/hid-hyperv.c:272:3:
include/linux/fortify-string.h:583:4: error: call to '__write_overflow_field' declared with attribute warning: detected write beyond size of field (1st parameter); maybe use struct_group()? [-Werror=attribute-warning]
  583 |    __write_overflow_field(p_size_field, size);
      |    ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

My guess is that the WARN_ON() itself is what confuses gcc, so it no
longer sees that there is a correct range check. Rework the code in a
way that helps readability and avoids the warning.

Fixes: 542f25a944715 ("HID: hyperv: Replace one-element array with flexible-array member")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-hyperv.c | 10 ++++------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-hyperv.c b/drivers/hid/hid-hyperv.c
index 49d4a26895e76..f33485d83d24f 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-hyperv.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-hyperv.c
@@ -258,19 +258,17 @@ static void mousevsc_on_receive(struct hv_device *device,
 
 	switch (hid_msg_hdr->type) {
 	case SYNTH_HID_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE:
+		len = struct_size(pipe_msg, data, pipe_msg->size);
+
 		/*
 		 * While it will be impossible for us to protect against
 		 * malicious/buggy hypervisor/host, add a check here to
 		 * ensure we don't corrupt memory.
 		 */
-		if (struct_size(pipe_msg, data, pipe_msg->size)
-			> sizeof(struct mousevsc_prt_msg)) {
-			WARN_ON(1);
+		if (WARN_ON(len > sizeof(struct mousevsc_prt_msg)))
 			break;
-		}
 
-		memcpy(&input_dev->protocol_resp, pipe_msg,
-				struct_size(pipe_msg, data, pipe_msg->size));
+		memcpy(&input_dev->protocol_resp, pipe_msg, len);
 		complete(&input_dev->wait_event);
 		break;
 
-- 
2.39.2