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Message-ID: <6173db54e3d75481a6b1f1079c5b06e1c1caf564.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] integrity: Always reference the blacklist keyring
 with apprasial
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To:     Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc:     dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org,
        serge@hallyn.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com,
        kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, konrad.wilk@oracle.com,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Date:   Wed, 12 Jul 2023 13:40:33 -0400
In-Reply-To: <20230705225229.1435691-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
References: <20230705225229.1435691-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
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On Wed, 2023-07-05 at 18:52 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> Commit 273df864cf746 ("ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with
> modsig") introduced an appraise_flag option for referencing the blacklist
> keyring.  Any matching binary found on this keyring fails signature
> validation. This flag only works with module appended signatures.
> 
> An important part of a PKI infrastructure is to have the ability to do
> revocation at a later time should a vulnerability be found.  Expand the
> revocation flag usage to all appraisal functions. The flag is now
> enabled by default. Setting the flag with an IMA policy has been
> deprecated. Without a revocation capability like this in place, only
> authenticity can be maintained. With this change, integrity can now be
> achieved with digital signature based IMA appraisal.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>

Thanks, Eric.  Other than including "appraise_flag=check_blacklist"
when displaying the measurement list, it looks good.
-- 
thanks,

Mimi