Received: by 2002:a05:6358:3188:b0:123:57c1:9b43 with SMTP id q8csp29421938rwd; Wed, 5 Jul 2023 11:33:58 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ACHHUZ5fv+09l8mgjK271SnmFBMevzWgotFCjJhJzGqakIm7/tzLgdE5ixbOnKy02jz1sujsZWwl X-Received: by 2002:a05:6808:209d:b0:39a:bd0e:449 with SMTP id s29-20020a056808209d00b0039abd0e0449mr19535985oiw.26.1688582038216; Wed, 05 Jul 2023 11:33:58 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1688582038; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=ZKKLMaQKcNCepWzsob7Zgf1abHfYBX0hZQ943jZvQ9KlWR4Rj+0Nq0vcFgZY6d597k vZr5XRc4O1iX5M5rI/hW01FmPOjt5M7zqI/8V/VDCUFoAYKrps7Ep1u5n5jSw9mUFvxC H42a4RZq1nssY6SRSOcaRTZ6ppTV9yazrLgkZfEiBn2b1qPSWIda5mditc5UXZTC8AAF 2blZhuAjhLHtepvch8UxZv7SPbvorgMWEHdLPJcqHZiu/y/z9vmeyFfmkPEJPtjZExMr jtfRrmOAf1UUB40mqX3FyNRg/gR6Ty1aYl21AFdIIS1YZMQU8qevq8qTrlCYWFF5Qwkw XXGg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:content-transfer-encoding:cc:to:subject :message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references:mime-version :dkim-signature; bh=dXjTLxu2B7e4dyW+lN0huxaA/BFi7Q1RInvMd8D9U8Q=; fh=3wO8J5l+C0AjT7dTRPzfWGW+k7K4FYa1LYN4YhWxGIM=; b=jw6cJCseWszdcMBCBHCBig5kiT4FCyRUJB/oMB4n+HO7rKZ0kpkJaq7IHBwhqGL3Eq geQ8/GjHBV7SOLOSS0DnN2aRtD56HTBQT23ZpbO4q0+5k9hEoGAnKiwzK/3O/N4cAOpY gWz/Ivz56e+Edr3Y5n8v6INmFUEwygu63wHpHZCVz8aqYJf33HWTdm1hJ+MTEv6qQ36T imFKnyTjzrqaq+SXs0z6tJWdtq7APk8l15CYfPRum7rQ/gdeeNYyfaBrJl25Dle38LUV 18GV+Uw27Xk0v8hGI+UodJppFkp9bXvPimVDNuaI2gkmB0NRqxkCY5Os2sVNkuoesKTZ 04eQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@google.com header.s=20221208 header.b=Y4uvDUUm; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=NONE) header.from=google.com Return-Path: Received: from out1.vger.email (out1.vger.email. [2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id l186-20020a6391c3000000b0055b7999649asi10173836pge.442.2023.07.05.11.33.36; Wed, 05 Jul 2023 11:33:58 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@google.com header.s=20221208 header.b=Y4uvDUUm; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=NONE) header.from=google.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233390AbjGESTp (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 5 Jul 2023 14:19:45 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:45026 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232713AbjGESTY (ORCPT ); Wed, 5 Jul 2023 14:19:24 -0400 Received: from mail-yw1-x112a.google.com (mail-yw1-x112a.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::112a]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4C8011713 for ; Wed, 5 Jul 2023 11:18:31 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-yw1-x112a.google.com with SMTP id 00721157ae682-5701e8f2b79so83125957b3.0 for ; Wed, 05 Jul 2023 11:18:31 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20221208; t=1688581088; x=1691173088; h=content-transfer-encoding:cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from :in-reply-to:references:mime-version:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=dXjTLxu2B7e4dyW+lN0huxaA/BFi7Q1RInvMd8D9U8Q=; b=Y4uvDUUmj1tqpQpeoS4VBbISmEjEEw2FeJkvjMnffeRwwFotLZhRWBkR20BrCW5vOD 6RBRuOTR+D1TCyzCIxfsJ9CjMyetH+qamjiLPgzNyH1dDCY8MX87o9HKytyVT77KG9g/ mN/zm8jZ3RDshUWsYdZxWDpxg2uX4P2A7we5ECVgpUs0XGGFxcu/S80zxLkq5/ddk6+N 3knTatCdseF/ArrI64EZqrjdUu5U8zfGljeTaJiL4jYrFEqjK7iAd6P54XwXcw47pC9/ tmmRJADmlMxYxQPUCZq8KWRustM5fmAN5NwJE08OYmMXOMS28qfqUqytwrTzExcFGxhL LTSg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20221208; t=1688581088; x=1691173088; h=content-transfer-encoding:cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from :in-reply-to:references:mime-version:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=dXjTLxu2B7e4dyW+lN0huxaA/BFi7Q1RInvMd8D9U8Q=; b=B1cxY3oqGLPNKmiqHdYUblnesKSpHROr/mvNlbQOeTbmuMaZlViam8wVtAWPrKI2Ts 8qhpLFW4io4Oxb71zAO3bJc/MM/WfpVVtPU9Fh87qxzqfW+Hk8C9Vz6v+sZl7IVByYtk wflNZkQuFEynYkEBibfEmI5VW+8FI8iN1HtyarED+FTLU7AHEXmkrADHzWJA9Tnx/PuX CXxjaEzhN0C5Kg5v6ujnrTEiwEsB9lsqcz5W4eswBoN2rYoPfJ2A+nm8FuftH+xanD12 W6u2pQ64X9d7E4OXpHVzCcuVnJzhF/Sjws1qoNgcGX0ldgsi/Rzt0v3y55toms4JIRTy y6pg== X-Gm-Message-State: ABy/qLawFrIjxzRyh9Kl1knPnOOH4eRDKQqzzwwPxqHMEQtRU6UhElEm IyR4lwfoCFark7/dF1kNQ+wlxok0IcNPgppAs0JhzQ== X-Received: by 2002:a0d:d595:0:b0:577:189b:121f with SMTP id x143-20020a0dd595000000b00577189b121fmr15572848ywd.40.1688581088499; Wed, 05 Jul 2023 11:18:08 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20230629205040.665834-1-axelrasmussen@google.com> In-Reply-To: <20230629205040.665834-1-axelrasmussen@google.com> From: Jiaqi Yan Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2023 11:17:57 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/6] mm: userfaultfd: add new UFFDIO_POISON ioctl To: Axel Rasmussen Cc: Alexander Viro , Andrew Morton , Christian Brauner , David Hildenbrand , Huang Ying , Hugh Dickins , James Houghton , Jonathan Corbet , "Liam R. Howlett" , Miaohe Lin , Mike Kravetz , "Mike Rapoport (IBM)" , Muchun Song , Nadav Amit , Naoya Horiguchi , Peter Xu , Shuah Khan , ZhangPeng , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_MED, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF, ENV_AND_HDR_SPF_MATCH,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL,USER_IN_DEF_SPF_WL autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Jun 29, 2023 at 1:50=E2=80=AFPM Axel Rasmussen wrote: > > The basic idea here is to "simulate" memory poisoning for VMs. A VM > running on some host might encounter a memory error, after which some > page(s) are poisoned (i.e., future accesses SIGBUS). They expect that > once poisoned, pages can never become "un-poisoned". So, when we live > migrate the VM, we need to preserve the poisoned status of these pages. > > When live migrating, we try to get the guest running on its new host as > quickly as possible. So, we start it running before all memory has been > copied, and before we're certain which pages should be poisoned or not. > > So the basic way to use this new feature is: > > - On the new host, the guest's memory is registered with userfaultfd, in > either MISSING or MINOR mode (doesn't really matter for this purpose). > - On any first access, we get a userfaultfd event. At this point we can > communicate with the old host to find out if the page was poisoned. > - If so, we can respond with a UFFDIO_POISON - this places a swap marker > so any future accesses will SIGBUS. Because the pte is now "present", > future accesses won't generate more userfaultfd events, they'll just > SIGBUS directly. > > UFFDIO_POISON does not handle unmapping previously-present PTEs. This A minor suggestion, would UFFDIO_HWPOISON be better? so that readers won't be confused with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING (a feature to fill the pages with poison patterns after free). > isn't needed, because during live migration we want to intercept > all accesses with userfaultfd (not just writes, so WP mode isn't useful > for this). So whether minor or missing mode is being used (or both), the > PTE won't be present in any case, so handling that case isn't needed. > > Why return VM_FAULT_HWPOISON instead of VM_FAULT_SIGBUS when one of > these markers is encountered? For "normal" userspace programs there > isn't a big difference, both yield a SIGBUS. The difference for KVM is > key though: VM_FAULT_HWPOISON will result in an MCE being injected into > the guest (which is the behavior we want). With VM_FAULT_SIGBUS, the > hypervisor would need to catch the SIGBUS and deal with the MCE > injection itself. > > Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen > --- > fs/userfaultfd.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > include/linux/swapops.h | 3 +- > include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h | 4 ++ > include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h | 25 +++++++++++-- > mm/memory.c | 4 ++ > mm/userfaultfd.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > 6 files changed, 156 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c > index 7cecd49e078b..c26a883399c9 100644 > --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c > +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c > @@ -1965,6 +1965,66 @@ static int userfaultfd_continue(struct userfaultfd= _ctx *ctx, unsigned long arg) > return ret; > } > > +static inline int userfaultfd_poison(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, unsign= ed long arg) > +{ > + __s64 ret; > + struct uffdio_poison uffdio_poison; > + struct uffdio_poison __user *user_uffdio_poison; > + struct userfaultfd_wake_range range; > + > + user_uffdio_poison =3D (struct uffdio_poison __user *)arg; > + > + ret =3D -EAGAIN; > + if (atomic_read(&ctx->mmap_changing)) > + goto out; > + > + ret =3D -EFAULT; > + if (copy_from_user(&uffdio_poison, user_uffdio_poison, > + /* don't copy the output fields */ > + sizeof(uffdio_poison) - (sizeof(__s64)))) > + goto out; > + > + ret =3D validate_range(ctx->mm, uffdio_poison.range.start, > + uffdio_poison.range.len); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + > + ret =3D -EINVAL; > + /* double check for wraparound just in case. */ > + if (uffdio_poison.range.start + uffdio_poison.range.len <=3D > + uffdio_poison.range.start) { > + goto out; > + } > + if (uffdio_poison.mode & ~UFFDIO_POISON_MODE_DONTWAKE) > + goto out; > + > + if (mmget_not_zero(ctx->mm)) { > + ret =3D mfill_atomic_poison(ctx->mm, uffdio_poison.range.= start, > + uffdio_poison.range.len, > + &ctx->mmap_changing, 0); > + mmput(ctx->mm); > + } else { > + return -ESRCH; > + } > + > + if (unlikely(put_user(ret, &user_uffdio_poison->updated))) > + return -EFAULT; > + if (ret < 0) > + goto out; > + > + /* len =3D=3D 0 would wake all */ > + BUG_ON(!ret); > + range.len =3D ret; > + if (!(uffdio_poison.mode & UFFDIO_POISON_MODE_DONTWAKE)) { > + range.start =3D uffdio_poison.range.start; > + wake_userfault(ctx, &range); > + } > + ret =3D range.len =3D=3D uffdio_poison.range.len ? 0 : -EAGAIN; > + > +out: > + return ret; > +} > + > static inline unsigned int uffd_ctx_features(__u64 user_features) > { > /* > @@ -2066,6 +2126,9 @@ static long userfaultfd_ioctl(struct file *file, un= signed cmd, > case UFFDIO_CONTINUE: > ret =3D userfaultfd_continue(ctx, arg); > break; > + case UFFDIO_POISON: > + ret =3D userfaultfd_poison(ctx, arg); > + break; > } > return ret; > } > diff --git a/include/linux/swapops.h b/include/linux/swapops.h > index 4c932cb45e0b..8259fee32421 100644 > --- a/include/linux/swapops.h > +++ b/include/linux/swapops.h > @@ -394,7 +394,8 @@ typedef unsigned long pte_marker; > > #define PTE_MARKER_UFFD_WP BIT(0) > #define PTE_MARKER_SWAPIN_ERROR BIT(1) > -#define PTE_MARKER_MASK (BIT(2) - 1) > +#define PTE_MARKER_UFFD_POISON BIT(2) > +#define PTE_MARKER_MASK (BIT(3) - 1) > > static inline swp_entry_t make_pte_marker_entry(pte_marker marker) > { > diff --git a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h b/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.= h > index ac7b0c96d351..ac8c6854097c 100644 > --- a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h > +++ b/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h > @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ enum mfill_atomic_mode { > MFILL_ATOMIC_COPY, > MFILL_ATOMIC_ZEROPAGE, > MFILL_ATOMIC_CONTINUE, > + MFILL_ATOMIC_POISON, > NR_MFILL_ATOMIC_MODES, > }; > > @@ -83,6 +84,9 @@ extern ssize_t mfill_atomic_zeropage(struct mm_struct *= dst_mm, > extern ssize_t mfill_atomic_continue(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned = long dst_start, > unsigned long len, atomic_t *mmap_ch= anging, > uffd_flags_t flags); > +extern ssize_t mfill_atomic_poison(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned lo= ng start, > + unsigned long len, atomic_t *mmap_chan= ging, > + uffd_flags_t flags); > extern int mwriteprotect_range(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, > unsigned long start, unsigned long len, > bool enable_wp, atomic_t *mmap_changing); > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h b/include/uapi/linux/userfa= ultfd.h > index 66dd4cd277bd..62151706c5a3 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h > @@ -39,7 +39,8 @@ > UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_SHMEM | \ > UFFD_FEATURE_EXACT_ADDRESS | \ > UFFD_FEATURE_WP_HUGETLBFS_SHMEM | \ > - UFFD_FEATURE_WP_UNPOPULATED) > + UFFD_FEATURE_WP_UNPOPULATED | \ > + UFFD_FEATURE_POISON) > #define UFFD_API_IOCTLS \ > ((__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_REGISTER | \ > (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_UNREGISTER | \ > @@ -49,12 +50,14 @@ > (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_COPY | \ > (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE | \ > (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_WRITEPROTECT | \ > - (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_CONTINUE) > + (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_CONTINUE | \ > + (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_POISON) > #define UFFD_API_RANGE_IOCTLS_BASIC \ > ((__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_WAKE | \ > (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_COPY | \ > + (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_WRITEPROTECT | \ > (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_CONTINUE | \ > - (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_WRITEPROTECT) > + (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_POISON) > > /* > * Valid ioctl command number range with this API is from 0x00 to > @@ -71,6 +74,7 @@ > #define _UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE (0x04) > #define _UFFDIO_WRITEPROTECT (0x06) > #define _UFFDIO_CONTINUE (0x07) > +#define _UFFDIO_POISON (0x08) > #define _UFFDIO_API (0x3F) > > /* userfaultfd ioctl ids */ > @@ -91,6 +95,8 @@ > struct uffdio_writeprotect) > #define UFFDIO_CONTINUE _IOWR(UFFDIO, _UFFDIO_CONTINUE, \ > struct uffdio_continue) > +#define UFFDIO_POISON _IOWR(UFFDIO, _UFFDIO_POISON, \ > + struct uffdio_poison) > > /* read() structure */ > struct uffd_msg { > @@ -225,6 +231,7 @@ struct uffdio_api { > #define UFFD_FEATURE_EXACT_ADDRESS (1<<11) > #define UFFD_FEATURE_WP_HUGETLBFS_SHMEM (1<<12) > #define UFFD_FEATURE_WP_UNPOPULATED (1<<13) > +#define UFFD_FEATURE_POISON (1<<14) > __u64 features; > > __u64 ioctls; > @@ -321,6 +328,18 @@ struct uffdio_continue { > __s64 mapped; > }; > > +struct uffdio_poison { > + struct uffdio_range range; > +#define UFFDIO_POISON_MODE_DONTWAKE ((__u64)1<<0) > + __u64 mode; > + > + /* > + * Fields below here are written by the ioctl and must be at the = end: > + * the copy_from_user will not read past here. > + */ > + __s64 updated; > +}; > + > /* > * Flags for the userfaultfd(2) system call itself. > */ > diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c > index d8a9a770b1f1..7fbda39e060d 100644 > --- a/mm/memory.c > +++ b/mm/memory.c > @@ -3692,6 +3692,10 @@ static vm_fault_t handle_pte_marker(struct vm_faul= t *vmf) > if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!marker)) > return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; > > + /* Poison emulation explicitly requested for this PTE. */ > + if (marker & PTE_MARKER_UFFD_POISON) > + return VM_FAULT_HWPOISON; > + > /* Higher priority than uffd-wp when data corrupted */ > if (marker & PTE_MARKER_SWAPIN_ERROR) > return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; > diff --git a/mm/userfaultfd.c b/mm/userfaultfd.c > index a2bf37ee276d..87b62ca1e09e 100644 > --- a/mm/userfaultfd.c > +++ b/mm/userfaultfd.c > @@ -286,6 +286,51 @@ static int mfill_atomic_pte_continue(pmd_t *dst_pmd, > goto out; > } > > +/* Handles UFFDIO_POISON for all non-hugetlb VMAs. */ > +static int mfill_atomic_pte_poison(pmd_t *dst_pmd, > + struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma, > + unsigned long dst_addr, > + uffd_flags_t flags) > +{ > + int ret; > + struct mm_struct *dst_mm =3D dst_vma->vm_mm; > + pte_t _dst_pte, *dst_pte; > + spinlock_t *ptl; > + > + _dst_pte =3D make_pte_marker(PTE_MARKER_UFFD_POISON); > + dst_pte =3D pte_offset_map_lock(dst_mm, dst_pmd, dst_addr, &ptl); > + > + if (vma_is_shmem(dst_vma)) { > + struct inode *inode; > + pgoff_t offset, max_off; > + > + /* serialize against truncate with the page table lock */ > + inode =3D dst_vma->vm_file->f_inode; > + offset =3D linear_page_index(dst_vma, dst_addr); > + max_off =3D DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(inode), PAGE_SIZE); > + ret =3D -EFAULT; > + if (unlikely(offset >=3D max_off)) > + goto out_unlock; > + } > + > + ret =3D -EEXIST; > + /* > + * For now, we don't handle unmapping pages, so only support fill= ing in > + * none PTEs, or replacing PTE markers. > + */ > + if (!pte_none_mostly(*dst_pte)) > + goto out_unlock; > + > + set_pte_at(dst_mm, dst_addr, dst_pte, _dst_pte); > + > + /* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */ > + update_mmu_cache(dst_vma, dst_addr, dst_pte); > + ret =3D 0; > +out_unlock: > + pte_unmap_unlock(dst_pte, ptl); > + return ret; > +} > + > static pmd_t *mm_alloc_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address) > { > pgd_t *pgd; > @@ -336,8 +381,12 @@ static __always_inline ssize_t mfill_atomic_hugetlb( > * supported by hugetlb. A PMD_SIZE huge pages may exist as used > * by THP. Since we can not reliably insert a zero page, this > * feature is not supported. > + * > + * PTE marker handling for hugetlb is a bit special, so for now > + * UFFDIO_POISON is not supported. > */ > - if (uffd_flags_mode_is(flags, MFILL_ATOMIC_ZEROPAGE)) { > + if (uffd_flags_mode_is(flags, MFILL_ATOMIC_ZEROPAGE) || > + uffd_flags_mode_is(flags, MFILL_ATOMIC_POISON)) { > mmap_read_unlock(dst_mm); > return -EINVAL; > } > @@ -481,6 +530,9 @@ static __always_inline ssize_t mfill_atomic_pte(pmd_t= *dst_pmd, > if (uffd_flags_mode_is(flags, MFILL_ATOMIC_CONTINUE)) { > return mfill_atomic_pte_continue(dst_pmd, dst_vma, > dst_addr, flags); > + } else if (uffd_flags_mode_is(flags, MFILL_ATOMIC_POISON)) { > + return mfill_atomic_pte_poison(dst_pmd, dst_vma, > + dst_addr, flags); > } > > /* > @@ -702,6 +754,14 @@ ssize_t mfill_atomic_continue(struct mm_struct *dst_= mm, unsigned long start, > uffd_flags_set_mode(flags, MFILL_ATOMIC_CONTI= NUE)); > } > > +ssize_t mfill_atomic_poison(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned long star= t, > + unsigned long len, atomic_t *mmap_changing, > + uffd_flags_t flags) > +{ > + return mfill_atomic(dst_mm, start, 0, len, mmap_changing, > + uffd_flags_set_mode(flags, MFILL_ATOMIC_POISO= N)); > +} > + > long uffd_wp_range(struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma, > unsigned long start, unsigned long len, bool enable_wp= ) > { > -- > 2.41.0.255.g8b1d071c50-goog >