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Message-ID: <tencent_9B1C89E61B915A91AD05B04A0F5D8501D407@qq.com>
From:   Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>
To:     crope@iki.fi
Cc:     mchehab@kernel.org, linux-media@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH]  media: anysee: fix null-ptr-deref in anysee_master_xfer
Date:   Sun,  9 Jul 2023 00:02:20 +0800
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In anysee_master_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf
is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be
passed. Malicious data finally reach anysee_master_xfer. If accessing
msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen.
We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.

Similar commit:
commit 0ed554fd769a
("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")

Signed-off-by: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>
---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/anysee.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/anysee.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/anysee.c
index aa45b5d263f6..12c16f09a808 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/anysee.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/anysee.c
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static int anysee_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg *msg,
 
 	while (i < num) {
 		if (num > i + 1 && (msg[i+1].flags & I2C_M_RD)) {
-			if (msg[i].len > 2 || msg[i+1].len > 60) {
+			if (msg[i].len != 2 || msg[i+1].len > 60) {
 				ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 				break;
 			}
-- 
2.30.2